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Abstract 
This thesis considers whether the legal recognition of non-conjugal relationships 
in New Zealand should be improved; particularly by extending them the rights 
and responsibilities of marital and marriage-like (conjugal) relationships.  For 
the purpose of this thesis, “non-conjugal” relationships are close, caring platonic 
relationships where people share their lives to a significant degree.   
 
Over the last decade, there has been a trend toward extending the legal 
consequences of marriage to non-conjugal relationships in countries such as 
Australia, Canada and the United States.  At the same time, the distinction 
between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships has been destabilised, due to 
the de-emphasis of sexual intimacy as a criterion for recognising marriage-like 
relationships.   
 
This thesis considers whether the marriage model should be extended to include 
certain non-conjugal relationships in New Zealand, as it has been overseas.  It is 
clear that non-conjugal relationships can exhibit many of the features associated 
with conjugal relationships, as demonstrated by the high profile Burden sisters' 
case in the United Kingdom.  These include characteristics such as long-term 
cohabitation, caring, commitment and interdependency.  However, non-conjugal 
relationships typically exhibit these features to a lesser degree, which means 
that they may have different needs and require different support from the state.   
 
Ultimately, this thesis recommends against extending the marriage model to 
non-conjugal relationships for a number of reasons, including that the marriage 
model does not appear to respond adequately to the needs or living 
arrangements of people in non-conjugal relationships.  However, this thesis also 
suggests that non-conjugal relationships in New Zealand can benefit from legal 
recognition in some cases.  Aside from human rights considerations, the state 
has an interest in promoting these relationships due to their contribution to 
social cohesion and informal caregiving.  As such, this thesis recommends a 
new framework for recognising personal relationships that also allows for non-
conjugal relationships in New Zealand to be supported and promoted by the 
law, where appropriate. 
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 46,722 words. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO NON-CONJUGAL 
RELATIONSHIPS AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES FOR RECOGNISING 
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
I Introduction 
Joyce and Sybil have been together for many years.  They live in the 
English countryside, in a house they jointly own.  They describe their 
relationship as caring, sharing, committed and interdependent.  In fact, they 
consider their relationship as much of an expression of self-determination and 
personal development as if they were joined in marriage.  Their expectation is 
of a lifelong partnership. 
Given this, each woman, in the event that she might be the one who dies 
first, has willed her share of their home to the other.  This is a common legal 
arrangement among married couples.  However, unlike a widow, the surviving 
woman will be subject to a crippling inheritance tax bill under British law.  To 
pay this bill, she will be forced to sell the family home. 
Joyce and Sybil consider this inequitable and a breach of their human 
rights.  For this reason, in the words of the BBC, the two women, “…have 
written to the Chancellor of the Exchequer the day before every Budget since 
1976, pleading for recognition under the tax rules as a cohabiting couple.”1   
Earlier this decade, it appeared that the women’s pleas might be 
answered through the Civil Partnership Bill (UK).  This Bill was amended in 
2004 by the House of Lords to extend many of the rights and obligations of 
married couples to same-sex cohabitees in Joyce and Sybil’s position (including 
an exemption from inheritance tax).2  However, at the penultimate moment, this 
amendment was removed by the House of Commons, even though the 
                                                
1 “Q&A: The Burdens’ inheritance tax” BBC News (London, 29 April 2008). 
2 (22 April 2004) 662 GBPD HL 1362. 
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fundamental purpose of the Bill was to address inequities between married and 
same-sex couples.3   
Why?  Because Joyce and Sybil are not a same-sex couple in the 
ordinary sense of these words.  They are sisters.  The purpose of the deleted 
amendment was to allow long-term cohabiting siblings, such as Joyce and Sybil 
Burden, to enter into a civil partnership in the same way that a same-sex couple 
can now do so under the Civil Partnership Act 2004.   
The Burden sisters enjoy what is known as a “non-conjugal” 
relationship.  The term “non-conjugal relationship” is used by academics and 
legal commentators to refer to adult personal relationships that are platonic, but 
are, nonetheless, very close.  Non-conjugal relationships can include 
relationships such as those between adult siblings, an adult child and their 
parent, extended family members, or two very close friends who have lived 
together for many decades and share their lives to a significant degree.  The 
term is therefore adopted in this thesis.   
In contrast, a “conjugal” relationship is essentially a marital or marriage-
like relationship.  In New Zealand, marriage-like relationships are civil unions 
entered into under the Civil Union Act 2004, or de facto relationships, which are 
also recognised by the law.  The idea that the law should treat two siblings the 
same as it treats married couples is fairly novel and has not been considered by 
lawmakers in New Zealand.  However, in parts of Australia, Canada and the 
United States of America, the law has been reformed to recognise relationships 
like that between the Burden sisters in a similar way to married couples.   
This recent trend is said to reflect the fact that non-conjugal relationships 
are so important to our wellbeing that the law rightly affords them the same 
privileges as it affords to conjugal relationships.  They are important because 
they exhibit the same desirable features we associate, ideally, with conjugal 
relationships.  For example, emotional and financial support, caring and 
commitment.  This raises the question of what support people in non-conjugal 
                                                
3 (12 October 2004) 425 GBPD HC 251. 
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relationships should receive from the state and whether such relationships 
should be supported and promoted in the same way as conjugal relationships.   
New Zealand has not experienced a test case similar to that of the 
Burden sisters and conjugality remains a key means of demarcating 
relationships for an array of legal purposes.  However, New Zealand already 
affords some limited legal recognition to close non-conjugal relationships, such 
as for the purposes of domestic violence.  These instances, while discrete, 
respond to a recognised need for the state to support a wider range of personal 
relationships than simply those that are conjugal.   
But are these measures sufficient?  What legal problems do people in 
non-conjugal relationships face?  What criteria are used to decide which of our 
personal relationships should be recognised?  Are these criteria appropriate in a 
free and democratic society?  What are the options for recognising non-conjugal 
relationships and what sort of non-conjugal relationships should be recognised?  
Can even friendship have legal consequences?  The purpose of this thesis is to 
consider whether New Zealand law should recognise non-conjugal relationships 
in the same way that it recognises conjugal relationships.4  It seeks to determine 
whether people in conjugal relationships enjoy legal privileges that should be 
extended to other caring relationships. 
Ultimately this thesis argues against recognising non-conjugal 
relationships in the same way as marriage or marriage-like relationships, either 
by allowing non-conjugal relationships to be registered for this purpose or by 
imposing rights and obligations on non-conjugal relationships.  The marriage 
model was not designed to apply to non-conjugal relationships and does not 
appear well suited to what is known of the needs and living arrangements of 
people in most non-conjugal relationships.  However, this thesis also considers 
                                                
4 Conjugal relationships include both marriage and marriage-like relationships (civil unions and 
de facto relationships).  Note that in New Zealand there are a few outstanding areas where 
marriage is treated differently from marriage-like relationships, such as adoption and the laws of 
evidence.  See Dean R Knight “State of the (Civil) Union: Assessing the Legal Significance of 
the Civil Union Act 2004 and Relationships Bill 2005” (paper presented to Lesbian and Gay 
Archives New Zealand Conference, Wellington, December 2006), but see Re AMM & KJO HC 
Wellington CIV 2010-485-328, 17 May 2010, where the High Court ruled that unmarried 
heterosexual couples could adopt under the Adoption Act 1955.   
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whether the law should treat non-conjugal relationships differently than it 
currently does, and if so, how and for what purposes?   
This thesis concludes that the Burden sisters’ case has shown that it is 
unfair to treat non-conjugal relationships differently from conjugal relationships 
for certain legal purposes, though not necessarily for all legal purposes.  
However, New Zealand does not have an overall policy that clearly signals why 
or when one personal relationship should be treated differently from another.  
For this reason, this thesis proposes a new framework to assist policymakers to 
identify what relationships are relevant when undertaking law reform that 
affects our personal relationships.  This will ensure that non-conjugal 
relationships receive appropriate legal recognition. 
II Structure of Thesis 
This thesis advances an argument for better legal recognition of non-
conjugal relationships on the basis that a distinction between conjugal and non-
conjugal relationships cannot always be justified and that non-conjugal 
relationships should also be supported and promoted by the state.  To develop 
this argument, the thesis is structured as follows.  
Chapter One introduces the topic and explores why we might ask 
questions about the legal recognition of non-conjugal relationships.  It then 
proposes some core criteria for assessing schemes for recognising close 
personal adult relationships, based primarily on those proposed in a report on 
the recognition of non-conjugal relationships by the Law Commission of 
Canada.5  It is suggested that these criteria should guide the development of 
future laws that affect close personal adult relationships.   
Chapter Two develops an understanding of the concepts of conjugality 
and non-conjugality, drawing on both legal and social science perspectives.  The 
chapter focuses on exploring the use of conjugality as a legal marker for 
recognising relationships.  It is impossible to understand non-conjugality 
without first understanding conjugality, as the two concepts are in binary 
                                                
5 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and supporting close personal 
adult relationships (2001) at 13. 
 5 
opposition, and non-conjugality would not exist without conjugality.  As part of 
this discussion, this chapter also considers the Burden sisters’ case and how the 
state benefits from the formation and maintenance of a variety of close personal 
relationships. 
Chapter Three introduces the legal models that are used to recognise 
close personal relationships. 
Chapter Four canvasses and critiques a range of overseas approaches to 
comprehensively recognising non-conjugal relationships. 
Chapter Five considers whether the marriage model in New Zealand 
should be extended to include non-conjugal relationships, concluding that, on 
balance, it should not be extended.  However, it is suggested that there are areas 
in which New Zealand law could better recognise non-conjugal relationships for 
particular purposes.  The chapter concludes by proposing alternative options for 
reform, in particular, the establishment of a new framework to assist 
policymakers determine which personal relationships are relevant to a particular 
law.   
The Burden sisters’ real-life situation is referred to throughout this thesis 
as a practical example of an important non-conjugal relationship to ground 
discussion and test analysis and proposals.   
III Setting the Scene 
What has been driving legal commentators and legislatures in countries 
such as Canada and Australia to support extending legal recognition to non-
conjugal relationships on a similar basis as to marriage?  This introductory 
chapter sets out some of the basic matters that underlie this inquiry.  This 
includes some preliminary information about the Burden sisters’ case, other 
examples of legal issues that those in non-conjugal relationships might face, 
some examples of where New Zealand law already recognises non-conjugal 
relationships and some demographic information about non-conjugal 
relationships.   
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One of the conclusions that this chapter draws is that there is limited 
demographic information available about non-conjugal relationships, mainly 
because population censuses are not designed to gather this information.  
However, despite the lack of information, there are compelling reasons to 
consider whether non-conjugal relationships should receive increased legal 
recognition.   
This chapter also identifies a set of fundamental principles to guide the 
recognition of personal relationships in New Zealand.  It adopts the principles 
suggested by the Law Commission of Canada in its seminal report Beyond 
Conjugality,
6
 with some adjustments.   This report aims to provide a 
comprehensive and principled approach to the legal recognition of close 
personal relationships (including both conjugal and non-conjugal relationships).     
A What Are Non-Conjugal Relationships?  
At first glance, non-conjugal relationships do not appear similar to 
conjugal relationships.  Non-conjugal relationships are diverse and can include 
relationships between senior citizens, adult children with their parents, adult 
siblings, friends, caregivers, extended family members or people who share a 
home (other than spouses or partners).  There are even documented cases of 
boarders living with older couples for many decades and legal disputes arising 
from this sustained period of intimate living.7   
As a lengthy period of cohabitation would suggest, non-conjugal 
relationships of interest to the law also tend to involve a significant degree of 
closeness or intimacy.  This, in turn, may reflect the presence of certain other 
characteristics, such as emotional and financial interdependency or caring and 
commitment.  If we look again at the situation of Joyce and Sybil Burden, we 
can see a real example of this type of relationship and how the law impacts on 
it. 
                                                
6 Ibid. 
7 See John Eekelaar and Mavis Maclean “Marriage and the Moral Bases of Personal 
Relationships” (2004) 31 JLS 510 at 536. 
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Burden v United Kingdom was a case that went before the European 
Court of Human Rights and the Grand Chamber of the Court on appeal.8  The 
case involved two elderly sisters (both in their late eighties) who had lived 
together from birth.  The sisters claimed that they were discriminated against 
and should be treated the same way as married couples and civil union partners 
because they had lived together in a “committed and mutually supportive 
relationship, all their lives.”
9
     
For the past thirty years the sisters had also lived in the family home 
which they inherited from their parents.  Each sister had cared for the other and 
had made a will leaving all her property to the other sister.  When one of the 
sisters died, however, under the Inheritance Tax Act 1984 (UK), the surviving 
sister would have to pay a tax bill of 40 per cent of the value of the deceased 
sister’s property (at the time, this was likely to amount to a sum of over 
₤285,000).  It was considered likely that the surviving sister would have to sell 
her home in order to pay the tax.  
The sisters alleged that they were discriminated against because spouses 
and civil partners are both exempted from inheritance tax (the latter under the 
Civil Partnership Act 2004), being treated as a single economic unit for 
inheritance tax purposes.10  In the first instance, the sisters brought a complaint 
before the European Court of Human Rights where judgment was delivered on 
12 December 2006.
11
  The Court found, 4-3, in favour of the British 
Government.  The sisters then appealed to the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights, which delivered its judgment, also in favour of the 
British Government, 15-2, on 29 April 2008.
12
  The arguments of the parties and 
                                                
8 Burden v United Kingdom (2006) 21 BHRC 640 (Section IV, ECHR); Burden v United 
Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 857 (Grand Chamber, ECHR). 
9 Burden (Grand Chamber), ibid, at 859. 
10 The sisters lodged a complaint under Article 14 (freedom from discrimination) of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, taken in 
conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (entitlement to peaceful enjoyment of possessions) 
of the Convention. 
11 Burden (Section IV), above n 8, at 656. 
12 Burden (Grand Chamber), above n 8, at 877. 
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the majority and dissenting judges will be explored in Chapter Two.  At this 
point it should be observed that, as Welstead suggests:13 
The story of two unmarried elderly women, the Burden sisters, who had lived 
together for the whole of their lives in a loving, mutually supportive relationship 
and their unsuccessful application to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) alleging discriminatory treatment, serves as a reminder that there is one 
category of family members whose needs have been largely ignored by the law 
… The ECHR’s ruling in favour of the UK Government is a perfect illustration 
of the failure of the law to address the problems faced by consanguineal couples 
who live together in close, loyal and caring relationships. Not only do they have 
no recourse to most of the familial rights available to those who are married or 
who live with a civil partner, they are also denied many of the lesser rights 
given to cohabitants. 
B The Legal Recognition of Non-Conjugal Relationships: Why is This 
an Important Issue? 
The Burden sisters’ case focussed on inheritance tax, but this is only one 
of many examples of why legal recognition may matter for non-conjugal 
relationships.  In a report considering the recognition of non-conjugal 
relationships, the British Columbia Law Institute suggests that relationship 
status is important for a wide variety of legal matters.14  These include 
employment, protection of the elderly, healthcare, taxation, social assistance, 
compensation for personal injury upon death and other survivor benefits, 
insurance and wills and succession. 
However, a high level description is not sufficient to understand the 
problems those in non-conjugal relationships such as the Burden sisters may 
face.  Anderson expresses a concern that using “language that maintains a level 
of generality conceals the human dimension of the issues in question.”15  He 
suggests focusing on the specifics of individual circumstances in order to 
understand the defects of the law.  While Anderson’s comments were made 
primarily in relation to the exclusion of certain marriage-like relationships from 
                                                
13 Mary Welstead “England and Wales: The Family the Law Forgot” in Bill Atkin (ed) The 
International Survey of Family Law 2010 Edition (Jordans, Bristol, 2010) 113 at 113. 
14 British Columbia Law Institute Report on Recognition of Spousal and Family Status (1999). 
15 Thomas G Anderson “Comment on the Report of the British Columbia Law Institute on 
Recognition of Spousal and Family Status” (2000) 12 CJWL 439 at 444. 
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legal recognition, they are also relevant to consideration of the legal status of 
non-conjugal relationships.   
Employment benefits are a helpful example.  These benefits could 
include medical and dental care, pension and life insurance plans, bereavement 
leave, sick leave, maternity and parental leave, and leave to take care of a sick 
family member.  But who do these financial and non-financial employment 
benefits cover?  Imagine a scenario where, prior to retirement, one of the 
Burden sisters was in employment where employees could take domestic leave 
to take care of a sick spouse or child.  Could she have taken domestic leave to 
take care of her sick sister if needed?  Could she also have nominated her sister, 
rather than a spouse, to be part of an extended medical care or insurance policy, 
or to receive survivor benefits?  
These questions are not limited to the employment sphere.  For example, 
if one of the sisters were killed in a car accident, would the other have a right to 
compensation?  What if an important choice was required in relation to 
healthcare where one sister was incapacitated and could not make a decision?  
What if one of the sisters had been sponsored to immigrate to and work in 
another country?  Could the other travel with her?  What if one of the sisters 
decided to leave the other out of her will, despite sharing a home, possessions 
and lives for so many decades?  Such questions form the basis for the following 
chapters.   
C The Demographics of Non-Conjugal Relationships: How Common 
Are They? 
There is little demographic information available about the nature and 
incidence of non-conjugal relationships.  In 2006, the Irish Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform published an options paper on domestic partnerships 
which found that:16 
There is very little research in Ireland or elsewhere on non-conjugal 
relationships … In the absence of research material, and in view of the dearth of 
submissions made, the Working Group found it difficult to consider in any 
                                                
16 The Working Group on Domestic Partnership Options Paper (November 2006) at 57. 
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depth the nature of the diverse relationships in this category and the options for 
and consequences of according legal recognition. 
The paper noted, however, that the 2002 Irish Census identified 53,000 
non-family households containing no related persons (153,000 people in total) 
and 39,000 non-family households containing related persons (93,000 people in 
total).17  While the precise living arrangements of people within these 
households were unknown, the number of non-family households, with or 
without related persons, was significant. 
A similar picture is created by the population censuses in other 
jurisdictions.  Barbara Stark writes of Canada that:18  
A substantial minority of households involve adults living alone, lone-parent 
families or adults living in non-conjugal relationships.  Households centred 
around a conjugal relationship may also include other adults with no conjugal 
ties to the couple, such as relatives or close friends.  In addition, adult children 
are often returning home to live with their parents, principally for financial 
reasons caused by unemployment or the need to complete their education. 
The concept of the economic family encompasses all relatives living in the same 
household, regardless of how they are related.  Adult siblings living together 
form the largest component of this group.  We know little about non-conjugal 
relationships between non-relatives … Many aging baby-boomers will spend a 
significant part of their senior years alone. Many will live with relatives or 
friends in non-conjugal relationships. Increasingly, both married and unmarried 
adults are serving as primary caregivers for aging and infirm parents or other 
relatives.  Many people live in extended-family households … 
The Law Commission of Canada observes that there have always been a 
variety of alternative family living arrangements in Canada, such as adult 
siblings sharing a home.19  However, the Commission notes that:20 
Many non-conjugal relationships are still largely invisible in mainstream social 
science research.  As well, we have only limited information about relationship 
                                                
17 Ibid. 
18 Barbara Stark International Family Law: An Introduction (Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hants 
(England), 2005) at 42. 
19 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality, above n 5, at ix. 
20 Ibid. 
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where adults are economically, emotionally and even physically interdependent, 
but do not share a residence. 
Similarly, there is little statistical or qualitative information about non-
conjugal relationships in New Zealand.  The New Zealand Population Census 
does not collect this information, although the Census gathers data on 
households.  A household analysis does not capture significant relationships 
outside the household or the nature of the relationships between household 
members, such as whether their lives, finances and possessions are shared or 
separate.  The focus of the Census is on family relationships within households, 
where a family is defined as a couple or a parent and a child.   
Nonetheless, Statistics New Zealand has projected that one-person 
households will increase by 46 per cent from 333,000 in 2001 to 480,000 in 
2021 and that people will be more likely to live by themselves or with people 
who are not their relatives.
21
  Relevant social patterns identified by Statistics 
New Zealand include changes in the rates of partnership formation (including 
repartnering and dissolution), the propensity of young adults to stay in the 
parental home, the propensity and ability of people to live alone, and the 
presence of other relatives (such as members of the extended family) and non-
relatives (such as boarders) in a household.22  These changes in living 
arrangements over time prompted Statistics New Zealand to undertake a review 
in 2008 which found that:23 
Historically, New Zealand and international official family statistics are bound 
by the use of the household as the measurement entity, and the underlying 
family nucleus concept.  It is now widely recognised that the household may be 
a less useful boundary for family-centred analysis and policy provision than it 
was in the past. 
The review recommended a new framework to allow the Census to 
collect information on a more detailed range of family types as well as social 
                                                
21 Statistics New Zealand National Family and Household Projections: 2001 (base) - 2021 
Update (2005).  
22 Statistics New Zealand Subnational Family and Household Projections: 2006(base) – 2031 
(2009). 
23 Statistics New Zealand Report of the Review of Official Family Statistics (2008) at 9. 
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and economic support across households.
24
  The review also recommended 
improving definitions and the collection of data on shared living arrangements, 
reviewing the ability to distinguish types of social and economic support, and 
the development of a survey about families focused on family structure and 
support arrangements.  However, no further work has been undertaken to date. 
The limited demographic data makes it difficult to understand the nature 
and extent of non-conjugal relationships.  It also makes it difficult to assess the 
potential impact of future policy changes in this area.  This gap in research does 
not look likely to be remedied in the near future.  However, as society continues 
to evolve and family forms diversify, with more people living in non-traditional 
households and a trend away from living in conjugal relationships, the need for 
this type of data will become more apparent.  In the meantime, sociological 
research may offer the best source of information about non-conjugal 
relationships.  For example, caring beyond the nuclear family has been 
considered by the Australian Institute of Family Studies as part of a series of 
articles on the needs of carers.25   
D Examples of Non-Conjugal Relationships Already Recognised by New 
Zealand Law  
In overseas countries, the extension of comprehensive rights to non-
conjugal relationships has taken place in environments where, prior to reform, 
both non-conjugal relationships and non-traditional conjugal relationships were 
not typically recognised by the law.26  However, New Zealand law already 
recognises non-conjugal relationships for particular purposes, though in some 
cases, this did not occur until after reform of the law relating to same-sex and de 
facto relationships.  Some of these statutory examples are identified below.  
A quick search reveals that terms such as “relative”, “family”, “sister”, 
“brother”, “parent” and so on occur hundreds of times on the New Zealand 
                                                
24 Ibid. 
25 Darryl Higgens “Families caring: Diverse care work of families in Australia” (2007) 76 FM 1 
at 6. 
26 For example, legislation was passed in the Canadian province of Alberta and in Tasmania in 
Australia in the midst of debate on how and whether to recognise same and opposite-sex de 
facto relationships (although Alberta recognised heterosexual de facto relationships prior to the 
introduction of a registration scheme for both conjugal and non-conjugal relationships).   
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statute book and for many different purposes.  The term “relative” is often used 
to include many different family relationships.  For example, the Human Rights 
Act 1993 defines “relative” as “any person who is related to the person by 
blood, marriage, civil union, de facto relationship, affinity or adoption; or is 
wholly or mainly dependent on the person; or who is a member of the person’s 
household”.27   Discrimination on this ground is illegal.  A “near relative” under 
the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 means a 
“grandparent, aunt, uncle, brother, or sister; and includes a brother or sister of 
the half-blood as well as of the full-blood.”28   Section 10 of the Human Tissue 
Act 2008 defines “close available relative” differently depending on whether the 
person in question is under 16 years or not, excludes grandparents from its 
ambit and includes guardians of children under 16.  These examples show that 
recognition may be limited to certain blood relatives or it may be extended to 
include a wider range of family members, including people not related by blood. 
Definitions relating to family relationships are continually evolving in 
New Zealand in order to take account of changing social and cultural norms.29  
The term “family” itself is an example of this trend.  For example, s 4 of the 
Prisoners’ and Victims’ Claims Act 2005 defines “immediate family, in relation 
to a victim” as “a member of the victim's family, whanau, or other culturally 
recognised family group, who is in a close relationship with the victim at the 
time of the offence”.  Section 3 of the Corrections Act 2004 defines a person’s 
family to include a person’s “family group”, among other relationships.  
“Family group” means: 
… a family group or extended family: in which there is at least one adult 
member with whom the person has a biological or legal relationship, or to 
whom the person has a significant psychological attachment; or that is the 
person’s whanau or other culturally recognised family group. 
The term “friend” also appears on the statute book, although friends are 
not subject to such extension recognition as traditional family members.  For 
example, under s 18(4) of the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Act 1966, in 
                                                
27 Human Rights Act 1993, s 2. 
28 Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989, s 2. 
29 Families Commission Family Centred Communities (2009) at 9. 
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ordering the release of a patient, a judge can take into account the fact that any 
relative or friend is willing to take care of the patient.  Similarly, under s 27 of 
the Domestic Violence Act 1995, a relative or friend can supervise contact 
between a respondent and a child.  Under the Mental Health Act 1993, a relative 
or friend can be named in a register so that they receive notice of the death of a 
patient under the Act as soon as practicable.  In terms of the right of review of 
those in residential care under the Disabled Persons Community Welfare Act 
1975, s 25B also allows a close relative (which includes a spouse or partner) to 
bring a review. 
Under s 51 of the Burial and Cremation Act 1964, relatives and 
“friends” also have particular rights with respect to an application to remove a 
body from a closed cemetery to a cemetery that is not closed (anyone can apply 
for a licence to do so, but fees are waived for relatives and friends who do so, 
where a licence is granted).  The term “friendship” no longer appears on the 
statute book, but in the past, has occurred in legislation such as the Disabled 
Persons Community Welfare Act 1975 (prior to repeal, former s 5 allowed 
grants for incorporating essential features in homes to take into account the 
permanency, by reason of any blood or marriage relationship or friendship or 
other circumstances, of any link between the disabled person and the person 
who was caring for him or her in the home). 
Some specific legal categories of relationship have also been created to 
recognise close personal relationships between adults.  In New Zealand, the 
best-known example is perhaps “domestic relationship” in the Domestic 
Violence Act 1995.  Under this Act, a person may apply for a protection order 
against someone with whom they are in a domestic relationship.30  The term 
“domestic relationship” encompasses a wide variety of personal relationships, 
including people who ordinarily share a household and people who are in a 
“close personal relationship”.31   
                                                
30 Domestic Violence Act 1995, s 7.  A protection order is a court order made by the Family Court 
of New Zealand.  A protection order identifies a person who has been violent and orders that they 
must not be violent toward the person who applied for the order or that person’s children.  It also 
prevents the person who has been violent from contacting the person who applied for the order or 
that person’s children, unless that person agrees. 
31 Ibid, s 4. 
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Section 4(3) of the Act indicates that a close personal relationship can 
exist between employers and employees and s 4(4) sets out some non-
exhaustive factors that may be used to determine whether a close personal 
relationship exists.  These include the nature and intensity of the relationship (in 
particular, the amount of time spent together, the places where that time is 
ordinarily spent and the manner in which that time is ordinarily spent) and the 
duration of the relationship.  It also expressly provides that it is not necessary 
that there also be a sexual relationship.  This definition of domestic relationship 
has some application outside of the Domestic Violence Act 1995, as it is also 
used with respect to conditions that may be imposed on bail under s 21 of the 
Bail Act 2000 (such as non-association conditions) and is referred to in s 9 of 
the Harassment Act 1997.32 
The New Zealand statute book also applies certain credit contract and 
income tax provisions to a person for whom another person “has natural love 
and affection”.
33
  For example, under the Credit Contracts and Consumer 
Finance Act 2003 a family trust is defined to include a trust that is established 
primarily to benefit “a natural person for whom the settlor has natural love and 
affection.”  Section 3 of the Coroners Act 2006 recognises the “the cultural and 
spiritual needs of family of, and of others who were in a close relationship to, a 
person who has died.”  The Victims Rights’ Act, the Sentencing Act 2002, the 
Human Tissue Act 2008 and the Prisoners’ and Victims’ Claims Act 2005 also 
recognise a “close relationship”.  
As the examples above may suggest, the recognition of non-conjugal 
personal adult relationships in New Zealand is somewhat piecemeal, lacking a 
degree of coherence.  A single right or responsibility (such as protection from 
domestic violence) tends to attach to a particular type of non-conjugal 
relationship (such as a domestic relationship), rather than a range of rights and 
responsibilities based on thorough consideration of the needs and obligations of 
                                                
32 The Harassment Act 1997 allows a person to seek a restraining order.  A restraining order 
legally prevents a person named in the order from contacting the person seeking the order.  
Protection orders and harassment orders are intended to be mutually exclusive although 
different criteria apply for seeking the orders. 
33 Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003, s 5.  See also various provisions in the 
Income Tax Act 2007 and the Tax Administration Act 1994. 
 16 
people in certain non-conjugal relationships.   This contrasts with the clear and 
comprehensive package of rights and responsibilities that attach to marital and 
marriage-like relationships.   
The approach taken to defining family and other relationships of 
friendship also appears haphazard.  For example, in some cases, family is 
limited to blood or adoptive relationships, such as under the Family Protection 
Act 1955.  In others, it is limited to certain classes of relatives, for example, 
half-siblings and uncles and aunts may be excluded even where a list is not 
confined to immediate family members.  In other instances they are included.  
Similarly, “relative” can be defined narrowly or widely.  Under s 9 of 
the Alcoholism and Drug Addition Act 1966, “relative”, in relation to an alleged 
alcoholic, is defined to mean a spouse, civil union partner or de facto partner; a 
parent, grandparent, sibling, half-sibling, child, grandchild, or step-child; or a 
step-parent who shares responsibility for day-to-day care of the person.  
However, under s 11 of the Adult Adoption Information Act 1985, relative 
means “a person who is by blood the grandparent, parent, child, grandchild, or 
(whether of the whole or half blood) brother, sister, or cousin, of that other 
person.”  
In other pieces of legislation, such as the Families Commission Act 2003 
and the Children Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989, the concept of 
family is very diverse.  For example, s 10 of the Families Commission Act 
states that family includes a group of people related by marriage, civil union, 
blood, or adoption, an extended family, 2 or more persons living together as a 
family, and a whanau or other culturally recognised family group.  This does not 
mean that it is inadvisable to have differing definitions of family and other close 
personal relationships in different statutes.  However, there does not appear to 
be a considered approach to deciding which definition is appropriate for a 
particular legal purpose. 
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E Recognising Non-Conjugal Relationships - the Human Rights 
Dimension 
The previous sections showed that while non-conjugal relationships may 
already be recognised by the law, they are not well recognised in national 
statistical data.  Much of the argument in favour of recognising non-conjugal 
relationships relies on human rights principles. 
Human rights are becoming increasingly important in family law to 
resolve difficult legal issues.  The Burden sisters called on principles of equality 
before the law and British and European Human Rights legislation to support 
their claim.  Similarly, the academic literature on recognising non-conjugal 
relationships points to human rights as the primary impetus for extending legal 
recognition to non-conjugal relationships.
34
  Nayar suggests that human rights 
are based on:35 
… those components, qualitatively articulated, which are identified as the 
universally relevant constituents of what is understood as “human life”, 
irrespective of the rich diversity of humanity, which when satisfied within 
specific social contexts give meaning to a distinctly human life. 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 was enacted to affirm, protect, 
and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand.  The Act 
sets out a variety of human rights that are protected.  Section 19(1) provides that 
“Everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of 
discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993.”  Section 21(l) of the Human 
Rights Act provides that family status is a prohibited ground of discrimination.  
In addition to marriage and marriage-like relationships, as mentioned above, 
family status also includes being a relative of a particular person.36 
Calls for non-discrimination against those in both conjugal and non-
conjugal relationships have accompanied the clamour for reform of the law 
relating to adult personal relationships.  However, it should be noted that many 
who advocate that recognition of non-conjugal relationships should be on a par 
                                                
34 See generally Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality, above n 5. 
35 R Jayakumar Nayar “Not another Theory of Human Rights” in C Gearty and A Tomkins (eds) 
Understanding Human Rights (Continuum, London, 2000) at 187. 
36 There do not appear to be any cases exploring the meaning of “relative”. 
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with conjugal relationships do not support the explicit recognition of same-sex 
relationships.37  Nonetheless, human rights values should underpin the 
recognition of personal relationships in New Zealand.   
IV Principles for Recognising Personal Relationships 
The final task for this chapter is to establish some core criteria that may 
be used as a basis to evaluate the recognition of close personal adult 
relationships (both conjugal and non-conjugal relationships).  This thesis largely 
adopts the constitutional and human rights principles set out by the Law 
Commission of Canada in Beyond Conjugality.38  The Law Commission 
suggests that equality and autonomy are the “fundamental values [which] ought 
to guide the development of government policies that have an impact on close 
personal adult relationships.39  The Law Commission also observes that: 
… there are a number of other important principles and values that must be 
respected in order to enhance equality and autonomy in the area of close 
personal adult relationships; these include personal security, privacy, freedom of 
conscience and religion, coherence and efficiency. 
The British Columbia Law Institute also advocates a series of similar 
principles to guide the recognition of personal relationships in British 
Columbia.
40
  These include the principle of voluntariness and the principle of 
the protection of reasonable expectations.  
This thesis suggests that the two overarching principles that should 
guide relationship recognition are equality and autonomy.  These principles 
should be given priority unless there are compelling reasons for prioritising 
others.  The other important principles identified below are personal security 
and protection of the vulnerable; freedom of conscience, thought, and religion; 
the protection of reasonable expectations; and other principles of good public 
policy design, namely efficiency, coherence and certainty.   It is inevitable that 
                                                
37 This observation will be explored thoroughly in Chapter Four, which considers the overseas 
regimes that have been established to recognise non-conjugal relationships and the rationales for 
establishing these schemes.   
38 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality, above n 5. 
39 Ibid, at 113. 
40 British Columbia Law Institute Spousal and Family Status, above n 14, at 2-3. 
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some of the principles identified compete with each other.  Some favour 
individualisation, while others favour protection and equality values.  
Ultimately the weight accorded to each principle must be determined in the 
particular context. 
A Equality  
The Law Commission of Canada considers that equality is a basic value, 
enshrined in international human rights documents and the Canadian 
constitution.
41
  Equality is also a fundamental value in the New Zealand legal 
system as enshrined in the rule of law and the Human Rights Act 1993.  The 
Law Commission focuses on the following two types of equality: equality 
within relationships and equality between relationships.
42
   
Equality within relationships is about power imbalances in personal 
relationships.  For example, the subordination of women, persons with 
disabilities and other members of disadvantaged groups.  The principle of 
equality within relationships aims to address unequal distributions of income, 
wealth and power.    
Equality between relationships refers to respecting and promoting 
equality among different kinds of relationships.  When benefits are distributed 
inequitably, those denied their share subsidise the recipients.43  Governments 
are under increasing pressure to better align the law with social realities by 
acknowledging and respecting the diversity of a wide variety of close personal 
relationships.
44
  However, while governments can acknowledge the existence of 
diverse relationships, whether they should be treated in the same way is a 
complicated matter.   
One of the predominant issues raised in the same-sex marriage debate is 
whether same-sex relationships are qualitatively different from heterosexual 
marital relationships.  Ball suggests that an understanding of equality as treating 
similarly those who are similarly situated cannot be applied neutrally in the 
                                                
41 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality, above n 5, at 13. 
42 Ibid. 
43 British Columbia Law Institute Spousal and Family Status, above n 14, at 9. 
44 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality, above n 5, at 13. 
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context of relationship recognition.
 45
  This is because it is not possible for the 
state to determine whether one type of relationship is similarly situated to 
another without making judgements about the goodness and value of the 
relationships.  In Quilter v Attorney-General, the majority in the Court of 
Appeal did not consider that prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying 
amounted to unequal treatment, in accordance with community values.46   
In practice, this idea of “sameness” is determined by having regard to 
the functions a relationship serves.  Cossman and Ryder state that:47 
Pursuant to this approach, legal decision-makers seek to identify the basic 
dimensions and functions of a marital relationship, and then determine whether 
the relationship in question has a sufficient number of these features to qualify 
as a conjugal or marriage-like relationship. 
The drawback to this approach when it is applied as a legal test is that it 
requires an investigation into the intimate details of the lives of those under 
examination.  It also tends to involve comparisons against an idealised version 
of the marital relationship.   
Similar issues arise in determining whether non-conjugal relationships 
are similar to conjugal relationships, for all material purposes.  If they are not 
then it may be undesirable to treat them in the same way, particularly where this 
does not lead to an equal outcome.  
B Autonomy 
The Law Commission of Canada suggests that autonomy is “the 
freedom to choose whether and with whom to form close personal 
relationships” and is a fundamental value in free and democratic societies.48  In 
this context, Karst observes that it is “the choice to form and maintain an 
intimate association that permits full realization of the associational values we 
                                                
45 Carlos A Ball “Against Neutrality in the Legal Recognition of Intimate Relationships” (2008) 
9 GJGL 321 at 322. 
46 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523. 
47 Brenda Cossman and Bruce Ryder “What is Marriage-Like Like?  The Irrelevance of 
Conjugality” (2001) 18 Can J Fam L 269 at 286. 
48 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality, above n 5, at 13. 
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cherish most.”
49
  The British Columbia Law Institute calls for the protection of 
relationships based on personal choice and suggests that the state has a duty to 
avoid policies “that do not recognize people who live together as family outside 
of the traditional forms, or that prevent people from voluntarily assuming family 
rights, obligations and responsibilities among themselves.”50 
As this suggests, voluntariness is a key aspect of the principle of 
autonomy.
51
  In this respect, the Law Institute suggests that the law should not 
impose rights and obligations on people who live together unless they accept 
those obligations or another principle outweighs the principle of voluntariness, 
such as the protection of the vulnerable.
52
  To give effect to the principle of 
autonomy, laws must also be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the particular 
circumstances of individual relationships.53  However, flexibility in legislative 
design must often be traded off against coherence and clarity.  Notwithstanding 
these concerns, the principle of autonomy requires that, unless there is good 
justification, people should be able to choose the people with whom they form 
close relationships.   
C Other Important Principles 
1 Personal security and protecting the vulnerable 
Sometimes people may be unable to protect themselves from other 
people with whom they have a relationship.  This does not just include 
protection from physical violence, but may also include being subjected to 
economic hardship during the relationship or when it ends.  States have a 
responsibility to support the personal security of people in relationships, 
including their physical, psychological and emotional security.  This enhances 
the ability of individuals to make free and healthy choices to enter and leave 
relationships.   
                                                
49 Kenneth L Karst “The Freedom of Intimate Association” (1980) 89 Yale LJ 624 at 637.  Karst 
identifies these as companionship, caring, commitment, intimacy and self-realisation   
50 British Columbia Law Institute Spousal and Family Status, above n 14, at 5. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid, at 6. 
53 Ibid. 
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The Law Commission of Canada suggests that states should take steps to 
discourage abusive relationships and protect vulnerable partners.54  Where 
possible, people in these relationships should be offered the same legal 
protections that the community has agreed are necessary in more traditional 
family units so that one party cannot use the absence of legal regulation to the 
other’s detriment.  In such cases the principle of voluntariness must sometimes 
give way to the principle of protecting the vulnerable.  In this respect, Thomas 
observes that people do not always have an unfettered choice regarding their 
living arrangements (for example, they may not freely choose to cohabit rather 
than marry) and states should be prepared to accord recognition, where 
necessary, to protect the interests of people in such relationships.55 
2 Privacy 
Privacy is another fundamental value that states should have regard to 
when regulating close personal relationships.  The Law Commission of Canada 
suggests that healthy personal relationships are founded on “candour and trust” 
and that “they can flourish only if we are confident that our intimate thoughts 
and acts will not be revealed to others.”
56
  The Law Commission suggests that 
states should establish rules that prohibit intrusive examinations or forced 
disclosure of confidences, though privacy values must sometimes give way to 
objectives such as detecting and prosecuting crime.   
It should be noted that the principle of privacy does not equate to the 
traditional belief that the state should not interfere in the domestic realm.  
Houlgate expresses this as the position that if “an area of life is believed to be 
private, this is expressed by saying that the law ought not to intervene and/or 
enforce the corresponding moral obligation.”
57
  This approach tends to reinforce 
power imbalances and privilege traditional relationships over non-traditional 
relationships.  In fact, Houlgate observes that, in reality, the state:58 
                                                
54 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality, above n 5, at 19. 
55 Caroline A Thomas “the Roles of Registered Partnerships and Conjugality in Canadian 
Family Law” (2006) 22 CJFL 223 at 233. 
56 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality, above n 5, at 21. 
57 Laurence Houlgate “What is legal intervention in the family? Family law and family privacy” 
(1998) 17 Law and Phil 141 at 142. 
58 Ibid, at 158 
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… intervenes with a power-conferring or defining function of family law 
whenever it defines a pre-existing social practice, for example, as when the state 
imposes its own conditions and consequences of marriage on a previous existing 
religious or social practice of marriage. 
3 Religious freedom and freedom of conscience 
The Law Commission of Canada suggests that religious freedom and 
freedom of conscience should also be considered guiding principles.  Freedom 
of thought, conscience, and religion are enshrined in s 13 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990, which provides that “everyone has the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience, religion, and belief, including the right to adopt and hold 
opinions without interference.”  Section 13 should also be reflected in policies 
regarding the legal recognition of personal relationships.  Section 7 requires that 
where a Bill appears to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights, the Attorney-
General must “bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any 
provision in the Bill that appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and 
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights.” 
4 The protection of reasonable expectations 
The Law Commission of Canada does not consider the role of 
reasonable expectations in the design of relationship recognition schemes.  
However, the British Columbia Law Institute suggests that “one function of the 
law is to protect people’s reasonable expectations” with respect to how the law 
will treat their relationship.59  The Law Institute recommends that the law be 
required to protect reasonable expectations, so that it does not recognise some 
non-traditional relationships and not others, or else risk losing its legitimacy and 
force.   
As a corollary, it is also important not to legislate against reasonable 
expectations by imposing rights and responsibilities on people who do not want 
or expect to be subject to them.  Sometimes principles such as equality, 
autonomy and protecting the vulnerable may require an outcome that is 
unfavourable to one of the parties in a relationship.  However, it might be 
suggested that, in such cases, such expectations may not be reasonable. 
                                                
59 British Columbia Law Institute Spousal and Family Status, above n 14, at 7. 
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5 Other principles of good policy design: efficiency, coherence and 
clarity 
The Law Commission of Canada also advocates efficiency and 
coherence as two important principles underlying the recognition of personal 
relationships.60  These principles should inform the development of legal 
models for recognising relationships because they, along with the values 
identified above, are at the heart of modern policy design.  Stone suggests that 
“… policy is the rational attempt to attain objectives.”61  Stone identifies the 
central concepts of modern policy analysis as equity, efficiency, security and 
liberty, concepts which may be understood as goals as well as justifications, 
criteria, and standards.   
The Law Commission suggests that efficiency, in the context of 
relationship recognition, requires that the policy reach the intended 
beneficiaries.62  Efficiency also allows for the assessment of the merits of 
different ways of doing things and involves assessing how burdens and benefits 
are distributed, how we measure the value and costs of a policy, and what mode 
of organising human activity is likely to yield the most efficient results.63  There 
are fiscal implications of extending rights relating to state support to a wider 
group of people.  However, some rights and obligations do not require the 
allocation of scarce resources, such as protection from domestic violence.  
Coherence requires that laws for recognising relationships have clear 
objectives and that there is consistency between policies.  The Law Commission 
observes that “If the objectives of laws are not clear, or the design of laws does 
not line up with their stated objectives, then laws lack coherence”.
64
  It is also 
important that laws are certain so that people can assess whether and how a 
particular law impacts on their situation. 
                                                
60 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality, above n 5, at 21. 
61 Deborah Stone Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making (2nd ed, Norton & 
Company, New York, 2002) at 37. 
62 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality, above n 5, at 21. 
63 Stone, above n 61, at 38. 
64 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality, above n 5, at 23. 
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V Conclusion 
This chapter set out to introduce the concept of non-conjugality and why 
non-conjugal relationships are relevant to the law, despite a lack of 
demographic information about their nature and incidence.  It also advanced a 
set of principles, based on human rights values, to guide discussion about the 
recognition of non-conjugal relationships in the following chapters.   In sum, 
these principles suggest that people should be at liberty to determine their own 
living arrangements, at least where this aligns with legitimate state objectives 
and support systems in place.  In turn, the law should support them in doing so.  
This thesis now turns to explore the concepts of conjugality and non-
conjugality, and the use of conjugality as a legal marker. 
 
 
 
 
 26 
CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING CONJUGALITY AND 
NON-CONJUGALITY 
I Introduction 
Considerable legal consequences can hinge on the distinction that is 
made between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships, as has been highlighted 
by the Burden sisters’ plight and the substantial tax bill that one of the sisters 
will eventually be required to pay.  In considering this distinction, conjugality 
must be the initial focus of this chapter, as without conjugality, non-conjugality 
would not exist.  However, defining conjugality is not an easy task.  Cossman 
and Ryder write that:1 
Given the heavy legal freight the notion of conjugality has been asked to bear, 
one would think it would have been thoroughly investigated and its meaning 
clearly understood.  Yet, while debates have raged over the question of who the 
law should consider to be a spouse, the definition of conjugality remains 
elusive.   
Cossman and Ryder suggest that the difficulty with understanding 
conjugality is that the “presence or absence of a sexual component to a 
relationship has become immaterial to, or of declining relevance in, identifying 
conjugal relationships” and that this has led to an “increasing instability of the 
distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships.”2    
This chapter explores social and legal understandings of conjugality; in 
particular, how the law conceptualises conjugality through the institution of 
marriage as well as marriage-like relationships.  The chapter starts by 
considering the origins of the term, the social and legal understandings of 
marriage and how the social sciences distinguish conjugal relationships from 
close non-conjugal relationships. The chapter then considers the case of Burden 
v United Kingdom
3 and the legal criteria used to identify de facto relationships 
                                                
1 Brenda Cossman and Bruce Ryder “What is Marriage-Like Like?  The Irrelevance of 
Conjugality” (2001) 18 Can J Fam L 269 at 269. 
2 Ibid, at 270. 
3 Burden v United Kingdom (2006) 21 BHRC 640 (Section IV, ECHR); Burden v United 
Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 857 (Grand Chamber, ECHR). 
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in New Zealand, exploring how these could also apply to a non-conjugal 
relationship.  The chapter concludes that there is a basis for requiring that 
certain non-conjugal relationships be considered when lawmakers are 
developing laws that will affect personal relationships. 
II The Origins of “Conjugality” 
Conjugality began as a narrow concept that referred to marriage or sex 
within a marriage.  Bieliauskas writes that “If we try to look for a precise 
definition of conjugal 1ove, we find that etymologically these two concepts 
describe the phenomenon of love in marriage.”4  Similarly, the Oxford English 
Dictionary Online defines “conjugal” as “of or relating to marriage, 
matrimonial” or “of or pertaining to husband or wife in their relations to each 
other.”5 It also defines the verb “conjugalize” as “to marry” and notes that term 
“conjugalism” occurred in 1823 in a magazine article entitled “Conjugalism, or 
the Art of making a good Marriage.”6  The attestations in the Oxford English 
Dictionary also allude to the idea that conjugal relationships are of a special 
nature, for example, referring to conjugal rights as “the privilege which husband 
and wife have of each other's society, comfort, and affection.”7   
III Marriage and Conjugality 
Historically, marriage “has been regarded as the cornerstone of family 
life and thus as the basis for numerous ascribed rights and duties.”
8
   Marriage is 
used to structure tax systems and allocate social welfare benefits, among other 
important matters.  However, marriage was not originally a legal institution and 
neither the state nor religion played a role in marriage.
9
  Understandings of 
marriage have changed over time and between cultures.10  This section briefly 
sets out historical and contemporary social and legal understandings of 
                                                
4 Vytautus J Bieliauskas “Masculinity, Femininity, and Conjugal Love” (2005) 10 J of Rel and 
Health 37 at 43. 
5 Oxford English Dictionary Online <oed.com>. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Milton C Regan Alone Together: Law and the Meanings of Marriage (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1999) at 10. 
9 Henry Finlay To Have But Not To Hold: A History of Attitudes to Marriage and Divorce in 
Australia 1858-1975 (The Federation Press, Sydney, 2005) at 4-5.   
10 Frank Flaspohler “All who live in love” (2009) 11 Loy J Pub Int L 87 at 90-91. 
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marriage.  It does this to show how marriage is an institution in a state of change 
and how social norms are not currently reflected in the legal criteria for entering 
into a legal marriage in New Zealand.  It also shows that the concept of 
conjugality has become more complicated as understandings of personal 
relationships such as marriage have changed.     
A Historical Social and Legal Understandings of Marriage 
Initially, laws regulating marriage were designed by and for the 
privileged classes and focused on “possessions and succession to property”.
11
  
Eekelaar suggests that the institution inherited by common law countries was 
centred on providing a means to secure wealth and political power, ensuring that 
bloodlines remained legitimate and allowing men to retain control of women.
12
  
A woman was absorbed into her husband’s legal personality, and, unable to 
contract in her own right, became economically dependent.  This dependency 
was reinforced by the establishment of legal rules that favoured men in the 
event of separation, effectively “obliterating” a woman’s freedom.13   
English common law understood a husband and wife to be one person.  
Women had no separate legal identity from their husbands and could not enter 
into a contract, own property or money or bring a lawsuit.  A wife was required 
to provide services and labour for her husband and obey him.  Marital rape was 
not a crime.  The common law allowed a husband to seek “restitution of 
conjugal rights”.14   This refers to the law’s ability to order a wife who has left 
her husband to return to the matrimonial bed.
15
  At the same time marriage was 
also understood as an “elevated ideal”, and likened to “the type of relationship 
described by Aristotle and others as full friendship.”16  Full friendship is not 
contingent on these matters, but rather on wanting the Good for the other 
                                                
11 Henry Finlay, above n 9, at 5.   
12 John Eekelaar Family Law and Social Policy (1st ed, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1989) 
at 5-6. 
13 Ibid, at 40. 
14 This petition was used in early New Zealand legislation, including s 16 of the Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1963 (repealed).  
15 Only a husband could claim this remedy.  However, in the 1900s a wife was able to cite it as 
grounds for divorce.  See Matyasevic v Matyasevic [1965] NZLR 15 at 22. 
16 Eekelaar Family Law, above n 12, at 40.  Originally, however, women were not considered 
capable of “full friendship”. 
 29 
person.
17
   Eekelaar suggests that full friendship is motivated by altruism and 
not moral obligation.18 
However, Eekelaar considers that this understanding of marriage was 
rarely manifested in the legal rules regulating marriage.
19
  He suggests that the 
“legal immunities between spouses conferred by the old common law … had 
nothing to do with the ideals of friendship, and everything to do with male 
domination.”
20
   Polikoff agrees that the legal rules relating to marriage may not 
necessarily reflect a particular social understanding of the institution.21    
B Contemporary Social Understandings of Marriage 
1 Marrying for love, not material benefits? 
There is no doubt that social attitudes toward marriage have changed in 
contemporary times in New Zealand and other comparable countries.  This is a 
consequence of events such as the women’s liberation and human rights 
movements, and the shift away from a fault-based approach to family law.  
These changes have also affected understandings of conjugality, as conjugality 
can no longer simply be equated to marriage. 
Parker writes of two major transformations in cultural and material 
values “that have driven many of the changes that have impacted on the 
institution of marriage.”22  These saw marriage transform from an economic and 
political institution in which romantic love was considered of secondary 
importance (if not completely irrelevant) to a relationship of companions, “the 
companionate marriage”, characterised by emotion and sentiment.   
Parker suggests that the emergence of love as the primary reason to 
marry began in the seventeenth century, when the authority of parents and 
governments was somewhat displaced by the influence of spouses, lovers and 
friends.  According to Parker, the second transformation began in the 1960s and 
                                                
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid, at 36. 
19 Ibid, at 41. 
20 Ibid, at 45. 
21 Nancy Polikoff, “We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage 
Will Not Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage” (1993) 79 Va L Rev 1535 
at 1611. 
22 Robyn Parker “Perspectives on the future of marriage” (2005) 72 Family Matters 78 at 78. 
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1970s, along with a trend toward universal education, falling birth rates and 
equality between men and women.  Parker suggests that the measure of a 
marriage “increasingly became each spouse’s own self-development and 
expression” and that this can be referred to as “individualised marriage”.
23
  In 
this respect, spouses can be seen as both “separate individuals with their own 
distinct interests” and “members of a community who have special obligations 
to promote its welfare”.
24
   
Cherlin also suggests that over the past fifty years, the practical benefits 
of marriage have become less relevant in the decision to marry and that this has 
corresponded with an increase in marriage’s symbolic and social significance.
25
  
Similarly, Regan suggests that we live in a society that emphasises emotional 
bonds within relationships rather than formal legal bonds.26  Giddens suggests 
that marriage increasingly:27 
… refers to a situation where a social relation is entered into for its own sake, 
for what can be derived by each person from a sustained association with 
another; and which is continued only in so far as it is thought by both parties to 
deliver enough satisfaction for each individual to stay within it. 
In this vein, Badgett undertook a study of couples that found that to 
marry, couples must reach a stage characterised by love, some degree of 
commitment and some expectation of a continuing relationship.28  Badgett 
emphasises the importance for couples of finding the “right person” and 
experiencing “the spark”.29  She observes that “tangible material benefits 
generally did not play a role in couples’ decisions” and they could access these 
benefits, in any event, as de facto partners.
30
   
                                                
23 Ibid, at 79. 
24 Regan Alone Together, above n 8, at 3. 
25 A J Cherlin “The desinstitutionalization of American Marriage” (2004) 36 J Marriage and 
Fam 848. 
26 Regan Alone Together, above n 8, at 12. 
27 Anthony Giddens The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love & Eroticism in Modern 
Societies (Polity Press, London, 1992) at 58. 
28 M V Lee Badgett When Gay People Get Married: What happens when societies legalize 
same-sex marriage (New York University Press, New York, 2009).  
29 Ibid, at 25. 
30 Ibid, at 29. 
 31 
Likewise, in a study by Eekelaar and Maclean of the reasons people 
choose to marry as opposed to cohabit, many of the participants found it 
“distasteful to discuss the choice to marry or cohabit in terms of rights” and that 
ideas of rights were not “prominent” in their perceptions of their relationships.
31
  
However, the study also identified that people do marry for pragmatic reasons, 
such as material benefits, as well as conventional reasons, such as confirming to 
religious or cultural norms.  Nevertheless, the symbolic status of marriage was 
still important and marriage had a “continuing power as a symbol of enduring 
rather than transitory attachment.”32 
2 Marriage as the quintessential relationship? 
Cohen states that: 33   
The law should clearly distinguish married couples from other personal 
relationships.  The harder it is to distinguish married couples from other kinds 
of unions, the harder it is for civil society to reinforce norms of marital 
behaviour. 
Marriage has “profound meaning and value” for “many people other 
than the two getting married”34  Debate surrounding the recognition of non-
traditional conjugal relationships has been polarised by those who seek to 
displace marriage and those who wish to continue to elevate it above all other 
personal relationships.   Badgett states that, as a “deeply rooted social and 
cultural institution, marriage is powerful in ways that we might not always 
appreciate and in ways that we cannot control.”
35
   
Giddens suggests that marriage is the event that has an “independent 
effect” in completing the “fundamental nature” of a partnership.36  Similarly, 
Badgett observes that marriage can be understood as “the paradigm of intimate 
commitment”.37  Marriage also has a long-standing association with religion.  
                                                
31 John Eekelaar and Mavis Maclean “Marriage and the Moral bases of Personal Relationships” 
(2004) 31 JL and Soc'y 310 at 536. 
32 Badgett Same-Sex Marriage, above n 28, at 7. 
33 Lloyd Cohen “No-fault family law: A problematic ideology (should family law promote 
marriage as the ideal?” NJLJ (26 January 2007). 
34 Badgett Same-Sex Marriage, above n 28, at 4. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid, at 7. 
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Flasphoser suggests that, for Christianity, “the understanding of marriage is 
quintessential to the understanding of the divine.”38  MacLeod even suggests 
that it is a self-evident principle “that conjugal marriage has intrinsic value, and 
is thus in itself a basic reason for human choice and action.”
39
  MacLeod also 
claims that it is:40 
… a self-evident observation that different relational arrangements display 
different characteristics and produce different social benefits.  On this ground, 
states rationally distinguish between conjugal marriage and other relationships 
and retain for conjugal marriage a special status in the law.   
This view of marriage has been discredited in recent times as a basis for 
privileging marriage over other relationships.  However, Atkin acknowledges 
the social and cultural dimensions of marriage stating that priority may be given 
to marriage over marriage-like relationships “either for ideological and cultural 
reasons or because of a sense that the public commitment in marriage makes it a 
better bet for secure family life.”
41
 
3 Marriage and children 
Marriage has a long-standing connection to child-bearing.42  The 
relationship between marriage and positive outcomes for children has been the 
subject of much research and social commentary.
43
   It is not necessary for this 
thesis to consider the various views.  However, it is noted that children are 
increasingly being born outside marriage and many live in non-traditional 
households.  This trend has weakened the relationship between child rearing and 
marriage.  As a consequence, family law is increasingly focused on the best 
interests of the child rather than parents’ relationship status.  Consequentially, 
while supporting children may be an important state objective, this does not 
necessarily justify privileging marriage above other relationships. 
                                                
38 Frank Flaspohler “All who live in love”, above n 10, at 88. 
39 Adam J MacLeod “The Search for Moral Neutrality in Same-Sex Marriage Decisions” (2008) 
23 BYU J of PL 1 at 59.   
40 Ibid, at 59. 
41 Bill Atkin “The legal world of unmarried couples: reflections on “de facto relationships” in 
recent New Zealand legislation” (2009) 39 VUWLR 793 at 794. 
42 Vivian E Hamilton “Family Structure, Children, and Law” (2007) 24 Wash U J L & Pol’y 9. 
43 See Robin Fretwell Wilson “Evaluating marriage: does marriage matter to the nuturing of 
children? (Symposium: The Meaning of Marriage)” (2005) 42 San Diego L Rev 847. 
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C The Contemporary Legal Approach to Marriage 
Musselman observes that American law has never recognised marriage 
as a sacrament or other religious construct.44  This is also the position in New 
Zealand even though religious organisations have traditionally had special status  
to officiate at marriage ceremonies.  In fact, the fundamental feature of the legal 
model for recognising marriage in New Zealand is the prioritisation of form 
over substance.  This means that marriages are recognised if procedural 
requirements are met, such as those relating to consent and capacity.  A similar 
approach is taken in most comparable commonwealth countries, though not all.  
In the United Kingdom, non-consummation of a marriage can void the marriage 
and adultery is a ground for dissolution.
45
   
In contrast, in New Zealand couples may marry if they comply with the 
requirements of the Marriage Act 1955, whether or not their marriage accords 
with social norms relating to marriage.  For example, there is no requirement 
that a marriage be caring or committed, or even that it be exclusive.  New 
Zealand restricts marriage to people aged 16 and over, prohibits marriages 
between close relatives (there is an extensive list of who a person cannot 
marry), and prohibits people from marrying more than one person at a time.  
Marrying couples are not required to establish that their relationship is suitable 
in other ways.   
This is not necessarily a criticism of the legal model for recognising 
marriage, as this approach allows couples to voluntarily assume legal status.  
The point is rather that the legal approach to recognising marriages makes it 
difficult to compare marriages with non-conjugal relationships, without relying 
solely on social norms which may not apply to the legal institution.  Once a 
couple marries they “need conform to no particular model of behaviour in order 
to receive the legal protections of that status”.46   
                                                
44 James L Musselman “What’s Love Got to Do With It? A proposal for elevating the status of 
marriage by narrowing its definition, while universally extending the right and benefits enjoyed 
by married couples” (2009) Duke J of Gender L & Pol’y 37. 
45 See Rosemary Auchmuty “Beyond Couples: Burden v United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 38; 
[2008] 2 FLR 787; Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, 29 April 2008” 
(2009) 17 Fem Leg Stud 205 at 206.   
46 Badgett Same-sex marriage, above n 28, at 8. 
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In particular, there is a concern about comparing non-conjugal 
relationships to an idealised version of marriage, which marriages might not 
themselves attain.  Feminist and post-modern narratives also highlight the 
danger of uncritical acceptance of the romantic discourse around marriage by 
setting out the reality of marriage over the course of history as a relationship 
used for the purposes of power and control of men over women.  When the role, 
functions, and nature of marriage are so contested, it becomes difficult to 
identify a robust reference point for comparing non-conjugal relationships to 
marital relationships.  As such, the approach taken by this chapter to defining 
conjugality in the law is to consider how marriage-like relationships approach 
conjugality.   
Ultimately, as a longstanding and well-tested institution of society, 
marriage is a natural choice of mechanism for allocating rights and distributing 
resources between citizens.  However, the question is whether the marriage 
model should be extended to apply to other relationships that fulfil a similar 
role, or whether these relationships should be recognised in other ways. 
IV Conjugality and the Social Sciences 
It is because conjugality and non-conjugality can be so broadly defined 
that an analogy between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships can, in turn, be 
so readily drawn by commentators.  The presence or absence of a sexual 
relationship is considered irrelevant and characteristics such as caring, 
commitment, and interdependence (or dependence) are given precedence.
47
  
These characteristics can be present in many personal relationships, whether 
they are conjugal or not.  Such an approach leads inevitably to equating 
conjugal and non-conjugal relationships.   
This section seeks to look beyond the bare equivalency of broad 
principles by drawing on the social sciences to distinguish conjugal 
relationships from important non-conjugal relationships.  If there is a 
                                                
47 See generally Cossman and Ryder “What is Marriage-Like Like?” above n 1; Caroline A 
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meaningful distinction between conjugality and non-conjugality, then it must be 
based on a more detailed examination of these relationships than that presented 
in the available legal commentary.   The commentary is flawed insofar as it does 
not draw on, or at least critique, any perspectives offered by the social sciences.  
This section focuses on developing a fuller understanding of what conjugality 
may entail, before turning to consider how the law defines conjugality through 
the criteria for recognising de facto relationships. 
A The Contribution of Philosophy – Conjugal Love as Unique 
This discussion focuses on the viewpoint of Christopher Bennett, who, 
in a philosophical exercise, argues that the state is justified in promoting 
relationships of conjugal love due to conjugal love’s unique contribution to 
establishing the conditions under which an individual is able to frame and 
pursue that individual’s conception of the Good.48  Bennett’s argument is 
informative because he seeks to distinguish conjugal love from that of family 
and friends by arguing that conjugal love has a unique capacity to bring about 
the circumstances in which an individual can have a meaningful life. 
Bennett’s basic proposition is made up of a series of assertions.  Bennett 
argues that autonomy is essential for an individual’s pursuit of the Good.  
Autonomy is not simply external freedom but includes the ability to act on that 
freedom.  Conjugal love can promote autonomy in a manner and to an extent 
that friendships cannot, by bringing about conditions in which we value our 
lives and make use of our autonomy.  This arises from the exclusive nature of 
conjugal love.  This proposition, Bennett argues, differentiates conjugal 
relationships from non-conjugal relationships such as close friendships.  These 
propositions are now considered in detail.  
1 Autonomy as freedom to pursue the Good 
The principle of liberty underpins autonomy.  The importance of the 
principle of liberty has been established by writers such as Rawls, who prioritise 
                                                
48 Christopher Bennett “Liberalism, Autonomy, and Conjugal Love” (2003) 9 Res Publica 285.  
Bennett does not distinguish between marriage and marriage-like relationships for the purposes 
of his discussion of conjugal love as his argument does not rely on how relationships of 
conjugal love are formalised by the law. 
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the principle of liberty above all others.
49
  The definition of liberty is the subject 
of many opposing bodies of work.  However, Rawls suggests that “for the most 
part, this debate is not concerned with definitions at all, but rather with the 
relative values of the several liberties when they come into conflict.”
50
  Rawls 
suggests that there is basic acceptance of the viewpoint that persons are 
autonomous when free from constraints to do or not do something and when this 
decision is protected from interference by others. 
Bennett’s argument goes further.  He suggests that autonomy does not 
simply equate to external freedom, as a person can be free but lonely and 
lacking in self-respect, which means that they will “lose their desire to value 
and pursue their own projects and enjoyments” and thereby be “psychologically 
unable to make use of available options.”51  Bennett suggests, therefore, that 
autonomy is better understood as the ability to “frame, revise and rationally 
pursue a conception of the good as this is necessary to value freedom.” 
2 Being valued underpins our desire to pursue the Good 
Bennett then suggests that being recognised and granted importance by 
others, and, in particular, having the detail of our lives valued, is a deep-seated 
human need and that autonomy can be compromised when this does not occur.  
Bennett suggests that friendships generally involve choosing someone as having 
a certain importance because of the particular individual they are.  He suggests 
that granting recognition to the content of a person’s life and valuing it can 
assist them to value themselves.  Bennett states that it “is this recognising, 
valuing, sharing of the content of the other’s life that is special to intimate 
relationships.”52  He suggests that:53 
A deep human need is that aspects of our lives such as our personal history, our 
present projects, and our character, be accepted, affirmed, granted importance 
by others (or by another).  When this need is not met, it can be difficult to 
                                                
49 John Rawls A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, New York, 1971) at 541-548. 
50 Ibid, at 201. 
51 Christopher Bennett “Liberalism, Autonomy, and Conjugal Love” (2003) 9 Res Publica 285 
at 286-7. 
52 Ibid, at 289. 
53 Ibid, at 290. 
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maintain our sense of the importance of what we are doing.  Thus autonomy can 
be compromised.   
Similarly, Leib suggests that friendship is “an important social relation 
that contributes to our integrity and our dignity” and an “indispensable 
component of a good life”.
54
  This proposition also receives support from Rawls 
who refers to the “social basis” of self-respect.55  Bennett suggests that this 
attention cannot come from anyone and needs to be reciprocated, because “for 
us to gain a sense of our own importance … the person who gives us this sense 
must be someone we take to be important as well.”56  Bennett acknowledges 
that this argument justifies state support of friendship as well as conjugal love.   
However, he suggests that conjugal love is unique in the way that it provides 
recognition.   
3 Conjugal love has unique value because it is exclusive 
Bennett considers that conjugality differs from intimate friendship 
because it is exclusive.
57
  He argues that conjugal love is unique because, 
ideally, we are valued exclusively by one other person in a way that no-one else 
values us.  Conjugal relations recognise the unique value of a person’s life in a 
way that friendship does not and thus entail a much more significant 
relationship.  Bennett suggests that the conjugal lover is concerned with the: 58 
… whole of your life in a way that a friend is not … a lover has the type of 
concern they have for you only for you (conjugal love is exclusive).  
Bennett considers that friendship differs because it is partial and not 
concerned with the whole of a person’s life.  The special type of importance 
attaching to conjugal relationships leads each person in the relationship to 
choose to take responsibility for the other as a whole on the basis of the value 
each attaches to the detail of the other’s life.  This is a responsibility that they do 
not assume for anyone else.  Bennett suggests that conjugality is contingent on 
                                                
54 Ethan J Leib “Friendship and the Law” (2007) 54 UCLA 631 at 647. 
55 John Rawls A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, New York, 1971) at 178 and 541.  
56 Bennett “Conjugal Love”, above n 51, at 290. 
57 Ibid, at 288. 
58 Ibid, at 294. 
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choosing one and no other, over all others, and this is how it derives its unique 
value.  Bennett states that:59 
A relationship is, amongst other things, a structure of responsibility.  Through 
the relationships we participate in … we are assigned duties to respect others, to 
look after others, to do things for others.  Others have a certain claim on us by 
virtue of our relationship with them.  In a conjugal relationship both parties to 
the relationship have a particular person to turn to for support, someone who, by 
virtue of the sort of relationship that they are having, is charged with their care 
and does not have anything more important to do.  Furthermore, in a conjugal 
relationship, as distinct from a friendship, one assumes responsibility for the 
whole person, the whole life of one’s partner. 
Bennett suggests that the exclusive nature of conjugal relationships may 
be manifested in the exclusive sharing of significant activities such as living 
together, making key life-decisions together, sexual intimacy and bringing up 
children.  He concludes that being “special for someone else affirms and 
recognises your sense that the things that make you a particular individual are 
valuable, because someone has chosen you for those things.”
60
  To bring his 
argument full circle, he suggests that it is this sense of value that underpins and 
sustains autonomous functioning and that conjugal relationships are 
instrumental to our sense of worth.  It is this, he suggests, that justifies the legal 
privileging of conjugal relationships over other forms of intimate relationships 
between friends. 
As such, Bennett attempts to provide a basis on which we can 
distinguish between the intimacy and caring provided in both conjugal and non-
conjugal relationships, and to identify why conjugal relationships are so 
important and significant.  The attraction of Bennett’s argument is that it 
attempts to rationally articulate something that many people have long believed 
about conjugal relationships – that conjugal relationships are special.   His 
argument is not circular, linked to religion or dependent on ideas of intrinsic 
worth.  Bennett states that:61 
                                                
59 Ibid, at 295-6. 
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This account of conjugal love, if on the right lines, would explain why conjugal 
love remains a durable ideal; why people keep trying to make it work even 
when the chances of success are unclear. It helps us to make sense of our 
overwhelming modern tendency to search for a single life-partner. The Hegelian 
argument therefore aims to give an account of the ‘social meaning’ of conjugal 
love: of the meaning that the marital relationship has (on its best interpretation) 
for its participants. 
Bennett recognises that conjugal love will not promote autonomy in the 
absence of other favourable social conditions such as an educated, flourishing 
and pluralistic civil society.  However, what he does suggest is that it is one of 
the most important institutions that the state ought to encourage. 
4 Critique of Bennett’s account of conjugal love 
Bennett acknowledges that he is putting forward a “normative account 
of friendship and conjugal love” and that his account might be used to critique 
certain present-day marriage arrangements rather than confirm them.62  He, 
therefore, qualifies his argument by suggesting that the state should support 
marriage only so far as marriage promotes conjugal love.  This proposition is 
impractical.  Another important matter that Bennett does not address is what 
sort of state support this understanding of conjugal love contemplates.  For 
example, few, if any, would suggest that a state’s interest in preventing 
domestic violence is confined to conjugal couples.  There are many other areas 
such as family provision legislation and conflict of interest laws that have an 
interest in other personal relationships.  As such, Bennett’s argument should be 
understood to provide a basis for distinguishing between conjugal and non-
conjugal relationships, but not necessarily for all legal purposes. 
Most likely, what Bennett refers to are financial supports.  However, 
conjugal relationships are a well-known example of the privatisation of care, 
whereby couples take care of each other, with financial support depending on 
whether there are children of the relationship (this financial support can also be 
paid to carers of children other than parents).  In fact, couples assume 
maintenance obligations toward each other when legal status attaches to their 
relationship.  Nonetheless, there are financial advantages, such as tax 
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advantages that can attach to conjugal relationships, but are not available for 
any non-conjugal relationships. 
Perhaps, most importantly, Bennett does not explicitly address the 
consequences of a lack of conjugal love.  Are we to understand that this 
compromises autonomy as it leaves people impaired in their ability to pursue 
their conception of the Good.  Does this mean that the Burden sisters, now in 
their nineties, who claim that they have a significant, caring, and stable 
relationship, would find a conjugal relationship more fulfilling?  Bennett 
advocates conjugal love as the ideal form of love, although he recognises that 
the existence of a conjugal relationship does not render a person’s friendships 
unimportant.   One of the questions this section turns to consider below is 
whether it is possible that a relationship such as that between the Burden sisters 
could be of as much value as that involving conjugal love. 
Golash suggests that Bennett also does not deal with the possibility that 
conjugal love devalues over time given that:
63
 
… a long history of interaction between two people who need each other’s 
validation tends to produce less meaningful responses over time, long-term 
conjugal relationships are unlikely to provide autonomy-enhancing support to 
their participants. 
Golash accepts that intimate friendships can promote autonomy but 
argues that it is not clear that conjugal love does so to a greater degree.  Bennett 
acknowledges that Golash’s argument is based on a:64 
… psychologically acute observation of how conjugal relationships work in 
actual practice.  In particular, she shows how tentative I need to be about the 
claim that underpins the second step in my argument: as I put it above, ‘that 
those who do not have the relationship of conjugal love are more vulnerable to a 
loss of autonomy or will find it harder to sustain their autonomy in the face of 
the characteristic difficulties of human life over the long haul’.  
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Rather, Bennett suggests that the benefit of conjugal love over time 
relates to the structure of the relationship, that conjugal relationships have a 
symbolic value that is based on each partner choosing to stay with the other and 
care for the other in a detailed and exclusive manner.
65
  Insofar as this caring 
persists, each conjugal partner continues to affirm the other’s value as a unique 
individual.  Ultimately, Bennett emphasises the fundamental nature of conjugal 
relationships in terms of the degree to which they manifest these desirable 
characteristics, stating that:66 
For the fact of conjugal love is that a person to whom you would devote 
yourself has chosen to – and continues to choose to – devote himself to you.  
This type of relationship can provide a reasonably reliable source of support and 
care – since one’s partner takes on a responsibility to look after you in 
particular.  But almost more important than this is the symbolism involved in 
his being willing to sustain this form of relationship with you.  For it is this 
continued effort on his part that shows you that your life matters in the scheme 
of things since it matters to this person who matters greatly to you. 
This argument is tested below, where the nature of the non-conjugal 
relationship existing between the Burden sisters is explored.  Before this, 
however, this section briefly explores the concepts of companionship and 
support networks as important aspects of our personal relationships, regardless 
of whether these relationships are conjugal or not. 
B The Importance of Support Networks and Companionship 
Families have long been understood in terms of caregiving 
relationships.67  Care is labour that is essential to the smooth functioning of 
society and families provide emotionally, social, physical and financial care and 
support to family members and rely on receiving it in turn.  Higgins writes 
that:68 
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‘Family’ is synonymous with ‘caring’ interdependencies.  The essence of much 
of the dependency is not only financial ties and obligations, but also the 
interrelating roles of giving and receiving care: both physical, as well as 
emotional care and support.  Caring defines what it means to be part of a family: 
the responsibility - and the desire - to care for those to whom we are 
biologically or emotionally connected.   
For those people who are not in conjugal relationships, friends and 
families provide a particularly important source of love, companionship and 
support.  A study by Wilson, Calsyn and Orlofsky found that the impact of 
sibling relationships on social support and morale in the elderly was significant 
for unmarried siblings, who received emotional and practical support and 
reciprocated such support.69  The study found that relationships between elderly 
sisters were particularly intimate.  Personal relationships which provide a source 
of companionship and support are particularly important for unmarried elderly 
people.  Friends also tend to be particularly important to older adults who may 
include a friend in their description of family (particularly if they are single or 
widowed).70  
Bennett’s argument should not be understood to suggest that non-
conjugal relationships are unimportant or should not be supported.  Rather, 
Bennett attempts to distinguish between the types of love and support provided 
in conjugal and non-conjugal relationships, suggesting that the expressive and 
affective attributes are present to a greater degree in conjugal relationships than 
in friendships.  This is manifested in the different living arrangements these 
relationships involve.  This chapter now turns to the case of the Burden sisters.   
V Burden v United Kingdom 
The Burden sisters’ case is a real example of a situation where two 
people in a non-conjugal relationship have sought the same legal status as 
conjugal couples, claiming that their relationship is analogous.  The question in 
this case was whether the sisters’ relationship was analogous to a marriage or 
marriage-like relationship for the purposes of inheritance tax.  This required the 
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courts to translate social understandings of personal relationships into legal 
consequences.  While the sisters ultimately lost their case, a minority in each 
division of the European Court of Human Rights found in their favour.   
A Background: The Civil Partnership Act 2004 (UK) 
The Civil Partnership Act 2004 (UK) was at the heart of the Burden 
sisters’ case.  In the United Kingdom, same-sex couples can register their 
relationships under the Civil Partnership Act 2004.  During debate in the House 
of Lords on the Civil Partnership Bill 2002, an amendment to extend eligibility 
to relatives was approved 148 votes to 130.71  The House of Commons later 
removed this amendment and sent the revised Bill back to the House of Lords 
for reconsideration, and this version was enacted.  The amendment would have 
made civil partnerships available to family members if they were over thirty 
years of age, if they had cohabited for at least twelve years, and if they were not 
already married or in a civil partnership.  It was supported by a cross-party 
coalition of peers and bishops. 
The proposed amendment was a result of the Burden sisters’ high-profile 
plight.  The sisters had written to the Chancellor of the Exchequer
72
 every year 
since 1976 requesting that cohabiting siblings be made exempt from inheritance 
tax.  The amendment was not passed because the Bill was considered an 
inappropriate legislative basis on which to address the concerns of cohabiting 
relatives who care for each other.  In rejecting the amendment, the House of 
Commons considered that the Bill, in its original format, would lead to 
discrimination against the family and that matters such as hospital visiting and 
intestacy for family members were already covered in other legislation.  
Sympathy was expressed as to the needs of wider family members, with the 
acknowledgement that the position of carers was a matter which required 
government attention.  However, the extension of a regime for marriage-like 
relationships was considered a wholly inappropriate response which would lead 
to “legal absurdities” and financial disadvantages.  In contrast, one of the lobby 
groups responsible for the Civil Partnership Bill termed it a “wrecking 
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amendment”, considering that it would have undermined the Bill’s purpose of 
providing legal status to same-sex couples.73   
B The Facts of Burden v United Kingdom 
The Burden sisters had lived together from birth and, for the past thirty 
years, in the house they inherited from their parents.  Each sister had made a 
will leaving all her property to the other sister.  When one of the sisters died, the 
surviving sister would have to pay a charge of 40 per cent of the value of the 
deceased sister’s property (at the time, this was likely to amount to a sum of 
over ₤285,000), which the surviving sister would have to sell the house to pay.   
The sisters alleged they were discriminated against because spouses and 
civil partners were exempt from inheritance tax (the latter under the Civil 
Partnership 2004), as they are treated as a single economic unit for inheritance 
tax purposes.74  In the first instance, the sisters brought a complaint before the 
fourth section of the European Court of Human Rights, where judgment was 
delivered on 12 December 2006.  The Court found 4-3 in favour of the British 
Government.  The sisters then appealed to the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights, which delivered its judgment, 15-2 in favour of the 
British Government, on 29 April 2008.   
C Arguments by the Parties  
There was no dispute between parties as to the purpose of the 
inheritance tax exemption as a measure intended to support and affirm conjugal 
relationships.  However, the parties’ views differed as to whether the Burdens’ 
relationship could be seen as equivalent to a conjugal relationship, in terms of 
the nature of conjugal relationships and the benefits they provide to the state. 
1 The Burden sisters’ argument 
The sisters claimed that they should be treated the same way as married 
couples and civil union partners because the sisters had lived together in a 
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“committed and mutually supportive relationship, all their lives.”
75
  They 
argued that their relationship had the same qualitative features of self-
determination, personal development, caring, long-term cohabitation and 
commitment as conjugal relationships and:
76
 
… many siblings were connected by nothing more than their common 
parentage … [the sisters] had chosen to live together in a loving, committed and 
stable relationship for several decades, sharing their only home, to the exclusion 
of other partners.  Their actions in so doing were just as much an expression of 
their respective self-determination and personal development as would have 
been the case had they been joined by marriage or a civil partnership. 
2 The United Kingdom’s response  
The Government of the United Kingdom argued that the essence of the 
Burden sisters’ relationship was different from that of a marriage and that 
they:77 
… could not claim to be in an analogous situation to a couple created by 
marriage or civil partnership (“a couple”).  The very essence of their 
relationship was different, because a couple chose to become connected, 
whereas for sisters it was an accident of birth.  In choosing to become a couple 
by entering into a formal relationship recognised by law, the partners also made 
a financial commitment to each other, and agreed to give the courts powers to 
divide their property and to order one partner to provide for the other on 
separation. 
However, the Burden sisters claimed that their association did not have 
the legal consequences they desired or would choose to take on under the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 if they were not restricted from doing so by being within 
the prohibited degrees.  The sisters argued that the only difference between their 
relationship and a civil partnership was that they were not lawfully entitled to 
have a sexual relationship.78  They did not consider this a material difference 
because sexual intimacy was not relevant under the Civil Partnership Act. 
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The Government also suggested that the objective of the inheritance tax 
exception was to promote stable, committed conjugal relationships and that this 
would:79 
… not be served by extending similar benefits to unmarried members of an 
existing family, such as siblings, whose relationship was already established by 
consanguinity, and recognised by law … The difference in treatment was, 
moreover, proportionate, given that the applicants, as siblings, had not 
undertaken any of the burdens and obligations created by a legally recognised 
marriage or civil partnership. 
The British Government also pointed to the financial implications of 
recognising sibling or other family living arrangements, given that the annual 
income from inheritance tax was significant.  The sisters responded that only a 
small minority of adult siblings were likely to share the type of relationship that 
they enjoyed.    
D Decision of the European Court of Human Rights at First Instance  
The European Court of Human Rights was called upon to settle this 
matter.  However, at first instance, the Court did not decide whether the siblings 
were in a relationship analogous to marriage, because it was able to dismiss the 
sisters’ complaint on other grounds.  
1 The majority Judges 
In delivering the majority judgment, the court recalled its previous 
decisions that affirmed the differences between marital and de facto 
relationships, but acknowledged that the Burden sisters were not free to assume 
the rights and obligations of marriage.  However, the Court dismissed the 
complaint on the basis that the United Kingdom had not exceeded the wide 
margin of appreciation afforded to states for the purposes of tax policy and that 
the difference of treatment was reasonably and objectively justified.80  The 
Court emphasised the role of the state in striking the balance between pursuing 
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tax revenue and social objectives.  It was recognised that this may create 
individual cases of apparent injustice or hardship.81 
2 The dissenting judges 
Three of the seven judges disagreed with the majority’s ruling.  In a joint 
dissent, Bornello and Garlicki JJ noted that the majority judges seemed to agree 
that this was a case of apparent hardship and criticised the judgment for not 
providing a full explanation for why this injustice was nonetheless justifiable.82  
Bornello and Garlicki JJ also highlighted the proposed amendment to the Civil 
Partnership Bill and stated that the concern that this was not the right vehicle to 
recognise relationships such as that between the Burden sisters, did not “absolve 
the legislature from providing an equitable solution to the problem at a later 
stage.”83  The Judges further considered that:84 
The situation of permanently cohabiting siblings is in many respects – 
emotional as well as economical – not entirely different from the situation of 
other unions, particularly as regards old or very old people.  The bonds of 
mutual affection form the ethical basis for such unions and the bonds of mutual 
dependency form the social basis for them.  It is very important to protect such 
unions, like any other union of two persons, from financial disaster resulting 
from the death of one of the partners.  The national legislature may establish a 
very high threshold for such unions to be recognised under tax exemption laws; 
it may also provide for particular requirements to avoid fraud and abuse.  But 
unless some compelling reasons can be shown, the legislature cannot simply 
ignore that such unions also exist. 
The judges went on to state that the injustice inherent in the 
Government’s approach was acute in this situation due to the fact that the sisters 
were elderly, had been together for several decades and did not have children.  
As such the state would collect tax when each sister died, instead of once when 
the second sister died, and this occurred in a situation where the surviving sister 
would need to sell the family home to pay the tax bill. 
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The third dissenting judge also considered that the majority ruling was 
unfair, stating that:85  
It strikes me as absolutely awful that, once one of the two sisters dies, the 
surviving sister’s sufferings on account of her closest relative’s death should be 
multiplied by the risk of losing her family home because she cannot afford to 
pay inheritance tax in respect of the deceased sister’s share of it. 
E Decision of the Grand Chamber on Appeal 
The sisters then appealed the case to the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights, the majority ruling in favour of the United 
Kingdom.   
1 The majority judges 
The Grand Chamber, in ruling against the Burden sisters, also relied 
upon the fact that the sisters had not registered their relationship, stating that 
“the legal consequences of civil partnership … which couples expressly and 
deliberately decide to incur, set these types of relationship apart from other 
forms of co-habitation.”86  What is particularly surprising about this ruling, is 
that the Grand Chamber did not consider that the “length or the supportive 
nature of the relationship” mattered, but rather, “what is determinative is the 
existence of a public undertaking, carrying with it a body of rights and 
obligations of a contractual nature.”87   
It should be observed that this argument could not be made in relation to 
New Zealand law for two reasons.  The first is that New Zealand law recognises 
de facto relationships, and as such, a public undertaking is not required for a 
relationship to be recognised.  Second, New Zealand has abolished estate duty 
(the equivalent of inheritance tax), which suggests that inheritance tax does not 
necessarily need to be linked to other rights and obligations.  The Grand 
Chamber also considered that the relationship between the Burden sisters was 
“qualitatively” different from that of a conjugal couple as:88 
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The very essence of the connection between siblings is consanguinity, whereas 
one of the defining characteristics of a marriage or Civil Partnership Act union 
is that it is forbidden to close family members … the fact that the applicants 
have chosen to live together all their adult lives, as do many married and Civil 
Partnership Act couples, does not alter this essential difference between the two 
types of relationship.  Moreover … marriage confers a special status on those 
who enter into it … and gives rise to social personal and legal consequences. 
The Grand Chamber did not further expand on the essence of this 
“qualitatively” different nature.  Bjorgvinsson J, who supported the majority, 
observed that this reasoning was circular and considered that the majority 
should have focused on substantive or material difference in the nature of the 
relationship.  In fact, he considered that the Burden sisters’ relationship could 
arguably be analogous to a marriage or marriage-like relationship, stating that:89 
Despite important differences, mainly as concerns the sexual nature of the 
relationship between married couples and civil partner couples, when it comes 
to the decision to live together, closeness of the personal attachment and for 
most practical purposes of daily life and financial matters, the relationship 
between the applicants … has … for the alleged purposes of the relevant 
inheritance tax exemptions in particular, more in common with the relationship 
between married or civil partnership couples, than the differences between 
them. 
However, in concurring with the majority, Bjorgvinsson J considered 
that the institution of marriage was closely linked with the idea of the family as 
one of the cornerstones of the social structure in the United Kingdom and other 
member states.  Imposing a duty on member states to extend the applicability of 
social security and tax benefits might have significant consequences and should 
therefore come within the margin of appreciation afforded to states. 
Two states also made third party submissions in support of the United 
Kingdom.90  In particular, the Government of the Republic of Ireland submitted 
that the Burden sisters were not in a position analogous to a married couple or 
civil partnership, as people in these relationships have chosen to assume legal 
obligations.  Rather, their position was analogous to any persons in an 
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established, mutually supportive, cohabiting relationship.   The Government of 
Belgium submitted that the British Government should be able to pursue the 
policies it considered provided the best prospect for family stability. 
2 The dissenting judges 
The two dissenting judges disagreed with the approach taken by the 
majority, considering that there was no qualitative difference between that of 
the sisters and conjugal couples.  Zupancic J stated that:91 
The quality of consanguinity is different from sexual relationships, but this has 
no bearing on the proximity of the persons in question. So what does the 
qualitative difference referred to by the majority come to?  Is it having sex with 
one another that provides the rational relationship to a legitimate government 
interest?   
Zupancic J considered that, if the state extended such a benefit to one 
non-marital group, then it should be extended, where reasonable, to others.  He 
considered consanguinity to be an arbitrary impediment.  Borrego J, also 
dissenting, considered that if the state decided to create a benefits scheme it was 
bound to do so in a manner that was compatible with the right to be free from 
discrimination.92 
F Burden v United Kingdom: Concluding Thoughts 
The Burden sisters’ case is significant because it shows that it is not 
contrived to suggest that two people in a non-conjugal relationship may 
consider that their relationship should attract a similar status to conjugal 
relationships, at least for a particular purpose.  The arguments of the British 
Government and the majority judges in each instance do not convincingly set 
out how the Burden sisters’ relationship differs qualitatively from a conjugal 
relationship.  Justice Borrego derided this failing, stating that “The fact that the 
Grand Chamber did not give a reply to the applicants, two elderly ladies, fills 
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me with shame, because they deserved a different approach.
93
  Similarly,  
Welstead observes that:94 
In functional terms, it is difficult to see how the relationship between Joyce and 
Sybil Burden could properly be regarded in any way other than analogous with 
that of a married couple or a same-sex partner. They had chosen to live with 
each other in their family home in a loving, committed and stable relationship 
for many decades, foregoing the possibility of marriage or civil partnership with 
any other person, yet unable to legalise that relationship because of their 
consanguinity. 
Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was not relied upon by the applicants or 
dissenting judges.  Article 8 refers to the right to respect for family life and 
home.  The concern behind the Burden sisters’ complaint was that the surviving 
sister might be required to sell the family home due to the imposition of an 
inheritance tax.  However, it is likely that an argument was not made under this 
Article as the ground of family life has traditionally been interpreted narrowly 
under the Convention. 
VI  De Facto Relationships: The Legal Test for Conjugality 
This section considers the legal test for identifying relationships in the 
nature of marriage and how it defines conjugality.  It also discusses the extent to 
which this test can be used to differentiate conjugal and non-conjugal 
relationships.  In New Zealand, relationships in the nature of marriage are 
known as de facto relationships.95  De facto relationships are a legal 
phenomenon.  While they are intended to reflect social practices, they represent 
an attempt to define the attributes associated with marriage and, in other words, 
conjugality.  This means that people who do not choose to register their 
relationship as a legal marriage are, nonetheless, subject to similar laws as 
married couples.  It is de facto relationships that provide us with a meaningful 
understanding of how the law defines conjugality. 
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A What is Marriage-Like Like? 
Defining what is marriage-like is a highly prescriptive and ideological 
exercise, at odds with a society that is increasingly accepting of diverse 
relationships.  However, as suggested in the following chapter, there are good 
reasons for recognising relationships which people have chosen not to register.  
Where this is the case, the law must identify criteria for recognising these 
relationships.  New Zealand takes the same approach to defining a de facto 
relationship as other commonwealth countries, which involves listing a set of 
factors (similar across countries) that can be used to help establish that two 
people are living together as a couple.   
Rights and responsibilities were comprehensively accorded to de facto 
partners in the twenty-first century in New Zealand under the Relationships 
(Statutory References) Act 2005.  This Act amended many different statutes so 
that de facto partners were recognised for almost all of the same legal purposes 
as married couples.  In New Zealand, the default definition of a de facto 
relationship is set out in s 29A(1) of the Interpretation Act 1999, which defines 
“de facto relationship” as a relationship between two people who “live together 
as a couple in a relationship in the nature of marriage or civil union.”  Section 
29A(3) of the Interpretation Act further provides that in determining whether 
such a relationship exists, regard must be had to the context, or the purpose of 
the law, in which the question is to be determined, as well as all the 
circumstances of the relationship. 
De facto relationship is a nebulous concept, incapable of precise 
definition and capable of changing meaning according to context, save for the 
requirement to be “living together as a couple”.
96
  This is not necessarily 
problematic and Atkin suggests that most situations will fall easily within or 
outside of the definition of de facto relationship.97  In New Zealand, s 2D of the 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976 provides a comprehensive definition of de 
facto relationship upon which many other statutes and the common law have 
been modelled.  The Act provides that in determining whether two persons live 
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together as a couple, all the circumstances of the relationship are to be taken 
into account, including any of the following matters that are relevant in a 
particular case:98 
• the duration of the relationship; 
• the nature and extent of common residence; 
• whether or not a sexual relationship exists; 
• the degree of financial dependence or interdependence and any 
arrangements for financial support, between the parties; 
• the ownership, use, and acquisition of property; 
• the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life; 
• the care and support of children; 
• the performance of household duties; and 
• the reputation and public aspects of the relationship. 
The Act also directs that no finding in respect of any of these matters is 
necessary, and a Court is entitled to have regard to these matters, and to attach 
such weight to any matter, as the Court considers appropriate in the 
circumstances of the case.  As far back as in Thompson v DSW Tipping J 
emphasised the ultimate decision will always be one of fact and degree, stating 
that:99 
A relationship between a couple may adopt a variety of forms which fall short 
of a de facto relationship. They may be friends or lovers, boyfriend and 
girlfriend, landlady and boarder, or flatmates in circumstances which fall short 
of a de facto relationship. 
A full discussion of each of these factors is unnecessary for the purposes 
of this thesis.  Cossman and Ryder observe that non-conjugal relationships may 
be characterised by joint residence, emotional intimacy, economic 
interdependency, domestic care and support, and economic dependence or 
                                                
98 Tipping J observes that “The list is derived substantially from the earlier case law of which 
the case of Ruka v DSW [1997] 1 NZLR 154 and my own earlier decision in Thompson v DSW 
[1994] 2 NZLR 369 were probably the best known examples.”  See Andrew Tipping, Judge of 
the Supreme Court of New Zealand “Sea of Changes in New Zealand Couples' Property Rights” 
(Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 16 May 2002). 
99 Thompson v DSW [1994] 2 NZLR 369 at 374. 
 54 
interdependency.
100
  In short, such relationships “may be characterized by many 
of the dimensions of family life that give rise to legal rights and responsibilities 
on the functional equivalence approach.”101  It is apparent that factors such as a 
shared dwelling and a relationship of long duration can apply to non-conjugal 
relationships such as that between the Burden sisters, who might even share 
their finances to a greater degree than some conjugal relationships.   
This section focuses on three aspects of the test, namely, sexual 
intimacy, a mutual commitment to a shared life and the concept of living 
together as a couple (the latter, being the overarching test).  It is these factors 
which may be more readily relied upon to distinguish conjugal and non-
conjugal relationships.  Sexual intimacy and the concept of living together as a 
couple do not apply to non-conjugal relationships, but are they material 
distinctions on which decisions can be appropriately be made regarding legal 
status?  In the case of a mutual commitment to a shared life, the question is 
whether this factor can be present to a degree in conjugal relationships that it is 
not in non-conjugal relationships.   
The factors of financial dependency and interdependency are not 
discussed, as it is difficult to distinguish between conjugal and non-conjugal 
relationships on this basis.  While financial interdependency may be present to a 
greater degree in conjugal relationships, some conjugal couples keep separate 
finances whereas some non-conjugal partners may not.   
1 Sexual intimacy 
It is difficult to contemplate a non-conjugal relationship involving sexual 
intimacy, given the historical association of conjugality and sexual 
relationships.  This means that certain personal relationships which are not 
typically recognised by the law, such as boyfriend and girlfriend relationships, 
should perhaps be seen as a category of conjugal relationship which does not 
meet the threshold for legal recognition.  In the same way, the argument does 
not need to be that all non-conjugal relationships require recognition, but rather 
those that meet certain criteria should be recognised by the law. 
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The declining relevance of sexual intimacy as a factor for determining 
whether a conjugal relationship exists has eroded, at least conceptually, a key 
difference between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships.  Cossman and 
Ryder write that in Canada:
102
 
Sex, once the hallmark of a conjugal relationship, has become legally less 
important, to the point that the Supreme Court has suggested that a relationship 
may be conjugal even if the individuals do not have a sexual relationship. 
In this respect, Harder observes that many sexual relationships do not 
carry expectations of commitment and support from the participants, just as 
many relationships that do carry such expectations are not sexual.
103
  Both 
Harder and Cossman and Ryder support the de-emphasis on sexual intimacy, as 
they consider that whether a relationship has a sexual component or not bears no 
relation to the achievement of legitimate state objectives.   Cossman and Ryder 
consider such an inquiry offensive because it requires participants to publicly 
disclose private details of their intimate lives.  The problem is, as expressed by 
Cossman and Ryder, that a sexual relationship “is often assumed in ordinary 
parlance to be a central if not defining feature of a “conjugal” relationship.”104 
In New Zealand, although there is a favouring of relationships with 
some degree of sexual content, this factor is neither determinative nor essential 
to establish.  In Scott v Scragg the High Court expressed the opinion that the 
relationship between a couple who had never lived together or had a sexual 
relationship due to religious beliefs, would qualify as a de facto relationship 
under s 2D of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976.105  In RDP v FMN the 
court considered that a de facto relationship had not been established, despite 
the presence of a sexual relationship, because the relationship lacked “the 
quality of commitment and intimacy which would normally feature in a sexual 
relationship between a couple committed to each other.”106  The reasons why 
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there is no sexual relationship are nonetheless relevant and Jefferson writes 
that:107   
An ongoing sexual relationship between parties is likely to have lesser 
significance than the existence of a sexual relationship at some time during the 
relationship. For example an older couple who live together for companionship 
and convenience and become mutually dependent upon one another both 
financially and emotionally.  
Sexual intimacy still continues to be part of the inquiry as to whether a 
conjugal relationship exists.  This is consistent with the conceptualisation of 
conjugality proposed by Bennett, whereby sexual relationships may be relevant 
as an expression of an “activity of exclusive concern”.  Bottomley and Wong 
suggest that:108  
What all these emerging patterns make clear is that extensions to cover others 
tend to include the drawing of lines around a central nexus of either marriage or 
sexual partnerships, although the unwillingness to speak of sexual practice tends 
to lead to a fudge which allows for slippage into non-sexual partners.  This 
slippage has to be distinguished from the more definite moves made in some 
jurisdictions to extend protection to the economically vulnerable, especially 
carers, even if they meet at a point where a shift in focus to economic 
vulnerability allows detraction from the issue of equality for sexual partners. 
This suggests that a decline in the relevance of sexual intimacy is 
eroding the legal distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships.  
Cossman and Ryder also observe that case law is “undermining the very 
distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships on which 
legislative definitions of spouse and common law partner rest.”
109
 
2 Commitment to a shared life and living together as a couple 
While a commitment to a shared life and living together as a couple are 
different concepts, they are closely related and are considered here together.  
Earlier in the chapter, an argument was advanced by Bennett that the 
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(eds) Feminist Perspectives on Family Law (Routledge Cavendish, New York, 2006) 39 at 48. 
109 Cossman and Ryder “The Irrelevance of Conjugality”, above n 1, at 284.   
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commitment present in conjugal relationships is qualitatively different from that 
in non-conjugal relationships.  In law, commitment is a factor that can be 
manifested in many ways, including sexual fidelity, emotional commitment, 
financial commitment and through the length of time spent in a relationship.  
The court in RDP v FMN observed that a degree of mutual commitment to a 
shared life is a factor:110 
… which threads through all of the other circumstances detailed in s2D(2). It 
refers to the quality of all the other factors which might indicate the existence of 
a qualifying de facto relationship. In a sense, it touches the ethos of the Act, 
whereby individuals who mutually commit to a shared life together acquire 
rights in the property of each other because of a partnership binding them 
together. 
In terms of what commitment requires, Jefferson writes:111 
What needs to be present is a measure of mutual commitment by the parties to 
the relationship. It need not be a commitment intended to last forever or 
indefinitely. Nor need it even be a commitment to a long term relationship. 
There must, however, be at the very least a commitment for the foreseeable 
future … Even that will not be determinative — presumably one can be 
committed to a friendship or a love affair without converting it into a de facto 
relationship. The very concept of “commitment” is not easy to grapple with. 
Arguably, commitment to a shared life is less likely to be present in non-
conjugal relationships due, as Bennett suggests, to the exclusive nature of 
conjugal relationships.  However, it is difficult to argue that this type of 
commitment is not present in the relationship between the Burden sisters.  
Perhaps society needs to be prepared to recognise that some non-conjugal 
partners, particular elderly siblings living together, may indeed intend their 
relationship to last in this manner.  Bala also queries why individuals should be 
denied a benefit because they do not have a particular kind of emotional 
commitment or do not have a sexual relationship.112   
                                                
110 RDP v FMN [2006] NZFLR 573 
111 Jefferson “friends with benefits”, above n 107, at 307. 
112 Nicholas Bala “Alternatives for Extending Spousal Status in Canada” (2000) 17 Can J Fam L 
169 at 194 
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With respect to the concept of living together as a couple, Atkin 
observes that when assessing whether a de facto relationship exists, “the list is 
not one to be assessed by counting up ticks and crosses”, it is not “exhaustive” 
and, most importantly, “must not overshadow the central concept itself of living 
together.”113  However, it is likely that where a commitment to a shared life 
exists, at least in the case of a conjugal couple, this will lead to a finding that 
participants are living together as a couple.  For what else can conjugality mean, 
sexual intimacy aside?  Nonetheless, it is unlikely a court would accept that any 
two people in a non-conjugal relationship were living together as a couple, even 
if there was no material distinction in the functions the relationship served.  For 
this reason, the relationship recognition regimes for non-conjugal relationships 
outlined in Chapter Four, while adopting most or all of the other aspects of the 
legal test for de facto relationships, omit this requirement. 
3 Conclusion – destablisation of the conceptual divide between 
conjugality and non-conjugality 
It is clear that there has been a conceptual destabilisation of the 
historically clear legal divide between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships.  
However, it is unlikely that courts in the near future will face difficult cases 
where a plaintiff seeks the application of the test for a de facto relationship to a 
non-conjugal relationship.  This is because it is possible, despite the preceding 
analysis, to tell a conjugal and non-conjugal relationship apart.  There was no 
mistaking the Burden sisters for a couple due to the fact that they were sisters.  
Even if they had been close friends, if they did not present their relationship as a 
romantic relationship, it would still be possible to distinguish their relationship 
simply because they did not seek to be treated as a couple in the ordinary sense 
of the word.   A more difficult situation might arise, nonetheless, if, of two 
unrelated persons, one claimed that a de facto relationship existed while the 
other claimed that the relationship was platonic.     
The real question is whether there is a material distinction between 
conjugal and non-conjugal relationships.  In all respects other than sexual 
intimacy and any “romantic” considerations, it is questionable whether the 
                                                
113 Bill Atkin “The legal world of unmarried couples”, above n 56, at 800. 
 59 
criteria for identifying a de facto relationship are materially different from the 
factors that could apply to a particular non-conjugal relationship.  In the case of 
the Burden sisters, it is arguably difficult to single out any individual factor that 
is likely to not have been present in their relationship, aside from sexual 
intimacy.  Rather the distinction is made on the basis that they are sisters and 
therefore could not be a couple.  As set out above, the majority judges in the 
Grand Chamber considered the difference was that they were sisters and had not 
registered their relationship, which is not actually a material difference.   
The simple fact that it is clear that the Burdens are not a couple in the 
romantic sense does not provide a concrete basis for making a distinction with 
serious legal consequences.  Nevertheless there may be some qualitative 
differences between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships, which are simply 
hard to identify when considering a close and enduring non-conjugal 
relationship such as that between the Burden sisters.  If so, this arises due to the 
degree to which conjugal relationships are likely to exhibit factors such as 
commitment to a shared life.  Many non-conjugal relationships would not be 
founded on this premise, due to the fact that those in non-conjugal relationships 
may hope to enter into a conjugal relationship in the future or may already be in 
such a relationship.  This may lead to a material distinction in the living 
arrangements between the two types of relationship. 
Overall, however, it is clear that non-conjugal relationships can exhibit 
the characteristics of conjugal relationships.  There is also a question as to why 
non-conjugal relationships should need to live up to an idealised conjugal 
relationship to receive recognition, or indeed why they cannot receive 
recognition in their own right, without a conjugal reference point.  Recognition 
does not necessarily need to be for all the same purposes as marriage or 
marriage-like relationships.  What is important is that the state begin to 
acknowledge more clearly that a wider range of relationships may be relevant 
than conjugal relationships when developing laws that affect personal 
relationships (as has already been recognised in the case of domestic violence 
with the establishment of a category of “domestic relationship”).  The remainder 
of this chapter continues to develop the case for recognising the importance of 
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non-conjugal relationships through discussing the state’s interest in supporting a 
wide range of personal relationships and the trend towards diverse and 
expansive understandings of the relationships “family” includes. 
VII The State’s Interest in Recognising a Wider Range of 
Personal Relationships 
The state has a particular interest in recognising conjugal relationships 
due to their procreative and child-rearing functions.  However, not all conjugal 
relationships result in children, yet the state still has an interest in supporting 
these relationships so that they can flourish as follows.  First, the state must 
maintain social order.  Individual well-being affects social order and personal 
relationships have a significant impact on well-being.  Second, the state is 
concerned with the allocation of scarce resources and personal relationships 
allow for the privitisation of dependency and thereby lessen the burden on the 
state’s finances.  These two particular interests of the state are fostered by 
recognising a broader range of relationships than those that are conjugal as set 
out below. 
With respect to social order, Rawls writes that “survival depends in 
significant part on the altruistic behavior of others.  A society or group cannot 
manage all the tasks of physical, economic and emotional living without 
cooperation from each other.”
114
  The consequence of living in societies is that 
social order between citizens must be maintained by the state.  Social cohesion 
is the term used to describe the bonds that bring people together in society.115  
Key elements of social cohesion are positive interactions and active social 
relationships.116  Personal relationships are ultimately an important source of 
social connectedness which is integral to well-being.  Relationships are a source 
of support and happiness, and give people a sense of their place in society. 
                                                
114 John Rawls A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, New York, 1971) at 794. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister State of the English Cities (2006). 
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From the state’s perspective it is important that citizens have a network 
of happy and healthy personal relationships to draw on.  In particular:117 
Several studies have demonstrated links between social connectedness and 
positive outcomes for individual health and wellbeing. Social connectedness is 
fostered when family relationships are positive, and when people have the skills 
and opportunities to make friends and to interact constructively with others. 
The state is also interested in encouraging relationships in which 
economic support is provided.118  An obvious example of economic support is 
for someone who is unemployed.  However, there is also an economic impact 
for the state in circumstances such as when people are in hospital because there 
is no one to care for them at home, or elderly people who require assistance to 
live independently.  People who are expected to provide social support to other 
individuals may receive certain benefits, such as tax relief, in the expectation 
that this will encourage and allow them to adequately discharge their 
responsibilities.  This arrangement is often the basis for the recognition of social 
groupings.    
VIII Non-Conjugal Relationships as Family Relationships 
The final task of this chapter is to consider the concept of a non-conjugal 
relationship. It is difficult to articulate a definition of non-conjugality.  At its 
simplest, a non-conjugal relationship is one that is not conjugal.  However, this 
is a broad definition that does not distinguish particular relationships that may 
warrant legal recognition in some way.  The differences between different non-
conjugal relationships are important because they affect our notions about the 
justice of extending certain legal rights and obligations to different types of non-
conjugal relationships.  Put simply, some non-conjugal relationships may need 
state support and other recognition whereas others may not, but how can we 
differentiate between these relationships?     
Essentially, a non-conjugal relationship, like a conjugal relationship, 
may be defined by reference to a particular status (in particular, a family status) 
                                                
117 Ministry of Social Development The Social Report (2009). 
118 See Martha Fineman “Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric” (1995) 
81 Va L Rev 2181. 
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or a list of functional criteria.  With respect to the latter, these may vary 
depending on the particular law in question.  However, a non-conjugal 
relationship that is relevant to the law is essentially a personal relationship of a 
sufficiently close degree, typically involving some or many of the types of 
factors that are usually identified with de facto relationships, such as 
interdependency, commitment, caring and support.  The nature of these factors 
suggests that some non-conjugal relationships are effectively family 
relationships.   
It is commonly recognised that the family is a fundamental and natural 
grouping within society and serves many important functions.
119
  The natural 
law tradition conceives of the family as an institution ordained for reproduction 
and comprising a father, mother and child.  However, modern theorists argue 
that family is a social construct and that family definitions and practices have 
varied enormously over time, place and culture.  In recent times there has been a 
re-envisaging of the family.  Ettelbrick suggests that “In the past fifty years 
alone, family structure and meaning have changed remarkably as a result of 
several distinct and intertwined social justice movements.”120   
Family law is now interested in a range of intimate personal 
relationships, whether or not they are understood as family relationships in a 
traditional sense.  The Families Commission states that:121 
Legal and policy definitions of family relationships are continually evolving in 
New Zealand in order to take account of changing social and cultural norms … 
New Zealand law seeks to be ‘relatively neutral’ with respect to the kinds of 
social relationships that constitute a family.   
The Families Commission also suggests that “increasingly we conceive 
of families in terms of what they do – sharing resources, caring, responsibilities 
and obligations – rather than the particular organisational form they take.”122 
                                                
119 See The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art 16(3). 
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All” (2001) 64 Alb L Rev 905 at 906. 
121 The Families Commission Family Centred Communities (2010). 
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Families provide love, care, and socialisation to others in the family group, and 
the family group:123 
… has common goals and shares concern for each other, the individuals that 
comprise the group usually are “liked-minded” adults, sometimes with children, 
and the individuals respond to biological, emotional, spiritual, and economic 
needs of the group and, to the extent possible, self care.   Most frequently the 
members of the group focus on extending love and care to the other members.  
Ultimately, it could be appropriate to view many of the non-conjugal 
relationships which are important to the law as family relationships.  It has been 
observed that relationships between non-relatives “can be experienced as the 
equivalent of biological or legal ties.”124  This is reflected in the Human Rights 
Act 1993, in which the term “relative is not limited to relatives by blood.  The 
law is increasingly willing to consider “family-like” relationships for particular 
legal purposes.  This does not mean, however, that legal recognition of non-
conjugal relationships should be limited to relationships that might be 
considered family relationships.  Even a simple friendship can be relevant to the 
law, as will be seen in the fifth chapter.  The point is more that those non-
conjugal relationships that are or resemble family relationships are likely to be 
the relationships of most relevance to the law and most in need of recognition 
and support, due to the degree of intimacy they exhibit. 
IX Conclusion 
Conjugality was simple in its inception, referring to marriage or sex 
within marriage.  Legal marriage itself was and continues to be characterised by 
procedural, rather than substantive requirements.  However, society has evolved 
to recognise a more diverse range of relationships.  The advent of marriage-like 
relationships has meant that the law has had to define conjugality and has done 
so by identifying the idealised attributes of a marriage. 
These attributes include factors such as commitment, caring and 
interdependency.  However, the range of personal relationships which perform 
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124 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality, above n 47, at 5. 
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these functions is not limited to marriage-like relationships, and can include 
close non-conjugal relationships.  In fact, the legal divide between marriage-like 
relationships and non-conjugal relationships, such as that between the Burden 
sisters, has been destabilised, as courts and commentators have questioned the 
relevance of sexual intimacy as a criterion for recognising relationships.   
Arguably, however, the law can still materially distinguish between 
conjugal and non-conjugal relationships.  Conjugality can be understood, 
ideally, as a personal relationship in which each partner exclusively values and 
commits to the other.  This suggests that there may be qualitative differences 
between the type of commitment and interdependency in conjugal and non-
conjugal relationships, with conjugal relationships typically exhibiting a greater 
degree of intimacy and sharing of lives.  Sexual intimacy is one manifestation of 
such commitment.  It is this feature of conjugal relationships, in addition to 
conjugality’s procreative function, which the state seeks to promote in terms of 
the positive benefits that arise for conjugal partners.   
Ultimately, the living arrangements in non-conjugal relationships and 
the expectations of parties are generally likely to be different from those in 
conjugal relationships.  However, there are exceptional cases, and it is difficult 
to identify a basis for distinguishing between the life-long relationship between 
the elderly Burden sisters and an elderly married couple, that should matter for 
apportioning legal rights and responsibilities.   
In addition, even if two people are not living together as a couple, this 
does not mean their relationship is irrelevant to the law.  Rather, the question is 
how their relationship should be recognised by the law.  The state has an interest 
in supporting and promoting close non-conjugal relationships as these 
relationships provide important benefits.  Close non-conjugal relationships can 
even be experienced as family relationships. 
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CHAPTER THREE: MODELS FOR RECOGNISING PERSONAL 
RELATIONSHIPS 
I Introduction 
Imagine a scenario where the United Kingdom conceded that the Burden 
sisters had been treated unfairly compared to civil partners under the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004, resolving to change the law so that the sisters would not 
have to pay inheritance tax.  How could this be effected?    
Certainly, the British Government could exempt relatives who have 
lived together for a certain period of time from paying inheritance tax.1  But 
should siblings receive such a privilege without being subject to other 
obligations?  Should they be required to register their relationship to receive this 
benefit?  What about other close personal relationships?  In fact, inheritance tax 
could even be abolished completely, without having regard to relationships, as 
has been its equivalent in New Zealand.2   
The question of whether a non-conjugal relationship should be 
recognised cannot be separated from the question of how the relationship is 
recognised.  In New Zealand, a small number of legal models are used to 
recognise a range of personal relationships.  Choice of legal model is important 
because it determines how a relationship is recognised, which has significant 
consequences.  For example, do people voluntarily assume obligations or are 
they imposed on them?  Are third parties affected or are the legal consequences 
limited to parties in the relationship?  The model of recognition chosen can also 
affect the nature of the rights and responsibilities associated with a relationship. 
                                                
1 As previously noted, during debate in the House of Lords on the Civil Partnership Bill, an 
amendment was introduced which would have allowed the legislation to apply to same or 
opposite-sex family members within the prohibited degrees of relationship if they were over 
thirty years of age, they had cohabited for at least twelve years and they were not already 
married or in a civil partnership with some other person.  The House of Commons later removed 
the amendment.  See generally (22 April 2004) 662 GBPD HL 1362. 
2 Estate duty in New Zealand was the equivalent of the United Kingdom’s inheritance tax.  
Estate duty was abolished by the Estate Duty Abolition Act 1993.  Prior to this, gift duty was 
introduced to prevent individuals from circumventing estate duty tax laws.  Gift duty was 
retained when estate duty was abolished.  However, the Government is currently considering a 
proposal to abolish gift duties as well.  See Hon Peter Dunne “Government Signals Repeal of 
Gift Duty” (press release, 14 June 2010).  
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This chapter briefly identifies the characteristics of each model, analyses 
the advantages and disadvantages, and observes how these models have been 
applied to conjugal and non-conjugal relationships in New Zealand.  The aim is 
to build an understanding of the basic options that are available for recognising 
personal relationships.  In the following chapter, this thesis considers how other 
countries have taken approaches to recognising non-conjugal relationships that 
New Zealand has not yet considered.   
II Models for Recognising Relationships 
There are three basic legal models for recognising personal relationships 
and common law jurisdictions typically employ a combination.  New Zealand 
uses each of these models to recognise conjugal relationships.  These models are 
also applied to non-conjugal relationships, but to a more limited extent.  They 
are: registration, ascription and private law (or contract).  These models 
represent an accepted classification of the ways in which the law can recognise 
personal relationships.3  However, marriage is sometimes considered as a 
separate model, rather than part of the registration model.
4
  This tends to reflect 
the political nature of marriage rather than key legal differences between 
marriage and other registration models.   
Nevertheless, marriage has not always been solely a registered 
relationship.  For example, in New Zealand, Māori customary marriage 
practices used to be common and, although unregistered, were recognised by the 
State until 1952, when all marriages had to be registered.
5
  This can be 
contrasted with South Africa, where the Customary Marriages Act 1998 
provides for the civil registration of marriages solemnised according to the 
traditions of indigenous tribes (including polygamous marriages). 
                                                
3 See generally Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and supporting 
close personal adult relationships (2001). 
4 This was the approach taken by the Law Commission of Canada in Beyond Conjugality, ibid. 
5 Law Commission Justice: The Experiences of Māori Women (NZLC R 53, 1999) at 23. 
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A Registration  
1 General features 
In New Zealand, marriages and civil unions are examples of the 
registration model.  The Marriage Act 1955 regulates marriages and the Civil 
Union Act 2004, civil unions.  Marriage is the most prevalent registration 
scheme in common law countries.   However, registration schemes do not need 
to be based on marriage, although they do tend to develop in parallel to it.6  The 
key characteristic of the registration model is the act of voluntary registration.  
People must choose to opt in.  Often a repository will be established to record 
registrations.  The registration approach respects the free will of parties, who 
must consent to become subject to the law.  This gives them the opportunity to 
identify the consequences of registration and assess them in advance (although 
parties may not always do so).  The South African Law Reform Commission 
suggests that “the benefit of this approach is … the certainty and peace of mind 
it provides from the moment of registration.”
7
     
Other formal attributes associated with the registration model are entry 
criteria, legal implications and international implications.8  In particular, people 
must usually meet certain criteria to register their relationship.  For example, in 
New Zealand, marriage must be between a man and a woman.9  There must also 
be consent and parties must not be within the prohibited degrees of 
consanguinity or affinity.
10
  As suggested in Chapter Two, a relationship does 
not need to serve a particular function to be registered as a marriage and there is 
                                                
6 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality, above n 3, at 117. 
7 South African Law Reform Commission Domestic Partnerships (DP 104, 2003) at 10.1.1. 
8 Barbara Stark International Family Law: An Introduction (Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hants 
(England), 2005) at 42.  Marriages are generally recognised between countries.  However, it is 
less common for same-sex unions to be afforded international recognition.   New Zealand only 
recognises same-sex registered partnerships in five overseas countries.  These countries are 
prescribed by the Civil Union (Recognised Overseas Relationships) Regulations 2005 and the 
relationships recognised are: a registered partnership (Finland); a life partnership (Germany); a 
civil partnership (the United Kingdom); a domestic partnership (New Jersey, USA); and a civil 
union (Vermont, USA).  One reason for limiting recognition of overseas registered partnerships 
is because the entry criteria may not be equivalent to those for civil unions in New Zealand (for 
example, underage partnerships can occur without parental consent). 
9 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523. 
10 See s 31 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 and s 15 of the Marriage Act 1955 respectively.  
Section 31(1)(a)(ii) provides that a marriage or civil union shall be void “by reason of duress, 
mistake, or insanity, or for any other reason, there was at the time of the marriage or civil union 
an absence of consent by either party to marriage or civil union to the other party.” 
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no inquiry into the quality of the relationship.  The entry criteria for marriage 
and civil unions in New Zealand relate to form, not substance.  This preserves 
privacy and freedom and provides certainty for couples that their relationship 
will be recognised by third parties, including the state.  Exit criteria also apply 
to the registration model and in New Zealand, married couples and civil union 
partners must be separated for two years before they can dissolve their union.11   
The acquisition of status is also an overarching feature of the registration 
model.  The ability to acquire status is said to symbolise to society the 
legitimacy of the relationship and allow the couple to publicly express their 
commitment to each other.  Overall, the Law Commission of Canada outlines 
the benefits of registration schemes as arising from:12 
… the characteristics of voluntariness, stability, certainty and publicity.  They 
provide an orderly framework in which people can express their commitment to 
each other, receive public recognition and support, and voluntarily assume a 
range of legal rights and obligations … These schemes affirm the basic 
principles and values that ought to guide the regulation of personal adult 
relationships, including equality and respect for diversity on one hand, and 
autonomy and freedom of choice on the other. 
The registration model does have some disadvantages, however.  Some 
commentators consider that registration schemes lend themselves to social 
engineering due to the criteria for entry and the way that rights and 
responsibilities are allocated within the scheme.  For example, the differential 
treatment of women by early divorce regimes or the association between 
marriage and caregiving roles for women.
13
  Another disadvantage of the 
registration model is that it may unfairly exclude certain types of relationships.  
For instance, following the introduction of the Social Security Act 1938, several 
welfare measures became dependent on a registered marriage, disadvantaging 
unmarried mothers.14    
                                                
11 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 39. 
12 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality, above n 3, at 117. 
13 Laura A Rosenbury (2007) “Friends with benefits? (family law doctrine)” 106 Mich L Rev 
189 at 193. 
14 This was remedied with the introduction of the Domestic Purposes Benefit for sole parents in 
1972.  See the Social Security Act 1964. 
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In addition: 
… the most likely victims of injustice, those who need the protection, namely 
the vulnerable, disorganised, pressurised, naïve, unsophisticated and ill-
informed, are those who will most likely not register their partnership.  They are 
also the ones who may be persuaded by a strong-willed partner not to register 
the relationship. Those whom the law aims to protect may thus not benefit from 
such a system. 
For this reason, use of the registration model is usually complemented 
by the use of other models, which target those who choose not to or cannot 
register their relationship.   
2 Registration and non-conjugal relationships 
In the absence of a consummation requirement, the Marriage Act 1955 
and the Civil Union Act 2004 do not expressly prevent all people in a non-
conjugal relationship from registering their relationship.  However, both Acts 
prevent people within the prohibited degrees of affinity or consanguinity from 
registering their relationships.  Nevertheless, for the mostpart, it is the 
registration model that has been used overseas to recognise non-conjugal 
relationships.  
To date, there is no registration scheme for recognising non-conjugal 
relationships in New Zealand.  However, an example of a scheme that comes 
close to this is the legislative framework for enduring powers of attorney.  If 
someone has lost the capacity to make, understand or communicate decisions, 
then a spouse cannot legally make decisions on behalf of that incapacitated 
person, if that person has not given them the power to do so.15  The Protection 
of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 provides a way for decisions to be 
made for an incapacitated person, either by an “attorney” who the person has 
appointed earlier, or by a court or someone appointed by a court.  
This differs from a typical registration scheme in that there is no central 
repository for recording who has a power of attorney over another person (this 
is unnecessary to achieve the policy intent and would, therefore, be inefficient).  
                                                
15 For example, the Human Tissue Act 1993.  This is subject to any express power provided in 
legislation. 
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However, as will be seen in the next chapter, some countries, in setting up 
comprehensive regimes to recognise non-conjugal relationships, also take this 
approach (whereby parties do not need to notify the state of their relationship, 
though entering into a relationship has significant legal consequences for the 
state and third parties and parties are required to enter into a formal agreement 
before a notary public). 
The Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 allows people 
to decide in advance who will make decisions for them if they become 
incapable of making decisions for themselves, and to formally record this 
intention in the presence of a lawyer.  This approach has more in common with 
the registration model than ascription or private contract, as arrangements are 
governed by legislation, are voluntary and affect third parties.  This also shows 
that it is possible to have a registration scheme that is very targeted.   
In allowing non-conjugal partners to enter into a registration scheme, 
there are certain questions that must be considered.  In particular, is it 
appropriate to extend all the rights and benefits of marriage to non-conjugal 
partners?  How do non-conjugal partners feel about registering their 
relationship, particularly given the symbolic functions of recognition and that 
they may, at some point in the future, wish to enter into a conjugal relationship 
(if they are not in a conjugal relationship already)?  What are the criteria for 
entry and what is the process for termination?  As will be seen in the following 
chapter, while the criteria for entering into a marriage are procedural in nature, 
the criteria for registering a non-conjugal relationship tend to require the 
relationship to serve a certain function.    
B Ascription 
1 General features 
Ascription refers to the imposition of legal status on parties.  Ascription 
schemes can confer recognition for the same purposes as registration schemes, 
but parties do not expressly consent to be bound by rights and obligations.  De 
facto relationships in New Zealand are based on the ascription model.  A key 
benefit of ascription is that it addresses the risks of exploitation in personal 
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relationships where there is a power imbalance.  It does this by ascribing a set of 
rights and obligations that are presumed to correspond with the expectations of 
most people in such relationships.16  Ascription also allows the state to extend 
support structures to dependents of people in these relationships.  Ascription is 
one way of providing legal recognition to controversial relationships, as it may 
be more politically viable than the registration model (it is not associated with 
the same symbolic status).   
However, a key difficulty with ascription is that criteria must be 
established to identify which relationships will be subject to the regime.  It was 
suggested above that registration schemes tend to be substantively empty and 
focus on procedural requirements.  In contrast, ascription schemes are often 
associated with stringent criteria.  When people disagree as to the status of their 
relationship, this may necessitate an inquiry into their private lives that may be 
unwanted and intrusive.  People also lack the certainty about their legal status 
that registered partners possess.  A further difficulty with the ascription model is 
the absence of a consent requirement, which means that people may not consent 
to the imposition of legal status or realise that they have become subject to 
certain legal obligations.   
For these reasons, registration is often preferred over ascription as a 
model for recognising personal relationships.  However, whether a registration 
or ascription model is chosen to recognise a particular relationship may be a 
decision based on politics rather than the suitability of a particular regime.  For 
example, New Zealand and Australia have developed a set of presumptions that 
grant parental status to same-sex mothers having children through assisted 
reproductive means in New Zealand and Australia.17  This can be contrasted 
with the more common use of registration models, such as second parent 
adoption, to gain parental rights for the non-biological parent in lesbian families 
elsewhere.  Graycar and Millbank observe that schemes must be considered:18 
                                                
16 Sotirios Sarantakos “Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships” (1998) 23 Alt LJ 222 at 
226. 
17 Reg Graycar and Jenni Millbank “From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters: Australia’s 
Distinctive Path to Relationship Recognition” (2007) 24 JL and Pol'y 121 at 123. 
18 Ibid. 
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… in their political and legal context.  This context helps to explain the wide 
divergence in approaches between relationship recognition law reform debates 
in Australia (mainly focusing on presumption-based approaches), and the opt-in 
forms of recognition, ranging from marriage, civil unions or registered 
partnerships, that seem to have been far more popular in other jurisdictions. 
2 Ascription and non-conjugal relationships 
The creation of a “domestic relationship” under the Domestic Violence 
Act 1995 is a significant example of the use of the ascription model where 
recognition does not depend on whether a relationship is conjugal or not.  In 
fact, as outlined in Chapter One, there are many other examples whereby people 
are ascribed certain rights on the basis of family status, by the use of terms such 
as “family”, “relative” and “sister or brother”.  Ascription is the primary model 
used in New Zealand to recognise non-conjugal relationships, although legal 
recognition often depends on whether people are family members by blood.   
There is a particular concern with applying a comprehensive ascription 
model to non-conjugal relationships, as such a regime may affect those who do 
not reasonably expect to be subject to such a regime.  For example, what if the 
relationship in question is one of dependency, not interdependency, where an 
elderly mother is living with her daughter and her daughter’s husband?  Even 
where there is a very close relationship and a shared economy of household, is it 
reasonable to expect parties to assume financial obligations toward each other in 
the future by reason of their interdependence?  Is not the nature of family such 
that one family member may provide support to another without the creation of 
legal obligations?  Are the rules of equity sufficient to correct any deficiency or 
is further legal intervention required?  
C Private Law and Contract 
1 General features 
Private law operates by default when governments do not provide a legal 
framework for regulating relationships.  Even when there is a framework, 
people may be able to express their commitments through private law 
mechanisms unless they are prohibited from contracting out of statutory 
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provisions.
19
  Private law remedies include contract, tort, unjust enrichment and 
constructive trust.  Private law is necessarily supported by an underlying legal 
framework.  However, the important point is that people must agree to be bound 
and may agree as to what being bound will entail (unlike registration where 
people automatically become subject to rights and duties). 
In recent times, it has been suggested that there has been a move from 
the registration and ascription models to one of private contract.  Leib states 
that:20 
It is hard in this age to think about legal obligations and liabilities as being 
based on a “status.”  Indeed, it is widely accepted that our legal culture – with 
all progressive societies – has moved away from status toward “contract”.  This 
status-to-contract story maintains that the law once held us liable for our social 
and familial roles but now holds us liable only for social relations to which we 
consent voluntarily: Under a contract model, we are able to define our own roles 
more freely and can limit our liabilities successfully by simply withholding our 
consent from creating binding legal relations in our private social lives.
 
 
On one level the notion of employing private law to regulate our 
relationships is enticing, because of private law’s embodiment of the principle 
of voluntariness.  However, as Leib also points out, legal systems are not 
voluntary, cannot ignore social roles and the law requires many people to 
perform special duties whether they consent to or not.21  The private law model 
also does not recognise the power imbalances that can exist in personal 
relationships, which can otherwise result in the subjugation of one party to the 
other.   
In addition, private law remedies are burdensome, costly mechanisms 
for regulating relationships, and tend to favour the party with greater resources 
or bargaining power.  They do not always recognise the nature of personal 
relationships, which unlike business relationships, are more likely to require 
after-the-fact remedies.  In these cases, equitable remedies become more 
important, as parties to a relationship are unlikely to have reached prior 
                                                
 
20 Ethan J Leib “Friendship & the Law” (2006-7) 54 UCLA L Rev 631 at 635 – 636. 
21 Ibid. 
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contractual agreement.  A further problem is that the private law model is 
typically only binding on parties to the relationship.  Some suggest that non-
conjugal relationships do not exhibit characteristics that render them appropriate 
for registration or ascription and are a private law matter.  However, outside of 
property division, it is rights against third parties, such as the state, employers 
and private service providers, that are particularly important.   
Finally, family law is about affective relationships.  Austin argues that 
the modernist de-emphasis on status and emphasis on contractual relations and 
transactions between autonomous individuals is not necessarily suited to our 
personal relationships.
22
  He further suggests that:
23
 
Most of us are deeply involved in relationships with others – we are sons, 
daughters, wives, parents, lovers, husbands, significant others, members of iwi 
and hapu, and now, civil union partners - relationships that, to some extent at 
least, sublimate our autonomy.  Some of these relationships involve contract, 
but all involve status.  They often involve powerfully irrational bonds with 
others, bonds that make us quite unlike the atomised individual envisaged by the 
contract side of the progress narrative. 
It could be suggested that the primary role of private contract in our 
personal relationships is to allow parties in a conjugal relationship to contract 
out of the statutory regimes imposed by registration or ascription.  Generally, 
conjugal relationships are not otherwise associated with the private contract 
model.  Nor should the state rely upon private contract to order affairs between 
intimates.  The state has an interest in healthy, strong relationships.  Private 
contract may only satisfy some state objectives and may be inadequate to satisfy 
others, unless the private ordering aligns with the state’s objectives.   The Law 
Commission of Canada suggests that:24 
Although contracts will continue to remain an important method for individuals 
to determine their mutual rights and obligations, they are not a sufficient remedy 
in and of themselves.  The contractual model may respect the value of autonomy 
but often falls short of fulfilling other values such as equality or efficiency since 
                                                
22 Graeme W Austin “Essay: Family Law and Civil Union Partnerships – Status, Contract and 
Access to Symbols” (2006) 37 VUWLR 183 at 184. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality, above n 3, at 115. 
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too few individuals are prepared to negotiate the terms of their close personal 
relationships. 
2 Private contract and non-conjugal relationships  
Cross, Palmer and Smith suggest that “Many authors propose that 
private contracts should be the vehicle for re-ordering the way in which benefits 
are distributed” 25  This view considers that the concerns of people in non-
conjugal relationships can be sufficiently addressed by allowing them to 
privately order their affairs.  However, as suggested, these relationships 
(particularly if they are between elderly cohabitants) may be particularly 
vulnerable to power imbalances, and private contract is unlikely to address 
issues which arise.    
Moreover, private contract typically only settles matters between parties 
themselves.  Many of the rights at stake in extending rights and responsibilities 
to non-conjugal partners arise in relation to state or third party support.   The 
Burden sisters’ complaint was based on an allegation that the state should not 
require them to pay inheritance tax.  In addition, “it is difficult to anticipate all 
of the situations in which the legality of kinship arrangements will be 
relevant.”
26
  As such, the private contract model is not sufficient to meet the 
legal needs of all those in non-conjugal relationships. 
III Conclusion  
This chapter set out three models for recognising personal relationships: 
registration (including the marriage model), ascription and private contract.  
Each of these models has a key defining feature.  In the case of registration, this 
is the act of choosing to register a relationship.  For ascription, this is the 
imposition of rights and responsibilities without express consent.  For private 
contract, this is an agreement between parties which involves parties consenting 
to each aspect of the law that governs them.   
                                                
25 Jane E Cross, Nan Palmer and Charlene L Smith “Families Redefined: Kinship Groups That 
Deserve Benefits” (2008-2009) 78 Miss LJ 791 at 811. 
26 Ibid, at 819. 
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Each of these models also has a different set of characteristics and 
benefits and risks associated with the way that they recognise our personal 
relationships.  However, it is clear that the private law model is not sufficient to 
meet the needs of those in non-conjugal relationships.  To date, the ascription 
model has been used most widely to recognise non-conjugal relationships in 
New Zealand.  The following chapter considers the application of the 
registration and ascription models to non-conjugal relationships in overseas 
countries.   This provides a basis for the final chapter which considers how the 
legal recognition of non-conjugal relationships in New Zealand may be 
enhanced. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: NEW APPROACHES OVERSEAS 
I Introduction 
Within the last decade, some commonwealth and continental countries 
have developed comprehensive legal frameworks for recognising non-conjugal 
relationships.  Some of these measures would equate to changes in New Zealand 
law that allowed people in non-conjugal relationships to enter into civil unions 
or that recognised certain non-conjugal relationships as a type of de facto 
relationship.   
This chapter considers schemes that recognise non-conjugal 
relationships in a manner similar to marriage or marriage-like relationships and 
for similar purposes.  This provides an opportunity to assess the merits of such 
schemes and whether New Zealand should adopt this approach.1  Recognition 
schemes are considered by country.  The key features of each scheme are 
identified and the schemes are evaluated against the principles of relationship 
recognition identified in Chapter One.2  The analysis is focused on principles to 
which these schemes do not appear to give effect.   
II Australia 
The Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Tasmania and 
Victoria recognise non-conjugal relationships in similar ways to marriage and 
marriage-like relationships.  This reform has taken place in a legal environment 
where state and territorial recognition of personal relationships is limited by the 
division of powers between those governments and the federal government.   
Under Australian law, the federal government has the power to regulate 
marriage and governs the recognition of marriages through the Marriage Act 
1961.3  Successive governments have consistently understood this to mean that 
                                                
1 An unfocused worldwide survey of individual legal provisions is outside the scope of this 
thesis.  However, the following chapter considers specific examples of recognition in New 
Zealand. 
2 These are equality and autonomy as overarching principles; personal safety and protection of 
the vulnerable; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; privacy; and other principles of 
good policy design, namely efficiency, coherence and certainty.   
3 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, s 51(xxi).   
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the federal government has the power to determine whether marriage-like 
relationships are recognised.  In 2004, the Marriage Act 1961 was amended to 
prevent the recognition of same-sex marriages.4  Then, in 2006, the Civil Union 
Act 2006 (ACT) was disallowed under s 35 of the Australian Capital Territory 
(Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth), as the federal government considered that it 
portrayed civil unions as same-sex marriages.5   
However, this division of powers has not prevented some states and 
territories from establishing registration schemes for recognising non-conjugal 
relationships, although these schemes are not recognised by federal law.  In fact, 
there has been some support from the federal government for these measures.  
In December 2007, the then Prime Minister of Australia announced that the 
Australian Government would be developing a national relationship register, 
similar to that in Tasmania (discussed below), which would officially record an 
existing same-sex relationship.6  At the time, he indicated that the register 
would be used by people in “platonic, dependent relationships”.   
No national relationship register has yet been established, although the 
federal government has removed discrimination against unmarried couples in 
many legal areas.
7
  The federal government’s commitment to introducing a 
national relationship register was reaffirmed on 29 July 2009.8  The approach 
endorsed by the federal government was to encourage all states and territories to 
create their own relationship registers, based on Tasmania's model, while 
federal legislation was amended to recognise these relationships.  In accordance 
with this policy, the Relationships Register Act 2010 was passed in New South 
Wales to allow unmarried couples to register their relationship.  However, 
unlike Tasmania’s model, the Act does not recognise non-conjugal 
relationships.   
                                                
4 Section 5 of the Marriage Act 1961 defines marriage as “the union of a man and a woman to 
the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life.”   
5 See “Australian government to block gay civil unions” New Zealand Herald (Auckland, 30 
March 2006). 
6 “Relationship register productive: Rudd” Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 16 December 
2007).   
7 See Attorney-General’s Department “Same-Sex Reforms: Overview of the Australian 
Government’s Same-Sex Law Reforms” <www.ag.gov.au>. 
8 AFP/SBS “Rudd rules out gay marriage” SBS (Sydney, 29 July 2009). 
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Although a new administration is not yet in place following the recent 
election, it seems unlikely that the federal government will introduce 
mechanisms to recognise non-conjugal relationships in the near future.  
However, there are two important points.  First, states and territories have the 
freedom to establish their own regimes (though the application of these regimes 
may be limited by federal law), provided that these regimes do not resemble 
marriage.  Second, as will be seen throughout this chapter, discussion of 
recognising non-conjugal relationships tends to occur in the midst of debate 
about same-sex law reform.  The same regimes that recognise non-conjugal 
relationships are also used to recognise non-traditional conjugal relationships. 
A Australian Capital Territory  
1 “Domestic Relationships” 
The Australian Capital Territory recognises non-conjugal relationships 
under the Domestic Relationships Act 1994.  The Act allows for the adjustment 
of property interests and the imposition of maintenance obligations where 
relationships break down.  At the time the Act was passed, the Australian 
Capital Territory did not have legislation in place to deal with property disputes 
between same-sex couples, although a statutory regime applied to marriages and 
heterosexual de facto relationships.  Millbank writes that:9 
The Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT) is a unique piece of Australian 
legislation.  It made the Australian Capital Territory the first common law 
jurisdiction in the world to enact a regime for dividing property on 
relationship breakdown to relationships beyond marriage and heterosexual de 
facto couples.  The Act did not limit eligibility to heterosexual couples, 
cohabitees, or couples at all. 
 The Act applies to two people who terminate their “domestic 
relationship”, which is:10  
A personal relationship between 2 adults in which one provides personal or 
financial commitment and support of a domestic nature for the material 
                                                
9 Jenni Millbank “Domestic Rifts: Who is Using the Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT)?” 
(2000) 14 AJFL 1 at 1-2.   
10 Domestic Relationships Act 1994, s 3(1). 
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benefit of the other and includes a domestic partnership but does not include a 
legal marriage. 
A domestic partnership is a de facto relationship.11  As “domestic 
relationship” includes, but is not limited to, a domestic partnership, the term 
clearly includes non-conjugal relationships.  The Act expressly contemplates 
non-conjugal relationships where one person provides “personal or financial 
commitment and support of a domestic nature.”12  Cohabitation is not a 
requirement, as domestic relationships may exist between people who are not 
members of the same household.13  However, relationships involving paid 
caregiving are not domestic relationships.14  
2 Application of relationship recognition principles 
At first glance, the Domestic Relationships Act could appear to promote 
the principles identified in Chapter One.  The Act ensures that property can be 
fairly distributed when relationships break down, thus promoting equality 
within relationships.  The Act can apply to anyone in a relationship where there 
is a degree of support or dependency, suggesting that it promotes equality 
between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships.  While the Act imposes 
obligations without express consent, it does so on the same basis of protecting 
the vulnerable, as does the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 in New Zealand.  
Behrens writes that the Domestic Relationships Act provides a:15 
… means for claiming private support based on dependencies that exist 
outside (as well as inside) sexual relationships. This is unique legislation and 
could be said to involve a partial re-envisioning of the notion of 'family'. 
However, the Act distinguishes between different types of conjugal 
relationships, providing expressly that a domestic relationship does not include 
a marriage.  The Act also provides for the adjustment of property interests and 
maintenance between people who do not cohabit.  It is difficult to see how such 
financial obligations arise in these relationships.  Does this approach really 
                                                
11 Legislation Act 2001 (ACT), s 169. 
12 Domestic Relationships Act 1994, s 3(1). 
13 Ibid, s 3(2)(a). 
14 Ibid, s 3(2)(b). 
15 Juliet Behrens “Book Review: The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth 
Century Tragedies” (1996) 10 AJFL 272 at 274. 
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accord with the needs and reasonable expectations of people in such 
relationships?  What was the basis for recognising people in relationships who 
provide personal or financial support of a domestic nature and how has the Act 
affected these relationships?    
To answer the last question, there is limited research available regarding 
the operation of the Act.  However, Millbank undertook a court file search to 
profile those people who had used the Act in the first five years of its 
operation.16  As only one case had been reported under the Act, Millbank 
conducted a case file search and found that of the 237 relevant court files 
identified, only seven cases concerned litigants who would have been excluded 
by traditional de facto relationship legislation.17  Of these, only one matter 
involved a “non-couple”, a heterosexual couple and a friend who had purchased 
property together.  Millbank considered that the low uptake by non-couples and 
non-cohabitees could not be explained without further research, but indicated:18 
… that this research suggests we do not need to be as worried about non-
couples and non-cohabitees in laws concerning property division, because 
such groups are simply less likely to jointly own or contribute to property than 
couples. 
Ultimately, the Act was not crafted to recognise the living arrangements 
and needs of those in non-conjugal relationships.  Millbank considered that the 
focus of the Act upon “carers”, which had been a key issue during debates on 
the Bill, was misguided.19  There were no cases of caregivers using the Act and 
Millbank considered that the possibility of a carer making a claim on a property, 
or a Court ordering that a carer had such a claim prior to the death of the owner, 
was unlikely.  In fact, Millbank’s research revealed that the main use of the Act 
was as a means of transferring property without attracting stamp duty, which 
provided a major incentive to seek an order under the Act, even if there was no 
disagreement between parties.20   
                                                
16 Jenni Millbank “Domestic Rifts”, above n 9.  
17 Ibid, at 8  
18 Ibid, at 46. 
19 Ibid, at 46-47. 
20 Ibid, at 13.  Stamp duty is a tax that is levied on documents. 
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If the available research indicates that there was no need to extend the 
provisions of this Act to include non-conjugal relationships, why did this occur?  
In reality, this Act establishes a regime that applies to de facto couples.  There is 
little doubt that the primary impetus was to provide a mechanism for dealing 
with property claims between same-sex couples that was palatable to 
conservative factions at the time the Act was passed.  During debate on the Bill 
it was observed that:
21
 
Persons involved in a formal marriage, of course, have had the protection of 
the Family Law Act for nearly 20 years …  Other jurisdictions have enacted 
legislation in respect of de facto relationships - marriages except for the 
formality of a marriage ceremony - and the ACT has lacked that in the past. 
This is an attempt to remedy that … 
In support of the Bill, it was also suggested that it was important not to 
deny a group in need assistance on the basis of “irrelevant considerations”, such 
as whether there was a sexual relationship between parties.
22
  Millbank also 
notes that there were two original categories of relationships proposed in the 
draft legislation: de facto and “other personal relationships”.  These categories 
were later collapsed, as it was not considered appropriate to “distinguish on the 
basis of gender”.23 
As such, the recognition of non-conjugal relationships under this Act 
was not based on an identifiable need to grant legal status to these relationships 
in a manner akin to the recognition of marriage.  Rather it was a strategy to give 
same-sex couples status and rights without expressly acknowledging the 
conjugal nature of these relationships.  When the Australian Capital Territory 
considered the establishment of same-sex civil partnerships in 2005, the 
Department of Justice and Community Safety stated, in respect of recent social 
legislation including the Domestic Relationships Act that: 24 
                                                
21 (19 May 1994) ACTPD 1800-1801. 
22 (21 April 1994) ACTPD 1117. 
23 Millbank “Domestic Rifts”, above n 9, at 18. 
24 ACT Department of Justice and Community Safety The Recognition of Same Sex 
Relationships in ACT (2005) at 5. 
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The overall result of these reforms was to extend the rights of same sex 
couples into an increasing number of legal areas, on the basis of equality with 
rights of unmarried opposite sex couples. 
Overall, this Act does not further the equality of non-conjugal 
relationships because it does not address any identifiable needs of people in 
such relationships.  It also sustains the distinction between different types of 
conjugal relationship, continuing to privilege marriage.  It remains unclear what 
type of non-conjugal relationships are covered by the concept of a relationship 
involving a “personal or financial commitment and support of a domestic 
nature” and Millbank’s research suggests it is unlikely that a court will ever be 
called on to decide this.   
There is no need for New Zealand to adopt such an approach to 
recognising non-conjugal relationships, because New Zealand already allows 
for the adjustment of property interests between people who do not come within 
the Property Relationships Act 1976 on the basis of the doctrine of constructive 
trust.
25
  This doctrine focuses on the reasonable expectations of parties and 
looks at whether they have contributed to the property in some way, whether 
they have a reasonable expectation that they would acquire an interest, and 
whether the property owner should reasonably have expected to grant the other 
person an interest in that property.  Situations may arise where cohabitants 
disagree about their respective interests in property upon relationship 
breakdown. However, the courts have a broad equitable jurisdiction to 
determine ownership in such cases. 
B New South Wales  
1 “Domestic Relationships” 
Five years after the Australian Capital Territory passed the Domestic 
Relationships Act 1994, New South Wales passed the Property (Relationships) 
Legislation Amendment Act 1999.  This Act amended the Property 
(Relationships) Act 1984 to grant a narrow range of non-conjugal relationships 
                                                
25 The Law Commission of England Sharing Homes: A Discussion Paper (2002) at 66. 
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some limited rights relating to property division as well as recognising de facto 
relationships in gender-neutral terms.26   
While the Amendment Act was based on the Domestic Relationships 
Act, New South Wales first considered recognising non-conjugal relationships a 
decade prior in a Law Commission report on de facto relationships.27  The 
Commission preferred not to extend its recommendations to “other domestic or 
household relationships, such as those constituted by parents and adult children, 
siblings, homosexual couples, or larger groups living in a common household.”  
The Commission considered that while de facto relationships partially 
resembled marriage, these other types of relationships bore less resemblance.   
Then, in 1993, the Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby in New South Wales 
released an initial discussion paper recommending that people be able to 
nominate “significant personal relationships” for particular purposes.28  The 
paper suggested that caregiving relationships and other forms of emotional or 
financial interdependent relationships raise different policy concerns than 
couple relationships.  It proposed that different people might be nominated as 
the person with whom someone has a significant personal relationship, for 
different purposes.  It questioned why certain rights and responsibilities flow 
from marriage and why marriage continues to be viewed as the benchmark.  
However, the Lobby resiled from this position in the final version of the paper 
released in 1994, indicating that the proposal of being able to nominate more 
than one person was too difficult to implement.29   
The 1999 amendment to the Property (Relationships) Act, which 
followed, allows for the recognition of couple relationships and non-couple 
relationships under the umbrella term of “domestic relationship”.   Section 5 
defines a domestic relationship as a de facto relationship (defined in s 4) or: 
… a close personal relationship (other than a marriage or a de facto 
relationship) between two adult persons, whether or not related by family, 
                                                
26 Prior to this amendment, the Property Relationships Act 1984 was titled the De Facto 
Relationships Act 1984. 
27 New South Wales Law Reform Commission De Facto Relationships (NSWLRC R 36, 1983). 
at 15. 
28 Lesbian and Gay Legal Rights Service “The Bride Wore Pink” (1993). 
29 Lesbian and Gay Legal Rights Service “The Bride Wore Pink” (2nd ed, 1994). 
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who are living together, one or each of whom provides the other with 
domestic support and personal care. 
As such, the Act is of similar scope to the Domestic Relationships Act 
1994 and covers the adjustment of property interests and maintenance 
obligations.  However, unlike the Australian Capital Territory, New South 
Wales maintains a distinction between couple and non-couple relationships and 
uses a narrower definition of domestic relationships, excluding non-cohabitees.  
Bottomley and Wong suggest that “lesser rights” accord to non-couple 
relationships.30  Writing shortly after the passage of the Amendment Act, 
Graycar and Millbank noted that only a small number of Acts were 
consequentially amended to refer to a “domestic relationship” (in the areas of 
statutory property division, inheritance, bail and stamp duty), while a much 
larger number refer to a “de facto relationship”.31   
2 Application of relationship recognition principles  
Like the Domestic Relationships Act, the real focus of the New South 
Wales legislation is on recognising non-traditional conjugal relationships 
without referring to their conjugal nature.  During Parliamentary debate on the 
Bill one politician asserted that:
32
    
If this bill were about sexuality I would not be able to support it.  However, as 
no-one is arguing that this bill is about sexuality, I will not oppose it.   
Ultimately, the Act raises concerns similar to the Domestic 
Relationships Act in respect of the application of the relationship recognition 
principles; in particular, equality, the protection of reasonable expectations, and 
the principles of good public policy design, including efficiency, coherence and 
certainty.  Of the uptake by non-conjugal partners, the New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission has observed that:33 
                                                
30 Anne Bottomley and Simone Wong Changing Contours of Domestic Life, Family and Law: 
Caring and Sharing (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009) at 20. 
31 Reg Graycar and Jenni Millbank “The Bride Wore Pink ... To the Property (Relationships) 
Legislation Amendment Act 1999: Relationships Law Reform in New South Wales” (2000) 17 
Can J Fam L 227 at 249. 
32  (26 May 1999) NSWPD 739. 
33 New South Wales Law Reform Commission Relationships (NSWLRC 113, 2006) at 3.7 
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There have been very few cases brought by people in close personal 
relationships.  In fact, in most cases where the existence of a close personal 
relationship is claimed, the claim is presented as an alternative argument.  The 
primary cause of action is usually that the applicant was in a de facto 
relationship with the defendant or, in the case of matters under the Family 
Provision Act 1982, the deceased. 
This report followed a review by the Commission of the operation of the 
Act.
34
  An initial discussion paper in 2002 queried whether de facto and close 
personal relationships should continue to be regulated by the same provisions.35  
The discussion paper stated that:36 
… de facto relationships and close personal relationships can be vastly 
different in nature, and people may form such relationships for very different 
reasons …  In general, the provisions of the PRA assume some degree of 
emotional and financial interdependence in a relationship. While this is 
usually the case in de facto relationships, it may not be so in other close 
personal relationships.  
The Commission also considered whether the cohabitation requirement 
should be removed from the Property (Relationships) Act, but raised a concern 
that this:37 
… could have the significant disadvantage of making it difficult to determine 
when a close personal relationship exists. This could result in relationships 
where there is only a tenuous emotional or financial interdependency, which 
could cause injustice. 
The 2006 report by the Law Commission, however, supported the 
continued application of the law to non-conjugal relationships.38  In fact, it 
recommended removing any hierarchy in legislation that attaches greater rights 
to some relationships than others and extending all the rights of marriage to 
close personal relationships (both conjugal and non-conjugal).  The report 
observes that, while the legislation is somewhat unclear, it is intended to apply 
                                                
34 Reg Graycar and Jenni Millbank “The Bride Wore Pink”, above n 31, at 228. 
35 New South Wales Law Reform Commission Review of the Property (Relationships) Act 1994 
(NSW)  (NSWLRC DP 44, 2002). 
36 Ibid, at 2.58 to 2.59. 
37 Ibid, at 2.67. 
38 New South Wales Law Commission Relationships, above n 33, at 1.56. 
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to carers.
39
  The report also highlighted some case law on the meaning of “close 
personal relationship”, which includes both domestic and personal support, 
where:40  
Domestic support includes such things as doing the shopping for the parties, 
cooking, washing and providing accommodation, etc. Personal care, on the 
other hand, implies care of a more private nature such as assistance with 
bodily functions and personal hygiene: for example, dressing and undressing, 
bathing, food preparation and eating, taking medication … one might expect 
this kind of care from an employed nurse or carer, or a mother for her sick 
child or a daughter for her elderly incapacitated mother. While the paid nurse 
or carer would be excluded by the terms of the Act, the mother or daughter in 
the last two examples would be included. 
In a recent case, it was held that taking the deceased to doctor’s appointments 
and keeping him company was not sufficient. The plaintiff did not provide 
any evidence that she provided assistance by way of feeding, clothing or 
showering, or administering medication to the deceased, therefore no close 
personal relationship was found to exist. By contrast, in Jurd v Public Trustee, 
apart from cooking, cleaning and keeping the property tidy for the deceased, 
the plaintiff claimed also to have bathed the deceased’s feet, brushed his hair 
and cajoled him into bathing etc. The deceased was very obese and suffered 
from diabetes and emphysema. The Supreme Court found that the elements of 
a close personal relationship had been met, although the relationship was one 
of short duration. 
In 2010, New South Wales enacted the Relationships Register Act 2010 
allowing for more comprehensive recognition of same-sex relationships.  
However, this Act is not intended to include people in non-conjugal 
relationships as two people are excluded from registering their relationship “if 
… the adults are related by family.”
41
   
Greycar and Millbank observe that, unlike overseas approaches, the 
initial focus in Australia toward recognising same-sex relationships was on 
presumption-based (ascription) regimes, rather than registration schemes.
42
  
Most likely this was due to the symbolic nature registration schemes (conferring 
                                                
39 New South Wales Law Commission Relationships, above n 33, at 3.5 - 3.6. 
40 New South Wales Law Commission Relationships, above n 33, at 3.8 – 3.10. 
41 Relationships Act 2010, s 5. 
42 Reg Graycar and Jenni Millbank “The Bride Wore Pink”, above n 31, at 228. 
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a great degree legitimacy on relationships they recognise), making it more 
politically palatable to accord recognition through ascriptive regimes that also 
recognise other caring relationships.  However, following these reforms, 
Tasmania introduced both comprehensive registration and ascription regimes 
for recognising conjugal and non-conjugal relationships. 
C Tasmania 
1 “Significant” and “caring relationships” 
Tasmania is one of Australia’s more conservative provinces.  Tasmania 
was the last state or territory in Australia to decriminalise sexual acts between 
consenting males, passing amending legislation in 1997.  However, Tasmania 
now recognises same-sex relationships under the Relationships Act 2003.  This 
Act also recognises non-conjugal relationships.  In fact, no state or territory in 
Australia yet rivals the extent of the recognition of non-conjugal relationships 
afforded under this Act.  
The Relationships Act allows a deed of relationship to be registered as 
either a “significant relationship” or a “caring relationship” when certain 
conditions are satisfied.43  Unlike the reforms in the Australian Capital Territory 
and New South Wales, registration of a relationship under the Relationships Act 
is not limited to the adjustment of property interests and has many significant 
legal consequences.    
To begin with, however, significant relationships are not intended to 
include non-conjugal relationships.  People who register their relationship as a 
significant relationship cannot be “related by family” and must have a 
“relationship as a couple”.
44
  Registration of a relationship is not essential to 
recognise it as a significant relationship.  Rather, participants must meet criteria 
traditionally associated with the recognition of de facto relationships. 
Caring relationships, on the other hand, are intended to include non-
conjugal relationships.  Two adults, related or not, can register a caring 
relationship if one provides the other with “domestic support and personal 
                                                
43 Relationships Act 2003, ss 4 – 5. 
44 Ibid, s 4. 
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care”.
45
  Neither partner can be receiving payment for the care of the other.
46
  
Registration is not required for a relationship to be recognised as a caring 
relationship and a Court can make a declaration that a significant or caring 
relationship exits between two people upon an application for the purpose by 
any person.  A non-exhaustive list of factors are set out that can be taken into 
account when deciding whether a relationship is a caring relationship or not.  
The lists of criteria used to identify significant and caring relationships 
respectively, are similar.  Three additional factors are included in the 
identification of a significant relationship, the first two of which are whether or 
not a sexual relationship exists and the care and support of children.  In 
addition, participants must also have a relationship as a couple.  A caring 
relationship, otherwise, involves the same criteria as a significant relationship.  
That is, regard may be had to the duration of the relationship; the nature and 
extent of a common residence; the degree of financial dependence or 
interdependence, and arrangements for support between the parties; the 
ownership, use and acquisition of property; the performance of household 
duties; the degree of commitment to a shared life; and the reputation and public 
aspects of the relationship.  An additional factor only relates to caring 
relationships, which is the level of personal care and domestic support provided 
by one or each of the partners to the other. 
The Relationships Act extends the rights, entitlements and 
responsibilities of opposite-sex married and de facto couples to a wider variety 
of personal relationships.  Both caring and significant relationships have legal 
consequences for superannuation, taxation, insurance, health care, hospital 
visitation, wills, property division, and employment conditions (such as 
parenting and bereavement leave).  However, caring relationships entail fewer 
legal consequences, particularly where they are not registered.   
The Relationships Act 2003 itself provides for the adjustment of 
property interests and maintenance upon dissolution of a caring or significant 
relationship.  All other changes were implemented through the Relationships 
                                                
45 Ibid, s 5. 
46 Ibid, s 4. 
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(Consequential Amendments) Bill.
47
  Many of the changes only apply to 
significant relationships and more apply to registered caring relationships than 
de facto caring relationships.   
Finally, a deed of relationship may be revoked on the death or marriage 
of either party or on the application of either or both of the parties.  To enter 
into either a significant or caring relationship, both parties must live in 
Tasmania.  It does not appear that any country recognises Tasmanian caring 
relationships, although some countries recognise Tasmanian significant 
relationships as the equivalent of same-sex partnerships in those countries.48 
2 Application of relationship recognition principles 
The proposal to reform Tasmania’s relationship laws by recognising 
both conjugal and non-conjugal relationships occurred in the midst of 
significant debate about same-sex law reform.  However, the recognition of 
significant and caring relationships was the result of an inquiry into the legal 
recognition of significant personal relationships by the Tasmanian Parliament’s 
Joint Standing Committee on Community Development in 2001.49 
The Committee found that the denial of legal recognition to same-sex 
relationships created unjustifiable hardship and expenses and that discrimination 
against these relationships occurred in many areas of life.50  The Committee 
recommended extending the legal definition of de facto relationship (which only 
applied to heterosexual couples) or using a new term such as domestic 
relationship or significant personal relationship, as well as allowing such 
relationships to be registered.51  The Committee reported that only “a small 
number of submissions referred to carer or other non-traditional relationships 
                                                
47 The Bill was split into many different amending Acts prior to passage. 
48 For example, England recognises significant relationships as equivalent to civil partnerships 
under the Civil Partnership Act 2004, and the State of New Jersey recognises significant 
relationships as equivalent to domestic partnerships, but not civil unions.  
49 Parliament of Tasmania: Joint Standing Committee on Community Development Report on 
the Legal Recognition of Significant Personal Relationships (2001) at 5. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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which were not of a sexual nature.”
52
  However, the Committee considered 
that:53 
… such relationships arise in response to individual circumstances and thus do 
not readily identify as a cohesive interest group, therefore a lesser response was 
to be expected from this category. 
The submission of the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Commissioner 
raised the issue of two elderly companions living together and perceived flaws 
with intestacy law.54  The Commissioner noted that even if the two people are 
financially independent, the fact that they are living together often means they 
are contributing, whether it is in psychologically-supportive ways or monetary 
or non-monetary ways, to whatever property is accumulated.  The Committee 
found that:55 
Like same sex couples, those in non-marriage like relationships are 
disadvantaged in areas of property rights, intestacy and other entitlements.  
These relationships, which may include carer and companion relationships, have 
been recognised in the ACT, NSW and Victoria.  However they do not receive 
the full range of rights afforded to non-traditional relationships based on sexual 
association. 
The Committee considered that while “… the term ‘de facto’ may seem 
incongruous when used in respect to non-couple relationships, the presumptive 
model of recognition can be utilised to recognise relationships which are not 
‘marriage-like’.”56  Previously, a Private Member’s Bill, the Significant 
Relationships Bill (No 2) 1998, had sought recognition of significant personal 
relationships in the same way as de facto relationships, referencing a variety of 
factors such as emotional interdependence, mutual fellowship, and mutual 
commitment to the continuance of the relationship, noting that these 
relationships might or might not be based on cohabitation and sexual association 
or financial interdependence.  The Committee endorsed this approach. 
                                                
52 Ibid, at 21. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid, at 26. 
55 Ibid, 25-26. 
56 Ibid, at 64. 
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However, the concerns raised in this inquiry with respect to the 
recognition of non-conjugal relationships have not been borne out in practice.  
Data provided by the Tasmanian Department of Justice in 2009 indicated that 
145 relationships had been registered in total since the Act came into force in 
2004.  Out of these, only two were caring relationships.57  For Tasmania as well 
then, recognition of non-conjugal relationships was an accompaniment to same-
sex law reform, whereby non-conjugal relationships were not recognised in their 
own right but to support the extension of legal recognition to same-sex couples.  
Croome writes that:58   
Some supporters of conjugal/non-conjugal equality have insisted on its 
pragmatic value.  Many of those conservatives who are fearful of endorsing the 
rights of same sex couples are less worried by law reform proposals which mix 
these couples in with a much broader range of significant relationships.  
Ultimately, the Tasmanian reforms also raise questions about the 
principled basis for extending a comprehensive recognition model based on 
marriage to non-conjugal relationships.  Similar questions about the application 
of the relationship recognition principles apply as were raised in relation to the 
Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales schemes. 
D Victoria 
1 “Registered caring relationships” 
Victoria has also enacted legislation that recognises certain non-conjugal 
relationships in a manner similar to marriage.  To begin with, in 2007, both the 
Cities of Melbourne and Yarra launched Relationship Declaration Programmes, 
which remain in force to date.  Under these programmes, two people can declare 
that they are partners and have this declaration recorded in the respective 
Council Relationship Declaration Registers (for example, for the purposes of 
establishing that a relationship exists).  Victoria then introduced the 
Relationships Bill in December 2007 to create a state-wide domestic partnership 
registry.  The Bill was enacted in April 2008 and commenced in December 
2008.   
                                                
57 Email from Department of Justice to Lorraine Johns regarding the number of caring 
relationships registered with the Department (15 October 2009). 
58 Rodney Croome “Word is Out” (2007) <www.arts.usyd.edu.au>. 
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The registration scheme initially applied to same and opposite-sex de 
facto couples.  Although the Tasmanian model of significant and caring 
relationships was considered during the passage of the Bill, the category of 
“caring relationships” was not included.  However, the Attorney-General stated 
in the second reading speech that this would be “the subject of further 
consultation with a view to considering possible amendment in the future”.59  
Section 5 defined a registrable relationship as: 
A relationship (other than a registered relationship) between two adult persons 
who are not married to each other but are a couple where one or each of the 
persons in the relationship provides personal or financial commitment and 
support of a domestic nature for the material benefit of the other, irrespective of 
their genders and whether or not they are living under the same roof. 
Despite the requirement for parties to be “a couple”, the Act also 
provides that people who provide paid care cannot register a relationship.  This 
would seem unnecessary if the scheme only applied to “couples”.  The Act also 
did not expressly exclude blood relatives from its ambit, as is usually the case 
where legislation is intended to recognise conjugal relationships only.  This 
might have begged the question as to whether people in a caring relationship 
would nonetheless attempt to register their relationship under the Act.  
However, the Relationships Amendment (Caring Relationships) Bill was 
introduced to provide for the registration of caring relationships in Victoria and 
the adjustment of property interests and rights to maintenance between caring 
partners who are in or have been in a caring relationship.  The Bill amended the 
Relationships Act to provide that a registered relationship means a registered 
domestic relationship (a conjugal relationship) or a registered caring 
relationship.   
There are no functional criteria that must be met in order to register a 
domestic or caring relationship.  The key difference between an application to 
enter a domestic relationship and an application to enter a caring relationship is 
that to enter a registered caring relationship both parties to the relationship must 
                                                
59 (6 December 2007) VPD 4393. 
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receive independent legal advice.  Registration under the Act provides 
conclusive proof of a relationship.   
2 Application of relationship recognition principles 
The Relationship Declaration Programmes are unusual types of 
registration schemes, as they have no substantive legal effect.  Rather, their 
purpose was to make it easier to establish whether a non-traditional conjugal 
relationship existed prior to legislative reform in Victoria.  The legislative 
reform itself raises similar concerns with respect to the application of the 
relationship recognition principles identified in relation to the Australian Capital 
Territory, New South Wales and Tasmania.  In fact, partners entering into a 
caring relationship are required to obtain independent legal advice due to a 
concern that they will be less likely than domestic partners to expect legal 
consequences to attach to their relationship. 
Two people are not be able to register their caring relationship if 
married.  Interestingly the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee, in 
vetting the legislation, suggested that this might amount to discrimination 
against married people, on the basis that this approach toward recognising 
caring relationships treated single persons differently from married couples.60  
The Committee observed that:61 
For example, a middle-aged person may provide significant care for a disabled 
friend.  If both are single, they will be able to register that relationship, allowing 
easy proof of that relationship and access to the property adjustment regime in 
part 3 of the Relationships Act 2008.  However, if the one happens to be 
married (e.g. to a long-term spouse with dementia who is living in a nursing 
home) or has an intimate relationship with a neighbour, then they will both be 
denied these legal benefits in respect of their caring relationship 
Ultimately, the effect of the Victorian legislation is similar to that of the 
other Australian examples.  It is not clear whether this legislation has, in fact, 
assisted those in non-conjugal relationships.  The ability to register a caring 
                                                
60 Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee Alert Digest No 15 of 2008 (2008). 
61 Ibid. 
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relationship commenced on 1 December 2009.  To date, none have been 
registered.62 
III Canada 
The federal and provincial power divide has driven the recognition of 
non-conjugal relationships in Canada even more so than in Australia.  It is now 
settled law in Canada that the power to define marriage lies with the federal 
government.63  Canada became the fourth country in the world to recognise 
same-sex marriage with the passage of the Civil Marriage Act 2005.  Before 
this, same-sex marriage was legalised as a consequence of court cases in many 
provinces and territories, whereby provincial and territorial courts ruled bans on 
same-sex marriage unconstitutional.64   
However, prior to the legalisation of same-sex marriage, two Supreme 
Court cases affirmed the right of de facto couples, including same-sex couples, 
to equal treatment under the Constitution Act 1982.65  First in 1995, in Miron v 
Trudel, the Supreme Court ruled that marital status was a characteristic which 
could not be a basis for discrimination, holding that an insurance benefit 
provided only to married couples discriminated against common law couples.66  
Then in 1999, in M v H, the Supreme Court ruled that same-sex couples were 
entitled to receive many of the legal benefits associated with marriage.
67
  
Most Canadian laws which affect couples are within provincial and 
territorial, rather than federal jurisdiction.  Provinces and territories were, 
therefore, required to ensure their laws were consistent with these Supreme 
Court rulings.  Bala observes that debate in Canada over the legal recognition of 
                                                
62 Email from the Victorian Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages to Lorraine Johns 
regarding the number of caring relationships registered with the Registry (25 August 2010). 
63 Constitution Act 1867, s 91(26).  This interpretation of the constitution was upheld in 
Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage [2004] 3 SCR 698.  Section 92(12) of the Constitution Act 
gives the provinces the power to pass laws regulating the solemnisation of marriage. 
64 See generally M v H [1999] 2 SCR 3. 
65 The Constitution of Canada is defined in subsection 52(2) of the Canada Act 1982 as 
consisting of the Canada Act (schedule B of the Canada Act sets out the Constitution Act 1982, 
which includes the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), all acts and orders referred to in 
the schedule (including the Constitution Act 1897) and any amendments to these acts and 
orders. 
66 Miron v Trudel [1995] 2 SCR 418. 
67 M v H , above n 64.   
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same-sex marriages and de facto relationships has been accompanied by a 
proposal that the law should recognise any adult relationship that involves some 
degree of economic interdependence and close emotional ties.68   
The response of both Alberta and Nova Scotia to the Supreme Court 
rulings was to establish legal schemes that recognise non-conjugal relationships.  
Both provinces now recognise same-sex marriage as a consequence of the Civil 
Marriage Act.  However, the schemes established to recognise non-conjugal 
relationships remain in force and are discussed below.   
New Brunswick also recognises non-conjugal relationships in a very 
limited manner as a “family relationship”.  Support obligations under the 
Family Services Act 1980 arise when two persons, not being married to each 
other, have cohabited continuously in a family relationship for three years and 
one person was substantially dependent on the other for support.69   Family 
relationship is not defined in the Act although “cohabit” is defined as living 
together in a family relationship and  “common-law partner” means a person 
who “cohabits in a conjugal relationship with another person if the persons are 
not married to each other.”70   
As such, a family relationship is broader than a relationship with a 
common law partner or spouse.   The effect of this measure is limited as it 
relates to a single provision that “Every spouse has an obligation to provide 
support for himself or herself and for the other spouse, in accordance with need, 
to the extent that he or she is capable of doing so.”71  The Act was amended to 
extend this provision from spouses to include family relationships.  This 
approach is notable for the characterisation of non-conjugal relationships as 
family relationships.  Section 114 of the Act also provides an obligation, in 
accordance with need, for every adult child to maintain his or her parents who 
have cared for that child and provided support, to the extent that the child is able 
to do so. 
                                                
68 Nicholas Bala “Controversy over Couples in Canada: The Evolution of Marriage and Other 
Adult Interdependent Relationships” (2003-2004) 29 Queens LJ 41 at 88. 
69 Family Services Act 1980, s 112(3). 
70 Ibid s 1. 
71 Ibid, s 112(1). 
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A Alberta 
1 “Adult interdependent relationships”  
Alberta recognises non-conjugal relationships in a manner similar to 
marriage through the Adult Interdependent Relationships Act 2002.  The Act 
followed two projects by the Alberta Law Reform Institute concerning the 
recognition of de facto relationships.  The Institute first considered extending 
the rights and obligations of married couples to heterosexual de facto couples 
after the Supreme Court ruling in Miron v Trudel.72  The Institute did not 
include same-sex de facto couples in this project because it did not consider 
social policy “sufficiently well established” to do so.73   
However, following the landmark ruling in M v H, the Institute released 
a further report concerning the legal recognition of same-sex relationships.
74
  
This report considered a variety of options to ensure that the law in Alberta 
would be consistent with this ruling, including the creation of a domestic 
partnership registry allowing any two people to register their relationship and 
acquire the benefits and obligations of marriage.  The Institute suggested that if 
the goal was to eliminate discrimination, then a domestic partnership registry 
would be appropriate.
75
  This recommendation was adopted by the legislature 
and the Adult Interdependent Relationships Act was passed in 2002.   
This Act allows two people to register their relationship or have their 
relationship recognised on an ascriptive basis.  The effect of the Act is that an 
adult interdependent relationship must be considered when determining legal 
rights and obligations under a variety of laws and policies in Alberta, including 
financial support, health and other insurance cover, maintenance, domestic 
violence, the right to sue for wrongful death, the disclosure of personal 
information and various conflict of interest provisions.   
                                                
72 Alberta Law Reform Institute Family Law Project: Spousal Support (DP 18.2, 1998).  Miron 
v Trudel, above n 66. 
73 Alberta Law Reform Institute Spousal Support, above n 72, at footnote 274. 
74 Alberta Law Reform Institute Recognition of Rights and Obligations in Same-Sex 
Relationships (RP 21, 2002).  M v H, above, n 64. 
75 Ibid, at 41. 
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With respect to registration of the relationship, s 3 provides that a person 
is the adult interdependent partner of another if they enter into an adult 
interdependent agreement under s 7.  Section 7 allows two people to register 
their relationship if they are living together or intend to live together.   
With respect to the ascription of relationship status, s 3 of the Act 
provides that a person is the adult interdependent partner of another if they have 
lived with the person in a relationship of interdependence for three years or 
more.76  A relationship of interdependence means that the two people share each 
other’s lives, are emotionally committed to one another and “function as an 
economic and domestic unit”.
77
  Section 1(2) of the Act provides that in 
determining whether two persons function as an economic and domestic unit, all 
the circumstances of the relationship must be taken into account, which may 
include: 
• whether or not the persons have a conjugal relationship; 
• the degree of exclusivity of the relationship; 
• the conduct and habits of the persons in respect of household 
activities and living arrangements; 
• the degree to which the persons hold themselves out to others as 
an economic and domestic unit; 
• the degree to which the persons formalise their legal obligations, 
intentions and responsibilities toward one another; 
• the extent to which direct and indirect contributions have been 
made by either person to the other or to their mutual well-being; 
• the degree of financial dependence or interdependence and any 
arrangements for financial support between the persons; 
• the care and support of children; and 
• the ownership, use and acquisition of property. 
The criteria for identifying whether an adult interdependent relationship 
exists are essentially the same as those used in New Zealand to identify whether 
                                                
76 This criterion is relaxed to a relationship of “some permanence” if there is a child of the 
relationship by birth or adoption. 
77 Adult Interdependent Relationships Act 2002, s 1(1)(f). 
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a de facto relationship exists, except for the New Zealand requirement that the 
two people in question live together as a couple.  “Conjugality” is a relevant 
factor, but it is not determinative.  It is not clear what conjugality means in this 
context, although, conceptually, it could be understood to refer to sexual 
intimacy.   
2 Application of relationship recognition principles 
The Alberta Law Reform Institute considered that a domestic 
partnership registry:
78
 
… gives effect to many fundamental principles: voluntariness, in that people 
may choose to assume the benefits and obligations of marriage; fairness 
between parties in a committed relationship involving issues which arise at the 
termination of the relationship, where one party is in a more vulnerable position 
and is in need of protection; minimizing discrimination in access to social 
status; equity in distribution of benefits; equality among family relationships; 
and protection of privacy. 
However, as Bala suggests “Alberta’s political decision to move towards 
reducing the significance of conjugality is clearly not motivated by any desire to 
de-emphasize the importance of heterosexual marriage.”79  Bailey observes that 
Alberta has a history of resisting gay rights, and has been careful to couch its 
legislative proposals in language that will not offend.
80
  Bailey also indicates 
that the Act’s application is limited and it does not address important issues 
relating to family property rights.81   
In addition, the legislation was amended prior to enactment to ensure 
that people related by blood or adoption could only become adult 
interdependent partners if they entered into a written agreement.  This was to 
ensure that the reasonable expectations of family members living with each 
other could not be subverted if one member, upon relationship breakdown, 
claimed they had been adult interdependent partners.  This suggests that the 
regime does not, in fact, accord with the reasonable expectations or living 
                                                
78 Alberta Law Reform Institute Same-Sex Relationships, n 72, at 38. 
79 Nicholas Bala “Adult Interdependent Relationships”, above n 66, at 89. 
80 Martha Bailey (2004) “Regulation of Cohabitation and Marriage in Canada” Law & Pol’y 153 
at 164. 
81 Ibid, at 163-4. 
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arrangements of people in non-conjugal relationships.  According to the Alberta 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Development:82 
Non-conjugal friends living together in a relationship of interdependence for a 
continuous period of not less than three years will become adult interdependent 
partners, whether or not they intend to … it is not possible to contract out of the 
Dependants Relief Act.  Thus, if two elderly friends … live together in a 
platonic relationship for several years, when one dies, the other may be able to 
claim a larger share of the deceased's estate than any surviving children, even if 
the two friends never signed an adult interdependent partnership agreement.     
Although this concern only applies to non-relatives, Davies considers 
that there is a real risk that cases may arise where a court finds that an adult 
interdependent relationship existed after three or more years of living in a non-
conjugal relationship.83  This could undermine the autonomy of parties 
involved.  It is difficult to determine whether this has occurred, as cases taken 
under the Act appear to all relate to traditional de facto partners.  However, Bala 
states that:84 
… while it is theoretically possible that non-conjugal cohabitants might find that 
they have many of the rights and obligations of “spouses”, in reality the 
A.I.R.A. is generally likely to result only in opposite-sex and same-sex conjugal 
partners having, after three years of cobhatitaiton or after having had a child 
together, most of these rights and obligations. 
As there is no central repository for those who formally enter into an 
adult interdependent relationship, neither the Alberta Ministry of Justice nor 
Statistics Alberta collect data on adult interdependent relationships and it is 
difficult to determine whether there has been any uptake by non-conjugal 
partners.   
                                                
82 Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Development Adult Interdependent Partners and 
Farm Estate Planning (2004). 
83 Christine Davies “The Extension of Marriage-Like Rights and Obligations Beyond  
Conjugality: The Adult Interdependent Relationships Act of Alberta” (Conference of the 
International Society of Family Law, June 2003). 
84 Nicholas Bala “Adult Interdependent Relationships”, above n 66, at 93. 
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B Nova Scotia  
1 “Registered partnerships” 
Nova Scotia introduced a domestic partnership registry in 2001.85  This 
registry appears to be based on the British Columbia Law Institute report on 
recognising spousal and family relationships (although this report was never 
implemented in British Columbia).86   
In 1997 the British Columbian Attorney-General directed the Law 
Institute to review the province’s laws that denoted a spousal or family 
relationship and make recommendations for changes necessary to recognise a 
variety of family relationships and identify relevant legal rights and 
obligations.87  On the basis of analysis drawing on principles similar to those in 
Chapter One, the Institute recommended that the law also recognise the family 
status of people (including non-relatives) who live together in a close 
relationship that is the equivalent of a family relationship.88   
The Institute proposed that a non-relative who is regarded as a family 
member should qualify as such in legislation that governs, for example, 
insurance protecting a person’s family; rights and obligations of a family when 
a member becomes incompetent; who may own shares in a professional 
corporation; and who should be considered to be related for the purposes of 
determining whether someone is in a conflict of interest or whether a transaction 
between two people is at arm’s length.
89
  It is likely that the Institute’s 
recommendations were never enacted because the Institute was not asked to 
                                                
85 Vital Statistics Act, RS, Ch 494. 
86 Alberta Law Reform Institute Same-Sex Relationships, n 72, at 36.  In 2000, the British 
Columbia legislature enacted the Definition of Spouse Amendment Act 2000 and brought into 
force the Definition of Spouse Amendment Act 1999.  These Acts did not extend recognition to 
non-conjugal relationships. 
87 British Columbia Law Institute Report on Recognition of Spousal and Family Status (1999) at 
1.  This report followed amendments made to the Family Relations Act in 1997, which 
recognised certain marriage-like relationships. 
88 Ibid, at 24. 
89 Ibid.  
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consider and report on whether it was desirable to recognise non-traditional 
relationships.  This is perhaps why:90   
… the report does not set out comprehensive analysis of the pros and cons of 
this type of reform, the impact it may have on the community, and whether 
these developments represent a threat to the institution of marriage or to 
traditional relationships  
Without this further analysis it is difficult to assess the merits of the 
Institute’s proposals to determine whether non-conjugal relevant are legally 
relevant in the areas identified by the Institute.  However, the Institute did 
highlight discrepancies in the approach taken to identifying close family 
relationships for legal purposes (for example, some legal lists stopped at 
siblings, others included half-siblings and in-laws), and recommended that a 
standardised approach be considered. 
The Institute recommended enacting a Family Status Recognition Act to 
define family relationships; set out the rules of general application respecting 
status, rights, and obligations; and set out rules for determining when such 
relationships arise and when they end.91  The Institute also recommended 
enacting a Domestic Partner Act to permit two adults to make a joint declaration 
that they are domestic partners and, as such, have status, rights and obligations 
similar to those that accrue to people who are married.  It was intended that 
amendments to the statute book would follow to ensure that British Columbia 
legislation applied fairly to traditional and non-traditional family relationships. 
Consistent with this approach, the Domestic Partnership Registry in 
Nova Scotia allows any two adults to register a domestic partnership.
92
  This 
is:93 
… intended to recognize and give certain rights to people in committed, 
intimate relationships. Penalties may be imposed if individuals attempt to use 
                                                
90 Thomas G Anderson “Comment on the Report of the British Columbia Law Institute on 
Recognition of Spousal and Family Status” (2000) 12 CJWL 439 at 443.   See also Thomas G 
Anderson “Models of Registered Partnership and their Rationale: The British Columbia Law 
Institute’s Proposed Domestic Partner Act” (2000) 17 Can J Fam L 89. 
91 British Columbia Law Institute Spousal and Family Status, above n 87, at 30. 
92 Vital Statistics Act, RS, Ch 494, s 2. 
93 Alberta Law Reform Institute Same-Sex Relationships, n 72, at 36. 
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the DPR to commit fraud to obtain certain benefits to which they would not 
otherwise be entitled. 
The Registry is administered by the Office of Vital Statistics.  However, 
parties can execute a partnership agreement without registering it.  If the 
partnership agreement is executed but not actually registered, the agreement 
applies between parties but is limited in its application to third parties (though it 
can help provide evidence of a relationship in the event of intestacy).  Upon 
registration, domestic partners have rights similar to spouses in relation to many 
different Acts.94  Either partner can terminate a partnership by signing a 
termination of partnership form and notifying the other partner.  If the 
relationship was registered, its termination must also be registered with the 
Office of Vital Statistics.    
2 Application of relationship recognition principles 
Domestic partnerships were introduced in Nova Scotia as a vehicle for 
recognising same-sex conjugal couples.  Similar to the other regimes discussed 
so far in this chapter, the rights and obligations, therefore, mirror those of 
marriage.  The British Columbia report on which the regime is based can be 
criticised, because it does not consider the basis for or impact of extending each 
of these rights and responsibilities to non-conjugal relationships.  The rights and 
obligations in question focus on financial rights and obligations between the 
parties as well as between the parties and the state.  It has been observed of the 
termination of domestic partnerships that:95 
If your domestic partnership registration included a statement that you and your 
partner were responsible for each other's living expenses, you'll probably want 
to immediately notify your ex-partner's creditors in writing that you'll no longer 
be responsible for his or her bills.  
                                                
94 Vital Statistics Act, RS, Ch 494, s 54(2).  These include the Fatal Injuries Act, Health Act, 
Hospitals Act, Insurance Act, Intestate Succession Act, Maintenance and Custody Act, 
Matrimonial Property Act, Members’ Retiring Allowances Act, Pension Benefits Act, Probate 
Act, Testators’ Family Maintenance Act, Public Service Superannuation Act, Teachers’ Pension 
Act, Wills Act and Workers’ Compensation Act. 
95 Sherrie Bennett “Domestic Partnership Registration and Benefits” <lawyers.com>. 
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As the scheme contemplates the registration of same-sex partnerships as 
well as non-conjugal relationships, there is no data available concerning the 
specific uptake by those in non-conjugal relationships.  Given the experience of 
other similar regimes, there are likely to be few, if any, relationships registered, 
because this scheme is also unlikely to reflect the living arrangements or 
expectations and beliefs of those in non-conjugal partners.  Again, questions are 
raised as to the merits of such a regime with respect to the principles set out in 
Chapter One.   
Unlike the proposals in the British Columbia Law Institute’s report, this 
scheme does not include an ascriptive component, and registration is required to 
access rights.  While ascription may be undesirable in some cases, the Institute 
did consider rationalising the discrepancies as to how the law defines family 
relationships (for example, inconsistent inclusion and exclusion of certain 
family members).   However, this element of Institute’s report was not adopted. 
IV United States of America 
Like Australia and Canada, relationship recognition in the United States 
of America is affected by the Constitution and the division of powers between 
the federal government and states and districts.  The federal government does 
not recognise same-sex marriage in accordance with the Defense of Marriage 
Act 1996.96  However, many of the rights and benefits relating to marriage are 
determined by the states, not the federal government, and the Defense of 
Marriage Act does not prevent states from defining marriage in relation to these 
rights and benefits. 
Same-sex marriage has been legalised by courts in three states and in 
two others and a district through legislation.  Prior to this, the federal 
government had not attempted to define marriage and recognised any marriage 
recognised by a state, even if other states did not recognise that marriage (for 
example, interracial marriages before the civil rights movement).    
                                                
96 1 USC, §7. 
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On the whole, America does not provide comprehensive recognition 
schemes for non-conjugal relationships.  However, this section briefly sets out 
proposals in Hawaii and Vermont to provide registration schemes with very 
limited legal effect for certain non-conjugal relationships. 
A Hawaii 
1 Reciprocal beneficiary relationships 
Hawaii does not recognise same-sex marriage or civil unions.  The 
Hawaiian Constitution was amended in 1998 to prohibit same-sex marriage and 
Hawaii’s governor recently vetoed legislation that would have established civil 
unions for same-sex couples.  However, Hawaii does recognise reciprocal 
beneficiary relationships under the Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act 1997.97  A 
reciprocal beneficiary relationship is a legal partnership between two people 
who are prohibited from marriage and are not currently in another reciprocal 
beneficiary relationship.98  The Act extends certain rights and benefits which 
were previously available only to married couples to reciprocal beneficiary 
partners.   
Those persons entering into a reciprocal beneficiary relationship must 
register their relationship as reciprocal beneficiaries with the Hawaiian 
Department of Health.99  Entering a relationship requires the completion of a 
short declaration form.  Parties do not need to demonstrate or affirm that their 
relationship serves a particular function.  Either party may terminate the 
relationship by filing a declaration of termination of reciprocal beneficiary 
relationship with the Department.  The Department is only responsible for 
registration and recording and not determinations of validity.  Reciprocal 
beneficiary relationships:100 
… include but are not limited to relationships such as brother and sister of the 
half as well as to the whole blood, uncle and nice, aunt and nephew, widowed 
mother and her unmarried son, and two persons of the same sex/gender. 
                                                
97 The Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, HRS. 
98 Ibid, § 572C-2. 
99 Vital records (birth, death, marriage, and divorce certificates) in Hawaii are administered by 
the Department of Health. 
100 The Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, HRS, § 572C. 
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Reciprocal beneficiary relationships are intended to cover both conjugal 
and non-conjugal relationships.  They extend a limited number of the rights and 
benefits of spouses to reciprocal beneficiaries, including inheritance, workers 
compensation, property, wrongful death, pensions, hospital visitation and 
healthcare decision-making.  By January 2009, 1,577 reciprocal beneficiary 
relationships had been registered with the Department of Health.101 
2 Application of relationship recognition principles 
The rights and benefits of a reciprocal beneficiaries relationship are 
more limited than those associated with marriage in Hawaii.  The primary 
purpose of the Act was to provide for the recognition of same-sex relationships 
rather than non-conjugal relationships.  The vehicle for doing so allowed this 
recognition to take place without acknowledging the conjugal nature of these 
relationships. 
The Act makes it possible for people in reciprocal beneficiary 
relationships to take domestic leave from work to care for their sick partner and 
to have hospital visitation rights.  Access to these sorts of rights would be 
beneficial for people in non-conjugal relationships such as the Burden sisters.  
However, to access them, people would need to register their relationship which 
may not suit the circumstances of many non-conjugal partners.  The Reciprocal 
Beneficiaries Act is yet another example of a regime set up under the auspices 
of recognising a wider range of relationships than conjugal relationships, but 
which is unlikely to meet the needs of these relationships.  In the first two years 
of the Act’s operation, it was observed that reciprocal beneficiary relationships 
had little fiscal impact for the state.102 
B Vermont 
1 Reciprocal beneficiaries 
Vermont has recognised civil unions between same-sex partners since 
2001 and same-sex marriage since 2009 under the Domestic Relations Act.
103
  
                                                
101 Statistics made available by the Hawaii Department of Health <hawaii.gov/health>. 
102 Hawaii State Auditor Study of the Fiscal Impact of Providing Certain Benefits to Reciprocal 
Beneficiaries R 99-17 (1999). 
103 Vt Stat Ann, title 15. 
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The Act also allows for the recognition of “reciprocal beneficiaries 
relationships”, a legislative scheme that was introduced at the same time as civil 
unions.104  The purpose is to:105 
… provide two persons who are blood-relatives or related by adoption the 
opportunity to establish a consensual reciprocal beneficiaries relationship so 
they may receive the benefits and protections and be subject to the 
responsibilities that are granted to spouses. 
These benefits only relate to a limited number of areas specified in the 
Act.  These are: hospital visitation and medical decision-making; decision-
making relating to anatomical gifts; decision-making relating to the disposition 
of remains; advance directions (meaning a power of attorney for health care and 
terminal care documents); patient’s bill of rights (allowing a reciprocal 
beneficiary partner to receive information relating to the patient); nursing home 
patient’s bill of rights; and abuse prevention.  
Two persons who meet the criteria in § 1303 may establish a reciprocal 
beneficiaries relationship by presenting a signed, notarised declaration of a 
reciprocal beneficiaries relationship to the Commissioner for Health and paying 
a filing fee.  Either party to a reciprocal beneficiaries relationship may terminate 
the relationship by filing a signed, notarised declaration with the Commissioner.  
If a party to a reciprocal beneficiaries relationship enters into a civil union or 
marriage, the reciprocal beneficiaries relationship terminates.  
In 2000, the Vermont Civil Union Review Commission was established 
by law to review the effectiveness of the new legislation in its first two years of 
operation.  In addition to a review of civil unions entered into, the Commission 
was also tasked to:106 
Examine reciprocal beneficiaries relationships and evaluate whether nonrelated 
persons over 62 years of age should be permitted to establish a reciprocal 
beneficiaries relationship, and whether the legal benefits, protections and 
responsibilities of a reciprocal beneficiaries relationship should be expanded. 
                                                
104 Vt Stat Ann, title 15. 
105 Vt Stat Ann, title 15, §1301(a). 
106 Vt Stat Ann, title 15. 
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No reciprocal beneficiaries relationships were registered while the 
Commission undertook its two reviews.  In its first review, the Commission did 
not comment on whether further rights and benefits should be extended to such 
relationships or whether elderly non-relatives should be able to enter into a 
reciprocal beneficiaries relationship.107  This is most likely because the primary 
purpose for establishing the Commission was to consider the impact of the new 
civil union provisions of the legislation.   
However, this matter was briefly dealt with in the second and final 
report of the Commission.108  The Commission called for submission from 
certain age-care concern interests groups.  However, these groups did not make 
an appearance.  Despite the fact that no such relationships had been registered, 
the Commission indicated that the state Department of Personnel had submitted 
that:109 
Unlike a party to a civil union, a person entering a reciprocal beneficiaries 
relationship is primarily doing so to obtain legal benefits. A person may enter a 
reciprocal beneficiaries relationship solely to obtain insurance benefits for an 
elderly or ill relative, and that could make insurance more expensive for 
everyone.  If benefits were extended to reciprocal beneficiaries, insurers would 
expect to get a disproportionate number of persons who are a “bad risk”, 
requiring significant repricing.  
Prior to the introduction of legislation allowing same-sex marriage, the 
Vermont legislature considered the Reciprocal Benefits Bill (never enacted) that 
would have disestablished civil unions and reciprocal beneficiaries relationships 
and replaced them with reciprocal partnerships.  §1301 of the Bill provided that 
to enter into a reciprocal partnership a person must be at least 18 years of age; 
not in a marriage or in another reciprocal partnership; be ineligible to marry; be 
competent to enter a contract; and consent to the reciprocal partnership without 
force, fraud or duress.  Clause §1224(a) provided that: 
                                                
107 Vermont Civil Union Review Commission Report of the Vermont Civil Union Review 
Commission (2001). 
108 Vermont Civil Union Review Commission Report of the Vermont Civil Union Review 
Commission (2002). 
109 Ibid, at 14. 
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A reciprocal partner shall have all the same benefits, protections and 
responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute, administrative or 
court rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted 
to a spouse in a marriage. 
2 Application of the relationship recognition principles 
Bala condemns reciprocal beneficiaries relationships on the basis that:110 
For the same political reasons that motivated the Alberta government, the 
Vermont legislature also created the “reciprocal beneficiary relationship” to 
allow two persons related by  blood or adoption to register and gain a limited 
legal relational status with each other.  While almost 3,500 civil unions were 
entered into by the beginning of 2002, there was not a single reciprocal 
beneficiary relationship registered.  Neither in Vermont nor anywhere else in the 
world are adults who are residing together in non-conjugal relationships 
involving economic interdependence and emotional ties seeking a “legal status” 
remotely akin” to “spousal”.  In particular, there seems to be no interest or 
expectation that there should be any oblibtaions, such as support claims, 
extending beyond the termination of cohabitation. 
This observation might be pertinent if made in respect of the proposed 
reciprocal partnerships under the Reciprocal Benefits Bill.  However, this Bill 
was not passed and reciprocal beneficiaries relationships do not have the legal 
consequences suggested by Bala, as they only extend a limited number of the 
rights and obligations of spouses.   In fact, these are areas of law where New 
Zealand also tends to recognise non-conjugal relationships (such as domestic 
violence, hospital visitation, powers of attorney and medical decision-making).  
The state has an interest in allowing certain close personal relationships some 
rights in respect of these areas. 
At first glance, the reciprocal beneficiaries relationships scheme might 
be considered to promote the principles of relationship recognition (depending 
on whether the fact the scheme does not involve all the rights and benefits of 
marriage was considered to undermine equality or not).  However, on the whole, 
the scheme does not appear effective in achieving its limited policy objectives. 
                                                
110 Nicholas Bala “Adult Interdependent Relationships”, above n 66, at 97 to 98. 
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For example, the scheme allows reciprocal beneficiaries partners to be 
considered “family” for the purposes of domestic violence laws.  The approach 
in New Zealand, however, is that a person should not need to register to come 
within the protection of these laws.  Likewise, the reciprocal beneficiaries 
scheme allows partners to enter into a power of attorney arrangement before a 
notary public.  In New Zealand, powers of attorney are not limited to certain 
relationships, but can be chosen without restriction, provided that criteria such 
as receiving independent legal advice are met.   
In addition, limiting such schemes to relatives by blood or adoption, 
where most close family relationships (such as siblings) could reasonably be 
recognised in these instances, is odd.  Ultimately, the scheme does not provide 
an effective basis for offering legal protections in certain areas to an appropriate 
range of non-conjugal relationships.  The Commissioner of Health keeps a 
record of all reciprocal beneficiaries.  However, correspondence with the 
Vermont Department of Health reveals that no reciprocal beneficiaries 
partnerships have been registered with the Department of Health to date.111  
Ultimately, the Commission, in undertaking its review, concluded that:112 
Considering there have been no reciprocal beneficiaries relationships 
established to date, the clear lack of interest among advocacy groups and the 
general public in expansion, and the likely increased costs and danger to the 
insurance market in Vermont, the Commission recommends that the reciprocal 
beneficiaries relationship not be extended to unrelated persons over 62 years of 
age, and that the legal benefits, protections and responsibilities of a reciprocal 
beneficiaries relationship not be expanded. If the reciprocal beneficiaries law 
continues to be unused, the General Assembly may want to consider its repeal. 
V Other Overseas Examples of the Recognition of Non-
Conjugal Relationships 
This chapter has identified and described the major schemes introduced 
in overseas countries for recognising non-conjugal relationships in a manner 
                                                
111 Email from Linda Merchant (Vital Records Supervisor, Vermont Department of Health) to 
Lorraine Johns regarding number of reciprocal beneficiaries relationships registered with the 
department (24 August 2010). 
112 Vermont Civil Union Review Commission Report (2002), above n 108, at 14. 
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similar to marriage.  It has not attempted to identify all instances of recognition 
for particular purposes as these would be numerous and this task is unnecessary 
to achieve the aims of this thesis.  However, there are two other examples of 
recognition of non-conjugal relationships that occur overseas that are set out 
briefly here. 
First, the legal concept of “common household” in Portugal is of 
interest.  Portugal has recognized de facto unions between same-sex couples 
since 2001 and same-sex marriage since 5 June 2010.  Portugal introduced civil 
unions for opposite-sex couples in 1999 and for same-sex couples in March 
2001.
113
  The law covers matters such as housing, work and welfare benefits for 
both same and opposite-sex de facto couples.  There is no registration process 
and the regime applies after a couple lives together for two years. Essentially 
the law sets up an ascription regime.  However, an application for a joint tax 
assessment can be made to prove the existence of the relationship (though this is 
not required). 
Also on 15 March 2001, a law known as “common economy” was also 
approved that extended to two or more persons who live in common economy, 
most of the rights of those in de facto relationships, except for welfare benefits.  
No other information is readily available about these schemes.  However, 
Santos writes that:114 
… while there is nothing that prevents a homosexual couple from benefiting 
from the legal protection provided by the law on common economies, this was 
considered insufficient by Portuguese LGBT associations, since it removes the 
affective component from the LGBT family relationship, reducing it to a merely 
economic concern. 
The Netherlands has also passed legislation establishing a scheme that 
may apply to those in non-conjugal relationships.  The Netherlands has a 
reputation has one of the most progressive countries in the world in areas of 
                                                
113 Adopta Medidas de Protecção das Uniões de Facto 2001  
114 Ana Cristina Santos “Sexual Orientation In Portugal: Towards Emancipation” (2004) 9 South 
Euro Science & Pol 159 at 161. 
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social reform.  Same-sex marriage became available in the Netherlands from 1 
April 2001.  The Dutch Ministry of Justice has stated that:115 
The principle of equal treatment was decisive. For many people, marriage is a 
symbol that carries a special meaning. They see it as a way of confirming their 
commitment to each other. There is no reason why same-sex couples should be 
denied the opportunity to do so. 
In addition to marriage and de facto relationships, Dutch law provides 
for registered partnerships and cohabitation agreements.116  All four living 
arrangements are open to same or opposite-sex people.  Registered partnerships 
are based on a conjugal model but cohabitation agreements are not.  Registered 
partnerships are not open to more than two people, whereas cohabitation 
agreements are.  Each serves a different purpose. 
A cohabitation agreement is a contract between two people or more 
people.117    It covers a variety of matters relevant to living together and sharing 
a home.  Participants can make their own arrangements or seek the assistance of 
a notary to draft an official cohabitation agreement.  An official agreement is 
needed to be eligible for matters such as partner’s pension schemes and certain 
other benefits, and creates rights which can be enforced against the state.  A 
cohabitation contract sets out the rights and obligations that a couple chooses 
for themselves. It does not have implications for private third parties. 
In 2005 this regime was subjected to some worldwide controversy, when 
it was reported that the Netherlands had commenced recognising plural 
marriages after three people entered into a cohabitation contract and undertook a 
ceremony resembling a marriage ceremony.
118
  Arguably, this approaches raises 
some public policy issues, if the state does not wish to appear to recognise 
polygamous households.  In particular, while a regime may be intended to 
recognise non-conjugal relationships, if the regime is similar in other respects to 
marriage, then there is a risk that, in practice, it could be used to register 
                                                
115 The Netherlands Ministry of Justice “Same-Sex Marriages” <english.justitie.nl>. 
116 Access Marriage, Registered Partnership, Cohabitation and Ending a Relationship 
(Netherlands, 2010) at 2. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Stanley Kurtz “Here Comes the Brides: Plural marriage is waiting in the wings” The Weekly 
Standard (26 December 2005). 
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polygamous relationships.  The then Dutch Minister of Justice refused to repeal 
the law relating cohabitation agreements when this matter received publicity, 
stating that “contracts that settle the cohabitation of more than two persons can 
have a useful ordering function.”
119
 
VI Conclusion 
The overseas regimes set out in this chapter represent efforts to extend 
some or many of the rights and obligations of marriage to non-conjugal 
relationships.  Some of these regimes make no distinction between conjugal and 
non-conjugal relationships, while others have separate categories for each.   The 
schemes have many factors in common.  First, they all occur in the midst of 
debate about same-sex and de facto relationship reform, and it has been 
suggested that they were driven by a desire to recognise non-traditional conjugal 
relationships without having to acknowledge their conjugal nature. 
Second, they are modelled on conjugality.  Where relationship status is 
ascribed, the factors for identifying relationships are similar or identical to those 
traditionally associated with identifying a conjugal relationship.  In some cases, 
factors even include children and the presence of a sexual relationship.  These 
two factors have been removed in some models, but the other remaining factors 
are similar to the criteria in New Zealand that are intended to assist with 
identifying whether people are living together as a couple. 
These schemes all raise issues with respect to the principles of 
relationship recognition identified in Chapter One.  It is unlikely that they 
promote equality because it is not clear that non-conjugal relationships should 
be treated the same as conjugal relationships, as there are arguably material 
differences between the two.  This concern is reflected in, for example, 
Alberta’s decision not to extend an ascription regime to relatives, although such 
a regime was extended to non-relatives.  This was because of concerns that legal 
obligations might arise that could not reasonably be expected.  Comprehensive 
                                                
119 Paul Belien “Dutch Minister Not To Prevent Polygamy” The Brussells Journal (1 November 
2005). 
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ascription regimes, in particular, may infringe upon the autonomy of those in 
non-conjugal relationships. 
There is also a concern about whether these regimes give effect to the 
principles of effectiveness, coherence and certainty.  The relationships to which 
they apply are not entirely clear.  The low uptake of these schemes by non-
conjugal partners – possibly no non-conjugal relationships have been registered 
under any of these regimes – does not promote respect for the law.  The criteria 
in the registration regimes (for example, that a relationship be committed or 
caring) would be difficult to enforce and undermine the registration approach, 
which traditionally allows people to self-select which of their relationships 
should be legally relevant by using procedural, rather than substantive criteria.  
Ultimately these schemes raise more questions than they answer about 
the recognition of non-conjugal relationships.  The practical need for and effect 
of the majority of these schemes is unclear and the reliance of legislatures on 
principles such as equality to justify these schemes appears misguided.  What 
this suggests is that it is not so much a case of extending conjugal regimes to 
include non-conjugal relationships, as recognising non-conjugal relationships in 
their own right.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: RECOGNISING NON-CONJUGAL 
RELATIONSHIPS IN NEW ZEALAND 
I Introduction 
This thesis has argued that non-conjugal relationships have important 
benefits for society and can perform many of the same functions as conjugal 
relationships.  The state depends on both conjugal and non-conjugal 
relationships to ensure that individuals are provided with emotional and 
economic support as this, in turn, supports social cohesion.  The question is 
whether non-conjugal relationships should be recognised in the same way as 
marital and marriage-liked relationships in New Zealand, or whether there are 
better ways for the law to recognise them.  
It is outside the scope of this thesis to undertake a comprehensive survey 
of all the rights and obligations attaching to marital and marriage-like 
relationships, and to assess whether these should apply to certain non-conjugal 
relationships.   This is not required, however, to come to the conclusion that the 
marriage model does not appear to recognise the needs of or relate to living 
arrangements in most, if not all, non-conjugal relationships.  This chapter sets 
out some of the reasons against applying marriage-like ascription and 
registration schemes to non-conjugal relationships and what further analysis 
would be required if this was to occur in New Zealand.  
Ultimately, there are better ways of addressing concerns about the 
equality of people in non-conjugal relationships than allowing them to register 
their relationship so that it is treated in the same way as a marriage or civil 
union.  This chapter proposes a framework for recognising personal 
relationships in New Zealand and applies it to areas of New Zealand law where 
non-conjugal relationships might receive better legal recognition.  The 
development and maintenance of non-conjugal relationships can be enhanced by 
carefully crafted legislation that recognises these relationships in their own 
right, rather than as analogous to marriage or marriage-like relationships.  In 
fact, whether a relationship is conjugal or not may be irrelevant to achieving the 
policy objective of a particular law.   
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II The Disadvantages of Extending the Marriage Model 
In a 2010 lecture, Baroness Deech of Cumnor queried:
1
 
… why in English law we treat siblings less favourably than married or civil 
partners; and why we do not expect adults to maintain their parents or their 
grandparents in return for the keep that was extended to them in their youth.  
One has to wonder why … the blood relationship comes second. 
The argument for treating conjugal and non-conjugal relationships as 
analogous rests on assumptions that there are no material differences between 
these types of relationships and that people in non-conjugal relationships face 
the same legal problems as those in conjugal relationships.  This assumption 
was questioned in Chapter Two, but there are other reasons for not adopting the 
approach taken overseas in recognising non-conjugal relationships by extending 
the marriage model to include such relationships. 
The key disadvantages of extending the marriage model to non-conjugal 
relationships in New Zealand are set out below.  In particular, this could defeat 
the reasonable expectations of those in non-conjugal relationships (thereby 
discouraging their formation); it does not appear to take into account the 
specific needs of people in non-conjugal relationships or reflect the nature of the 
living arrangements of people in these relationships; it may entail costs to the 
state which need to be quantified and assessed; it may impact on equality 
between conjugal relationships; and it may appear to legitimise polygamous or 
incestuous relationships.   
This does not mean that non-conjugal relationships should not receive 
any legal recognition or that such relationships do not face any legal problems.  
Rather, there are two ways of improving legal recognition of non-conjugal 
relationships so that they are better supported by the state.  First, partial or 
comprehensive registration and ascription regimes could be introduced, 
provided that they are based on a sound understanding of the needs and living 
arrangements of people in the non-conjugal relationships to which they apply.  
                                                
1 Baroness Deech of Cumnor “Sisters, sisters, there were never such devoted sisters” (Gresham 
College, 2 February 2010). 
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Specific law reform projects would be required to achieve this.  Second, rights 
and responsibilities could be accorded to these relationships on a case-by-case 
basis, as new laws are developed and current laws reviewed.  This exercise 
should be guided by an overarching framework for recognising personal 
relationships, based on the principles identified in Chapter One.  
A Defeating the Expectations of Non-Conjugal Relationships 
This thesis has acknowledged that it is becoming more difficult to 
conceptualise and articulate material differences between conjugal and close 
non-conjugal relationships, in terms of features that are relevant to legal rights 
and responsibilities.  However, conjugal relationships, ideally, are associated 
with a greater degree of interdependency, commitment and sharing of lives.  
Therefore, while both conjugal and close non-conjugal relationships may 
exhibit similar features, there may be a material, qualitative difference in the 
manner and extent to which these features are exhibited.  In any event, it is clear 
that conjugality is not simply a matter of “household economies” as suggested 
by the Law Commission of Canada in Beyond Conjugality.2  Bala states that 
conjugality is not exclusively defined in sexual terms and that:
3
 
What distinguishes a conjugal cohabiting relationship from two roommates 
living together, or from an adult child and parent residing together, is the 
combination of their interdependent roles and the expectations about the 
relationship.  While individual attitudes and behaviours vary, Canadians still 
generally have a profoundly important set of cultural, psychological and 
spiritual feelings about conjugal relationships.   
The low uptake of schemes set out in Chapter Four indicates that most 
people in non-conjugal relationships do not perceive their relationship as 
analogous to marriage or a marriage-like relationship.  This is most likely 
because the marriage model does not reflect expectations about the degree to 
which the lives of those in non-conjugal relationships will be shared as well as 
expectations about their living arrangements.  We must look beyond the 
immediate consequences of an inheritance tax bill in making this assessment. 
                                                
2 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and supporting close personal 
adult relationships (2001) at 29. 
3 Nicholas Bala and Rebecca Jaremko Bromwich “Context and Inclusivity in Canada’s Evolving 
Definition of the Family” (2002) 16 IJLPF 145 at 171. 
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This raises the concern that, for the purposes of comprehensive legal 
regulation, it may not appropriate to recognise conjugal and non-conjugal 
relationships in the same way and for the same purposes.  The principles of 
relationship recognition identified in Chapter One support the legal recognition 
of non-conjugal relationships, but only to the extent that this supports and 
promotes these relationships.   
The general extension of the legal consequences of marital relationships 
to non-conjugal relationships by ascription would defeat the reasonable 
expectations of most, if not all, people living in these relationships.  In Alberta, 
family relationships were excluded from having adult interdependent 
relationship status conferred on them by ascription for this reason.  Some 
marital rights and obligations are premised on the idea of shared lives, exclusive 
commitment and how to restore order when the relationship breaks down.  It 
does not seem equitable or appropriate to extend these particular rights and 
obligations to most non-conjugal relationships.   
In addition, the dependency present in conjugal relationships may differ 
from that in non-conjugal relationships.  Bala observes that:4 
… despite individual variations, there is an expectation between spouses that 
both will gain from the relationship and that they will share at least some 
significant aspects of their economic lives.  This can be contrasted with the 
situation of adult children living at home with their parents.  The relationship is 
one of dependence, where the adult child depends on their parents to share 
common resources, for example, so the child can undertake tertiary study.   
In the case of an adult child living with his or her parents, in New 
Zealand, guardianship of a child and, thereby, any financial responsibility, ends 
at age 18.5  It would be inconsistent with this to suggest that financial 
responsibility for a child might continue simply because an adult child remains 
financially dependent on his or her parents after the child turns 18.    
                                                
4 Nicholas Bala “Controversy over Couples in Canada: The Evolution of Marriage and Other 
Adult Interdependent Relationships” (2003-2004) 29 Queens LJ 41 at 43. 
5 Care of Children Act 2004, s 8. 
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 Bala suggests that many non-conjugal relationships are actually 
relationships of dependence, rather than interdependence, whereby one party is 
primarily dependent on the other for financial resources.6  He suggests that it is 
atypical for major property to be shared, and when it is, there are generally clear 
contractual responsibilities (as is likely where two friends or sisters buy a first 
house together in order to make owning property more affordable in the absence 
of a conjugal partner).  It may be appropriate to draw a distinction in law 
between non-conjugal relationships that are dependent and those that are 
independent for the purposes of legal recognition.  For example, dependency 
might be relevant to a claim for a death benefit but not for “termination” of a 
relationship (for instance, where the adult child leaves home).  Even where it is 
relevant, it may be that the common law rules of equity are better able to 
address issues that arise than the statutory regime and assumptions of the 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976. 
Bala and Jaremko Bromwich also raise a concern about whether 
imposing obligations on non-conjugal partners might damage some of these 
relationships.7  They highlight the plight of dependent adults, such as the 
elderly, who may have a “limited pool of friends or family willing to allow the 
dependent person to share a residence and provide support.”8  They suggest that 
the supportive adult might face a difficult decision about whether to continue to 
support the dependent adult, if there are legal burdens added to those practical 
ones they already face in undertaking such care.  Bala and Jaremko Bromwich 
consider this is likely to:9  
… have a very significant adverse impact on how many dependent adults 
receive care from relatives or friends.  Because of the different ties in a conjugal 
relationship, the imposition of obligations would have a greater disincentive on 
the formation of non-conjugal households than for conjugal households. 
Bala and Jaremko Bromwich also observe that conjugality is still linked 
with children and that there are few who would consider raising a child with a 
non-conjugal partner.  They consider that the “commitment of the adults to their 
                                                
6 Nicholas Bala “Controversy over Couples” above n 4, at 43. 
7 Bala and Jaremko Bromwich “Context and Inclusivity”, above n 3, at 171. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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relationship that is inherent in conjugality is also desirable in establishing an 
environment in which to raise children.”10   
The concerns raised above relate primarily to the extension of an 
ascription-based regime to non-conjugal relationships, as registration of such 
relationships would only take place by consent.  However, as discussed now, 
there is also a concern as to whether the expansion of marriage-like registration 
regimes would meet the needs of those in non-conjugal relationships or whether 
registration should even be required to access the legal recognition required by 
those in non-conjugal relationships. 
B Meeting the Specific Needs of those in Non-Conjugal Relationships 
In New Zealand, in 2005, de facto relationships became subject to 
almost all of the same rights and obligations as married couples due to the 
passage of the Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005.  This Act was 
informed by comprehensive analysis undertaken by the New Zealand Ministry 
of Justice as to whether it was appropriate to extend the rights of married 
couples to de facto relationships and the advantages and disadvantages of doing 
so.  Cross, Palmer and Smith suggest that:
 11
 
… individuals in kinship groups may not want the full range of rights and duties 
accorded in domestic partnership or marriage laws.  Thus, kinship arrangements 
can range from “offering the most extensive rights and obligations” that can be 
offered in adult relationships to “no rights or obligations at all” between adults.  
Between these two extremes lies the concept of the granting of benefits and 
entitlements that are important to share in emotionally and economically 
interdependent relationships. 
The marriage model does not appear to suit the living arrangements of 
people in non-conjugal relationships.  This may be for a variety of reasons.  For 
example, while some of the legal consequences may be desired by parties (such 
as protection from domestic violence or hospital visitation rights), others may 
not (such as being treated as a couple where one person is in receipt of a benefit 
or the division of assets that might result if the relationship ends due, for 
                                                
10 Ibid, at 172. 
11
 Jane E Cross, Nan Palmer and Charlene L Smith “Families Redefined: Kinship Groups That 
Deserve Benefits” (2008-2009) 78 Miss LJ 791 at 827. 
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example, to one of the parties deciding to marry, although this does not affect 
the parties’ friendship).   
It was also suggested in Chapter Three that registration schemes (and, in 
particular, marriage) have a significant symbolic function.  It is likely that 
people in non-conjugal relationships do not require this symbolic recognition.  
In fact, many may shy away from a formal registration process which would 
have the same symbolic connotations as entering into a marriage or marriage-
like relationship.  Many may wish to marry in the future.  
Another matter that is rarely considered in the literature is the design of 
the procedural requirements for entering into and dissolving a registered non-
conjugal relationship.  In some cases, a registered relationship is terminated by a 
unilateral declaration by one party or the act of entering into a marriage.  In 
others, a period of time may be imposed before the relationship is terminated.  
This, again, may not reflect the way in which people form and end close non-
conjugal relationships.   
In fact, non-conjugal relationships may not “terminate” in the same 
manner as conjugal relationships at all.  When a conjugal relationship 
terminates, this represents a decision that the other party no longer exclusively 
values the other or wishes to maintain a shared life or commitment to a shared 
future.  While the New Zealand family law system is set up to encourage 
reconciliation where possible, the reality is that where conjugal partners 
separate, the nature of their relationship fundamentally changes and it is likely 
that both will want to repartner at some point in the future.   
However, where people are living together in non-conjugal relationship, 
“termination” may be for different reasons and the relationship may not change 
in its importance or break down.  In particular, it is desirable for adult siblings 
and parents, as well as other family members, to maintain an ongoing 
relationship.  The “clean break” principle does not apply to these relationships.  
While there may be an expectation of repartnering for a conjugal couple, this is 
not the same for non-conjugal partners, particularly where they are family 
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members related by blood.  The family relationship persists despite any 
differences between the individuals.   
Moreover, a registered partnership between family members may 
confuse or distort an existing social and legal relationship.  It is also possible to 
be in an important non-conjugal relationship at the same time as a conjugal 
relationship.  For example, an elderly widow living with an adult child and the 
adult child’s spouse, until the widow passes away.  It is common for family or 
extended family members to live together in Pacific Island and Māori families 
in New Zealand.  This does not mean that these relationships should be 
subjected to the legal consequences of conjugality.  Any recognition regime 
should take note of and manage these factors as well as any cultural differences. 
A key area of concern that has been raised with respect to the 
recognition of non-conjugal relationships as marital relationships is ensuring 
that property rights can be adjusted should relationships break down.  This is 
particularly so because the close nature of such relationships means that parties 
might not make use of private contract to sort such issues before they arise (and 
these issues might also arise by virtue of the relationship following purchase of 
the property).  However, equity uses constructive trust to deal with such 
situations where they arise, as in the cases of Riddle v Jones and Tickner v 
Wheeler.12  This approach allows the court to take equitable interests into 
account where parties have not contracted to deal with the division of property 
in which both might have an interest.   
As indicated, a comprehensive survey of the law is outside the scope of 
this thesis.  However, it appears that people in non-conjugal relationships face 
their own legal issues that may require different legal solutions.  Ultimately, 
registration is not required for the extension of legal protections as demonstrated 
by the comprehensive model New Zealand has in place for recognising de facto 
relationships.  Analysis of the specific implications of extending the various 
rights and duties associated with marriage would be required before any 
                                                
12 Riddles v Jones (High Court, Nelson, CP 39/88, 20 June 1990); Tickner v Wheeler (1985) 3 
NZFLR 782 (both involving a mother and daughter). 
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extension in New Zealand should be proposed, either on the basis of ascription 
or registration.   
Finally, the state must consider (in establishing a non-conjugal 
registration scheme) the effect that uptake of this scheme might have on 
conjugal relationships, particularly if a non-conjugal relationship could not be 
registered at the same time as a conjugal relationship.  Fineman suggests that:13 
Some people continue to insist that legitimate families can only be built upon 
the foundation of a traditional marital tie. Others emphasize the biological 
connection and minimize the importance of legal relations in favor of kinship 
structures that form affiliations transcending current formal definitions of the 
family.  For others, the preference is for an affectional family, a unit composed 
of those with whom we choose to connect but who may not be “related” to us 
by either blood or marriage 
Nonetheless, the state has an ideological and cultural interest in the 
institution of marriage and any policies that might have an impact on 
conjugality or children of those relationships.  This does not mean that 
ideological and cultural values should outweigh any other principles supporting 
the recognition of non-conjugal relationships, but they are factors that should be 
considered.  The state should also take into account any impact on the formation 
of non-conjugal relationships.  Arguably, the nature of family is such that 
support may be provided by one family member (or a friend) to another without 
the creation of obligations between parties.  It is likely that non-conjugal 
partners seek rights in relation to the state and third parties rather than in 
relation to each other.  On balance, the marriage model does not seem suitable 
for non-conjugal relationships.  People in non-conjugal relationships, are not 
always, as suggested by Welstead “analogous counterparts of spouses and civil 
partners.”
14
 
                                                
13 Martha Fineman “Masking dependency: the political role of family rhetoric (Symposium: 
New Directions in Family Law)” (1995) 81 Va L Rev 2181 at 2190. 
14 Mary Welstead “England and Wales: The Family the Law Forgot” in Bill Atkin (ed) The 
International Survey of Family Law 2010 Edition (Jordans, Bristol, 2010) 113 at 119. 
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C The Cost of Legal Recognition 
During debate in House of Lords on the Civil Partnership Bill 2004 
(UK), a concern was raised about the financial implications of extending the 
Bill to include non-conjugal relationships in terms of the impact on the payment 
of pension rights to non-spouses.  A concern was also raised in respect of the 
Burden sisters’ case before the European Court of Human Rights, that allowing 
a further exception to the payment of inheritance tax would substantially reduce 
the government’s revenue.  This indicates that care should be taken to quantify 
any costs of creating a registration regime for non-conjugal partners, both for 
the state and third parties.  The state’s resources are necessarily limited and 
governments must prioritise the allocation of scare resources.  Third parties may 
also be affected by any required changes, such as in employment leave policies 
or insurance policies. 
This does not mean that human rights and other considerations could not 
outweigh the fiscal impact of extending state support or requiring third parties 
to recognise a wider range of personal relationships.  However, fiscal 
implications should be considered during the development of any 
comprehensive registration or ascription scheme. 
D Impact on Equality between Conjugal Relationships 
The relationship recognition principles outlined at the start of this thesis 
identified equality as a principle that should be given priority by any 
relationship recognition regime introduced in New Zealand.  This does not just 
refer to equality between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships.  It also refers 
to equality between conjugal relationships.  This principle does not require all 
personal relationships to be treated in the same way.  Only like relationships 
should be treated similarly.  Same-sex and de facto relationships have a long 
history of being stigmatised and some consider that these relationships cannot 
be equated to heterosexual marriage on religious, moral or philosophical 
grounds.  Bala and Jaremko Bromwich point out that:
 15
 
                                                
15 Bala and Jaremko Bromwich “Context and Inclusivity”, above n 3, at 172. 
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 … for some politicians the project of abandoning conjugality may be a way to 
make legal recognition of same-sex relationships less politically contentious.  
The de-emphasis on conjugality may be seen as a way of subverting 
conservative opposition to legal recognition of partnerships outside marriage.  
But it is also way of hiding same-sex relationships. 
The recognition of non-conjugal relationships should not be used as a 
vehicle to recognise non-traditional conjugal relationships, in order to conceal 
the conjugal nature of these relationships.  New Zealand recognised that these 
relationships deserve state support and protection in passing the Civil Union Act 
in 2004 and Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005.  Therefore the same 
concern does not arise in New Zealand, except to the extent that New Zealand 
does not allow same-sex marriage.   
The recognition of non-conjugal relationships does not appear to have 
been formally considered during the development of the Civil Union and 
Relationships (Statutory References) Bills.  However, at the time the civil union 
legislation was passed, it was argued that civil union registration should be 
applied to ‘non-romantic relationships’.  While the Departmental Reports of the 
Ministry of Justice on the Civil Union and Relationships (Statutory References) 
Bills do not refer to the recognition of non-conjugal relationships, the Maxim 
Institute, a well-known conservative lobby group in New Zealand, considered at 
the time that:
16
   
The Civil Union Act discriminates against people in committed but non-
romantic relationships who want the legal certainty of registration but not the 
marriage-like ceremony of a civil union … the Maxim Institute firmly believes 
that clarity around next-of-kin status is important for all people, not just 
romantic relationships … there is a need for an opt-in relationship which has 
clear legal rights but does not mimic marriage as the civil union does, because 
this is inappropriate for many people.  
E Concerns about Polygamous or Incestuous Relationships 
There is also a concern that if non-conjugal relationships can be legally 
registered, then it will be possible for people to register polygamous or 
                                                
16 Garth George “Civil union fuss turns about much ado about nothing” New Zealand Herald (4 
May 2006). 
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incestuous relationships.  In New Zealand, it is not possible to register either of 
these relationships.  Polygamous marriages are prohibited under the Marriage 
Act 1955, although s 2 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 permits the 
recognition of overseas polygamous marriages.  The United Nations Human 
Rights Committee has stated that “Polygamy violates the dignity of women.  It 
is an inadmissible discrimination against women.  Consequently, it should 
definitely be abolished wherever it continues to exist.”
17
  Incestuous 
relationships may have criminal consequences.   
If a registration scheme were introduced for non-conjugal relationships, 
it would be necessarily to consider whether it was appropriate to allow more 
than two people to register such a relationship.  On the one hand, non-conjugal 
relationships may genuinely involve more than two people (for example, 
consider the scenario if the Burden sisters had also had a third sister).  On the 
other, the state should not undertake measures that could promote polygamous 
unions, unless there are other important objectives (such as the support and 
protection of children).  In the Netherlands, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
concerns have been raised about whether cohabitation agreements legitimise 
polygamous relationships. 
Likewise, concerns were raised in the United Kingdom during the debate 
on the proposed amendment to the Civil Partnerships Bill (extending the Bill to 
cover long-term cohabiting siblings), as to whether this would amount to an 
endorsement of incestuous relationships.  Registration schemes are typically 
crafted to exclude relationships within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity 
or affinity.  This is reflected in both the Marriage Act 1955 and the Civil Union 
Act 2004 in New Zealand.  While it is unlikely that many, if any, incestuous 
relationships would be registered, there are documented cases of incestuous 
relationships occurring, including where children are born of these relationships.  
The state should take care in developing any registration scheme that could, 
conceptually, allow for legal recognition of such relationships.  However, none 
of the relationship recognition schemes outlined in Chapter Four prohibit the 
registration of an incestuous relationship. 
                                                
17 United Nations Human Rights Committee General Comment No 28, Equality of rights 
between men and women (Article 3) CCPR (29 March 2000). 
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F The Plight of the Burden Sisters: Responses other than 
Comprehensive Recognition Based on the Marriage Model  
A comprehensive registration or ascription regime is not necessarily 
required to address the concern raised by the Burden sisters regarding the 
payment of inheritance tax.  It is not completely clear whether the Burden 
sisters were seeking that their relationship be recognised as a civil partnership, if 
this were required to gain an exemption from in heritance tax, though this was 
suggested in the parties’ arguments.  The essence of their case was, however, 
that, for the purposes of inheritance tax, it was unjust to treat their relationship 
differently from civil partnerships or marriage. 
As noted in Chapter Three, estate duty, the New Zealand equivalent of 
inheritance tax, was abolished by the Estate Duty Abolition Act 1993.  
Abolishing inheritance tax would also be one option for addressing the Burden 
sisters’ concerns.  This was not considered in the European Court of Human 
Rights due to acceptance by both parties of the legitimacy of the policy and the 
legitimacy of the exemption for married couples.18  However, this approach 
does not involve discriminating between different personal relationships.   
In New Zealand, the abolition of gift duty has also been proposed.  It has 
been suggested that this will have little fiscal impact due to a practice whereby 
people gift assets away to a trust over a long period of time in order to avoid gift 
duty.
19
  As such, another option for the Burden sisters would have been to 
explore whether careful estate planning could mitigate the consequences of 
inheritance tax on the death of one of the sisters, by gifting assets to a trust over 
a long period of time.  The specific statutory regime in place would also have 
allowed the surviving sister to pay a portion of the inheritance tax each year 
over a period of many years. 
However, arguably the sisters should not need to employ careful 
accounting strategies in order to avoid the inheritance burden placed on the 
surviving sister.  It was suggested by the majority judges in both divisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights that the Burden sisters do not deserve an 
                                                
18 Kenneth McK Norrie “Inheritance tax, civil parntership and the rights of spinster sisters” 
(2008) 12 Edinburgh LR 1364. 
19 Hon Peter Dunne “Government Signals Repeal of Gift Duty” (press release, 14 June 2010). 
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exemption from inheritance tax because they have not taken on any of the 
obligations of civil partners.  However, it is not clear what obligations are 
contemplated, and, if they are support obligations, it likely that the non-conjugal 
relationship between the Burden sisters has produced savings for the state in 
terms of the care provided by each of the sisters by the other.  In other words, a 
connection between benefits and obligations should be drawn before deciding 
that, in order to gain a particular legal right, people must consent to certain 
obligations.   
There is, however, a solution that would not require the state to yield any 
of the income that it received from inheritance tax and at the same time, would 
ensure that the surviving sister would not have to sell the family home to pay an 
inheritance tax bill.   This solution would be to defer inheritance tax liability on 
the death of the first sister until the death of the second sister.  Payment would 
be secured by a charge on the sisters’ properties, with interest calculated at an 
appropriate rate and paid in full on the death of the second sister (at this time, 
the full amount of inheritance tax would be paid in respect to each sister).  This 
deferred payment, particularly if only applicable to long-term cohabitants, 
would have few fiscal implications for the state.  It has been observed that:
20
 
The Burdens' situation may seem heart-rending. But, with a little careful 
planning, it is still possible for people like them to save a fortune in IHT and 
even get to leave the family home to their loved ones. 
No doubt an inequitable situation existed between that of the very long-
term cohabiting Burden sisters and married couples and civil partners.  
However, this does not automatically provide a basis for applying the marriage 
model to all non-conjugal relationships. 
G Conclusions as to the Merits of Extending the Marriage Model to 
Include Non-Conjugal Relationships 
This thesis concludes against extending the rights and obligations of 
marriage to people in non-conjugal relationships in New Zealand, either by 
registration or by ascription.  This is not because these relationships do not 
                                                
20 Kate Hughes “Protect your family from the taxman” The Independent (United Kingdom, 4 
May 2008). 
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deserve legal recognition, but rather, because it does not appear that they require 
recognition in the same way as marriages or marriage-like relationships.  While 
there are similarities between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships, it is 
possible, in most cases, to distinguish between the two.   
This does not necessarily result in the privileging of marriage and 
marriage-like relationships over other caring relationships.  It is possible to 
recognise both at the same time.  However, people in non-conjugal relationships 
are generally likely to have different expectations of their living arrangements 
than those in conjugal relationships.  The law should give effect to these 
expectations rather than simply extend the rules relating to conjugal 
relationships because this is a mechanically simple.  There are compelling 
arguments against extending an ascription-based model to non-conjugal 
relationships as this would be likely to defeat their reasonable expectations 
(where they became subject to unexpected obligations) as well as compromise 
their autonomy.  Typically, overseas jurisdictions have used the registration 
model, rather than the ascription model, to recognise non-conjugal relationships.   
There are also concerns about applying the registration model to non-
conjugal relationships, however.  Ultimately, Chapter Four indicates that there 
have been no successful overseas examples of a registration model for non-
conjugal relationships.  There has been no uptake of such regimes in Vermont 
and Victoria to date.  Tasmania only has two registered caring relationships.  It 
is not impossible that these relationships might involve conjugal partners who 
have chosen to register their relationship as a caring relationship, rather than a 
significant relationship.  Since these registration regimes were enacted, the state 
governments have shown little interest in monitoring the application and impact 
of the regimes on non-conjugal relationships (although the review body set up 
by the Vermont legislature recommended the disestablishment of that regime).  
In sum, it does not appear that registration schemes modelled on marriage are at 
all effective in recognising the needs of those in non-conjugal relationships. 
However, if two people in a non-conjugal relationship wished to register 
their relationship under such a regime, understood the implications of doing so, 
and any implications for the state (in terms of the recognition of prohibited 
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relationships and fiscal and other impacts on both the state and third parties) 
were addressed, there would be fewer concerns, as this approach would respect 
the autonomy of consenting, knowledgeable parties.  It would be more 
desirable, however, if recognition were extended as a result of a comprehensive 
inquiry into the needs of people in such relationships, such as those in 
caregiving relationships or those sharing a home, so that rights and obligations 
were tailored to suit these relationships.  It would not enhance respect for the 
law to create a legal registration scheme which was never used, as has happened 
over the last decade in Vermont.  Such a project would necessitate an inquiry 
similar to that underlying the recognition of de facto relationships and civil 
unions in accordance with the Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005.   
However, it would also be possible to allow for recognition on a more 
limited basis, similar to the approach taken in the Protection of Personal and 
Property Rights Act 1988 (although under this Act, these relationships are not 
registered with a state respository).  La Violette refers to this as the “blank slate 
plus” approach, as opposed to the “marriage minus” approach and suggests the 
former is more appropriate than the latter for people in non-conjugal 
relationships.
21
  The “blank slate plus” approach involves granting specific 
rights and obligations to individuals in a partnership, “without attempting to 
parallel marriage laws.”22 
As indicated, it would also be important to first quantify the fiscal cost 
of a registration scheme to the state as well as assess how it might impact on 
society.  This could include considering how the regime might affect conjugal 
or other family relationships, or whether it might encourage the formation of 
undesirable relationships such as incestuous relationships.   The state might also 
need to consider whether the regime would have an impact on the state’s 
objective of encouraging people to form conjugal relationships and any 
childbearing policies, although it is difficult to imagine a person forsaking the 
opportunity to enter into a conjugal relationship for the sake of preserving the 
legal recognition of a non-conjugal relationship.   
                                                
21 Nicole La Violette “Waiting in a New Line at City Hall: Registered Partnerships as an Option 
for Relationship Recognition Reform in Canada” (2002) 19 Can J Fam L 115 at 122. 
22 Ibid. 
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However, it is unlikely that any such project will be a political priority in 
the foreseeable future, particularly given that New Zealand has already extended 
the marriage model to apply to same-sex and heterosexual de facto partnerships.  
In all the circumstances, the focus of any change should rather be on ensuring 
that policymakers have a framework within which they can properly consider 
which non-conjugal relationships might be relevant for a particular purpose.   
III Case Study: Recognising Relationships between Informal 
Carers and Disabled Adults in New Zealand 
Before turning to consider the framework proposed below for 
recognising relationships for particular purposes, this thesis briefly considers the 
recognition of the relationship between informal caregivers and disabled adults 
in New Zealand, as an example of a non-conjugal relationship where legal 
recognition has been sought.  A paper, The New Zealand informal caregivers 
and their unmet needs, was released in June 2010 by a prominent lobby group, 
following a decision by the Human Rights Tribunal that a Ministry of Health 
policy not to pay family members who provide support to disabled adult 
children was discriminatory on the grounds of family status under the Human 
Rights Act 1993.23   
Both the report and the case are considered below in terms of what they 
demonstrate about how the law might recognise non-conjugal relationships 
between informal caregivers and the disabled adults for which they care.  This is 
a more specific type of caregiving than that which exists in relationships such as 
that between the elderly Burden sisters.  However, these caregivers represent an 
identifiable interest group and their predicament is a good starting point for any 
state inquiry into the legal needs of caregiving relationships. 
A Atkinson v Ministry of Health 
In Atkinson v Ministry of Health, the nine plaintiffs comprised seven 
parents of disabled adult children who had provided long-term care to their 
                                                
23 Diane Jorgensen, Matthew Parsons, Stephen Jacobs and Hilary Arksey “The New Zealand 
informal caregivers and their unmet legal needs” (2010) 123 New Zealand Medical Journal 1; 
Atkinson v Ministry of Health (2010) 8 HRNZ 902. 
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children, as well as two of the adult children.  These parents sought a 
declaration that the Ministry of Health’s policy of not funding parents, spouses 
and resident family members to care for disabled family members amounted to 
discrimination on the basis of family status under the Human Rights Act 1993.  
They considered that this policy excluded commercial carers from employment 
opportunities and denied their children the right to choose a family member as a 
paid caregiver.
24
  
The Ministry argued that its policy was a justified limitation on the right 
to be free from discrimination on the grounds of family status for a number of 
reasons.  In particular, because the support services provided by family 
members were “natural supports” and should not attract payment.25  The 
Ministry argued that an aspect of the “social contract” between families and the 
state is that the family is regarded as the fundamental social unit but, in return, 
the state will not pay families to care for their own members.26  The Ministry 
considered that to propose otherwise could commercialise family relationships, 
create perverse incentives for families to refuse to provide care and for disabled 
persons to become overly dependent, and was fiscally unsustainable.27 
The Tribunal rejected the justifications provided by the Ministry of 
Health.  It observed that the Ministry sometimes made exceptions to this policy 
and that the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) provided most of its 
home support services through paid labour by family members.
28
  In addition, 
the Ministry and ACC had developed joint services specifications for the home-
based care of disabled persons.29 
This case raises a difficult question for government, as the state’s 
interest in privatising dependency by encouraging unpaid family labour 
conflicts with human rights and equity considerations.  Ultimately, the Tribunal, 
in finding in favour of the plaintiff adult carers, considered that caring for a 
disabled child into adulthood was beyond the normal social expectation of 
                                                
24 Ibid, at 907. 
25 Ibid, at 906. 
26 Ibid, at 908. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid, at 100-113. 
29 Ibid. 
 134 
family caring.  The Tribunal considered that it would be possible to constrain 
the fiscal impact of this decision by developing strategies such as treating 
payments on a clear exceptions basis.  The Tribunal also recommended that the 
state develop an overarching carers’ payment policy which should also apply to 
the care of the elderly in a home setting.30   
The Ministry of Health is appealing this decision to the High Court and 
the hearing is set to commence on 13 September 2010.  Carers New Zealand 
commissioned legal advice on the appeal which stated that a policy failure had 
resulted in a:31 
… gap between the estimated number of people entitled to receive disability 
support (291,000 in 2006) and the number of people who actually receive 
disability support. The ‘gap’ is estimated to be 29,000 who receive no funded 
care. There is an assumption that these people are either living independently 
with no care at all (apart from their natural supports), or that more extensive 
support services are being provided free by unpaid family or friends. 
B The Needs of Informal Caregivers 
Carers New Zealand suggests that the recent careers needs study “is one 
of the largest qualitative studies about carers in the world.”
32
   The aim of this 
study was to identify the characteristics and demographics of the New Zealand 
caregiver.33  The study found that mothers and daughters undertake the majority 
of informal care, although ten per cent of informal caregivers in the study were 
not members of the immediate family.  The largest group of care recipients were 
in the group aged 70 to 89 (29 per cent).  A high proportion of carers in the 
study experienced stress and depression.  The study observed that:34 
When caregivers were asked how they were supported and what they thought 
would improve their lives and those of the care recipients their responses could 
be grouped into two main themes; comments about the support they were or 
were not receiving; and the impact of caregiving on their lives. 
                                                
30 Ibid, at 225. 
31 John Forman “ Atkinson & Others v Ministry of Health – Commentary” (legal advice, 8 
February 2010. 
32 Carers NZ <carers.net.nz>. 
33 Jorgensen and others, above n 23. 
34 Ibid. 
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Many were experiencing financial difficulties.  Many also experienced 
social isolation as they had trouble taking time away from their caregiving 
duties.  While other family members were initially supportive, assistance 
reduced over time.  Caregivers primarily sought more financial assistance, 
flexible and reliable respite, as well as the opportunity and ability to be in paid 
employment. 
It is clear that the types of schemes set out in Chapter Four would not 
meet the needs of the type of non-conjugal relationship experienced by informal 
carers and the people for whom they care.  The Government recognises the 
specific need to support informal and formal caregiving relationships in their 
own right through the Carers’ Strategy and Five Year Action Plan 2008.35  A 
discrete example of the type of legal assistance caregivers may desire is 
reflected in the overseas trend to allow “carers leave” for those carers in 
employment.  To date, such measures have not been introduced in New 
Zealand.  However, the Employment Relations Amendment Act 2008 gave 
workers with caring responsibilities the right to ask for flexible working 
arrangements.  Under s 69AAB of the Employment Relations Act 2000, a 
person can make such a request when they have “the care of any person” after 
they have been with an employer for six months.   
IV The Relevance of Non-Conjugal Relationships to the Law 
Non-conjugal relationships may potentially be relevant to the following 
areas of law identified by the British Columbia Law Institute:
36
 
• Employment issues: family-based financial benefits (basic and 
extended medical and dental care; pension and group life 
insurance plans; bereavement leave; sick leave; leave to care for 
a sick family member); 
• Protection of the elderly; 
• Conflicts of interest arising from family relationships; 
                                                
35 Ministry of Social Development. 
36 British Columbia Law Institute Report on Recognition of Spousal and Family Status (1999). 
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• Healthcare issues (visiting rights; consent to healthcare; human 
tissue donation and autopsy decisions; decisions respecting burial 
or cremation); 
• Information collection and privacy; 
• Insurance issues (who is and is not protected under a policy by 
reason of being part of an insured’s family); 
• Prison (family visits); 
• Accident compensation (who gets compensation); 
• Social assistance benefits (income support policies; continuing 
care; sickness and disability benefits); and 
• Wills and succession (status to be a personal representative, to 
share in an estate or to challenge a will). 
The following discussion applies a framework for determining what 
personal relationships the law should recognise to some of these areas, namely: 
family provision, intestacy, sick and bereavement leave, joint family homes, 
domestic violence, pensions and accident compensation.   The aim is to provide 
a basis for debate as to why and how non-conjugal relationships might be 
recognised by particular laws in New Zealand.  The focus of this discussion is 
on very close non-conjugal relationships.  However, this does not mean that the 
law is never interested in non-conjugal relationships that are less intimate.  
Ultimately, even a simple friendship may have legal consequences.  This section 
takes a moment to consider the concept of a duty of care between friends.   
While there do not appear to be any New Zealand cases on the duty of 
care between friends, Welstead identifies examples in the United Kingdom and 
Leib in the United States of America.37  Welstead observes that those in non-
conjugal relationships like the Burden sisters generally do not owe a duty of 
care to each other.
38
  However, due to the nature of their living arrangements, 
she suggests that they might be “liable for the tort of negligence if they fail to 
care for each other when care is needed.”39  Welstead gives the example of a 
                                                
37 Welstead The Family the Law Forgot, above n 14; Ethan J Leib “Friendship and the Law” 
(2007) 54 UCLA 631 at 685. 
38 Welstead, Ibid, at 119. 
39 Ibid. 
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British case where a mother and son lived together for a very long time, with the 
son giving up work to care for his mother.40  The mother fell ill and had a fall, 
after which she was incapacitated.  However, her son did not call an ambulance 
until the following day.  The son was charged with and pleaded guilty to 
manslaughter. 
Leib also suggests that, in some circumstances, friends owe a duty of 
care toward each other.
41
  In particular, although the common law does not 
recognise a duty of stranger rescue, there may be such a duty between friends.  
Leib gives an example of a man who witnessed his friend being severely 
beaten.
42
  He drove his friend to his friend’s grandparents’ house and left him 
there after failing to wake him up.  His friend subsequently died because he did 
not receive medical attention for his injuries in time.  The friend's estate sued 
for wrongful death and the court found in favour of the estate.  Leib observes 
that:43 
Perhaps we do not need the law to tell us to save our friends. But why shouldn't 
the law confirm what we already know to be true? It is perfectly sensible for the 
law to reinforce our well-accepted duties; it contributes to the law's affective 
resonance, and may have broader effects in facilitating compliance with the 
law's commands more generally. 
Leib also suggests that there may sometimes be a duty between friends 
to disclose and deal fairly due to the fiduciary nature of their relationship.44  He 
notes that while some courts do not treat friendship as capable of triggering such 
fiduciary duties, other courts take a different approach.   He also identifies cases 
where third parties have had or sought standing to sue on behalf of someone 
with whom that party is closely associated, as well as cases where courts have 
recognised caregiving responsibilities for friends. 
                                                
40 Ibid.  See Re Land (deceased) [2007] 1 All ER 324. 
41 Ethan J Leib “Friendship and the Law”, above n 14, at 685. 
42 Ibid.  See Farewell v Keaton 240 NW 2d 217. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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V Proposed Framework for Recognising Relationships 
The Law Commission of Canada proposes the following four step-test as 
an overarching framework for determining how to recognise close personal 
relationships:45 
1. Legitimacy of law: Are the objectives of the law legitimate?  
If not, the law ought to be repealed or fundamentally revised. 
2. Relevance of personal relationships: Do relationships 
matter?  If the law’s objectives are sound, are the relationships 
included in the law important or relevant to the law’s 
objectives?  If not, the law should not refer to any particular 
relationship but, rather, focus on the individual. 
3. Self-selection of relationships by individuals: If 
relationships matter, can individuals be permitted to designate 
the relevant relationships themselves?  If so, the law should 
allow individuals to choose which of their close personal 
relationships they want to be subject to the particular law. 
4. Other ways of recognising relevant relationships: If 
relationships matter and self-designation is not feasible or 
appropriate, is there a better way to include relationships?  
Can the law be revised to more accurately capture the relevant 
range of relationships? If so, an appropriate mix of 
relationships status and functional tests should be used to 
identify relevant relationships. 
This framework is based on principles similar to those outlined in 
Chapter One and is designed to allow for better legal recognition of non-
conjugal relationships.  The first question should form part of any robust policy 
analysis exercise.  However, the Law Commission then proposes that states 
should take a “step back” and determine whether relationship status is actually 
                                                
45 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality (2001) at 29 to 36. 
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relevant to a particular policy.
46
  This should occur whether or not the policy 
objective is legitimate.47  Ultimately, the Law Commission asks whether we can 
“imagine a legislative regime that accomplishes its goals more effectively by 
relying less on whether people are living in particular kinds of relationships.”
48
   
 If relationships are relevant, the self-designation approach suggested by 
the Law Commission supports principles of autonomy and voluntariness as well 
as the principle of privacy.
49
  It allows people the freedom to decide which of 
their relationships are important.  However, sometimes self-selection will not 
support the achievement of a particular policy aim.  In that case, the state should 
consider carefully how personal relationships could be specified for the 
purposes of the law.  Here, it may be appropriate to allow an individual to opt in 
(by registering their relationship and gaining a particular status) or ascribe rights 
and duties.  These tests should not focus exclusively on marital and marriage 
like relationships, but should be prepared to recognise a range of economically 
and emotionally interdependent relationships.  It may be necessary to develop a 
new test or establish a new relationship status to achieve this. 
The Law Commission advocates a test based primarily on economic 
interdependency and emotional intimacy, although the Law Commission 
suggests that sharing a house could also be a relevant consideration.50  
However, in some relationships that are relevant to the law, there may be no 
financial interdependence and parties may not live together.  For example, 
bereavement leave, which derives from the emotional intimacy between the 
bereaved and the deceased.  The list of factors for identifying whether a de facto 
relationship exists may be a starting point for identifying what relationships are 
relevant, but policymakers should not apply these at the expense of developing 
innovative solutions. 
It was suggested in Chapter Two of this thesis that important non-
conjugal relationships may be considered family relationships.  Family status 
                                                
46 Ibid at 29. 
47 Ibid 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid, at 32. 
50 Ibid, at 34. 
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could also become a mechanism for recognising non-conjugal relationships.  A 
family status model would allow “family-like” relationships to be recognised 
and could even allow people to designate the people with whom they have a 
family relationship, by extending the model underpinning the Protection of 
Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 (as discussed in Chapter Three) to allow 
people to nominate important relationships for other legal purposes.  
“Household members” could also be used to identify relationships where 
cohabitation is a relevant factor.  This thesis now turns to apply the framework 
to various areas of New Zealand law. 
A Family Provision: Family Protection Act 1955 
In New Zealand, the Family Protection Act 1955 allows close relatives 
to challenge a will if they feel that the deceased has not adequately provided for 
them.  This approach is based on the privitisation of dependency, which requires 
that other family members meet the needs of dependent family members.  The 
Act recognises that a person may be entitled to a share of a deceased’s estate 
where the deceased has a moral duty to provide for them.  A moral duty can be 
of both a financial and sentimental nature.  This has lead to some people 
alleging that the Act is outdated and that testamentary freedom should not be 
overridden by such considerations.  The New Zealand Law Commission was 
directed to undertake a review of the Act in 1993 in order to give “better effect 
to the intentions of will-makers, and take account of the diversity of New 
Zealand families”, although the Act was not subsequently amended.
51
   
This thesis does not consider whether the objective of this law is valid as 
the framework for recognising relationships can be applied regardless of 
whether the objective is valid or not.  However, this controversy does mean that 
any argument to extend the range of relationships to which this Act applies 
could be subject to a revision of the objective of the Act.  Grainer, who advised 
the Law Commission on its review, suggests that the concept of “moral duty” 
should be replaced by “a more clearly defined test based on dependence and 
                                                
51 See Law Commission Succession (NZLC R41, 1997). 
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need.”
52
  However, it may be difficult for one adult to prove dependency on 
another, even in spousal relationships.  
In applying the framework suggested by the Law Commission of 
Canada, the testator’s freedom must be balanced against the claimant’s needs.  
Currently, the Act allows only a limited range of people the legal status to bring 
a claim.  In accordance with s 3 of the Act, the only people entitled to claim are 
spouses, civil union and de facto partners, children, grandchildren, stepchildren 
and parents.  If somebody else wishes to make a claim they must bring a case 
under the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949.  This Act is of very 
limited applicability and only covers the situation where a person has provided 
work or services for a deceased person who has either expressly or impliedly 
promised to provide for them in that person’s will. 
To begin with, given the objective of the Family Protection Act, there is 
an argument that family provision claims should not be limited to the 
relationships specified.  For example, siblings, such as the Burden sisters, are 
excluded from the operation of the Act, although parents are included.  Sibling 
relationships may involve significant emotional intimacy and financial 
interdependency, and are recognised in other areas of the law.  There are no 
clear grounds for distinguishing between parental and sibling relationships.  It 
could be suggested, therefore, that the Act should be expanded to, at least, 
include siblings and other such relationships, or even all household members 
who are in a relationship of emotional and financial dependence or 
interdependency with the deceased.   
This approach would continue to balance testamentary freedom with 
equitable considerations relating to a deceased’s responsibilities, but would 
ensure that an appropriate range of relationships could be recognised, rather 
than privileging the current list of family members “over and above other 
people”.53  This approach also acknowledges the increasing diversity of family 
and other relationships and recognises the state’s interest in supporting and 
                                                
52 Virginia Grainer “Is Family Protection a Question of Moral Duty?” (1994) 24 VUWLR 141 at 
141. 
53 Ibid, at  151. 
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promoting informal care and close relationships, particularly where the claimant 
provided an extensive degree of care and support to the deceased.     
There would be a low risk of abuse if this approach were adopted, as it 
would be difficult for people such as flatmates to demonstrate the required 
emotional and financial interdependency not to mention difficulties in 
establishing that they had standing to bring a claim.  While it would be possible 
for people in the situation of the Burden sisters to take a claim under the 
Testamentary Promises Act, on the basis of an implied promise to compensate 
for caring provided, it is debatable whether people in relationships of emotional 
and financial dependency should need to rely on such a limited provision which 
conceives of relationships in terms of services performed. 
In addition, it is difficult to make out a claim under this Act due to the 
fact that a deceased may make a promise to a family member out of love and 
affection rather than in return for services provided.54  Under the Act, families 
need to establish that their “services” were not those involved in a normal 
family relationship, but went further.55  Where a claimant is not family, but was 
treated as a family member, their “services” will be assessed in the same way.56  
Sutton and Peart suggest that testamentary claims by adult children are a “vexed 
matter”.57   
Of the approach taken in the United Kingdom, Walstead observes that a 
person (including a sibling) may apply for financial provision under the 
Inheritance Act 1975 if they can show that reasonable financial provision has 
not been made for that person by a deceased.58  They must show that the 
deceased was maintaining them in order to apply, although couples do not need 
to establish this and a different definition of reasonable financial provision 
applies to them (for couples, this is what is reasonable in all the circumstances 
of the case, whereas for siblings, this is what is reasonable for the purpose of 
                                                
54 See Re Welch [1990] 3 NZLR 1 and Samuels v Atkinson [2009] NZCA 556.  
55 Samuels v Atkinson [2009] NZCA 556. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Richard Sutton and Nicola Peart “Testamentary Claims by Adult Children – The Agony of the 
“Wise and Just Testator” (2003) 10 Otago LR 385 at 385. 
58 Welstead “The Family the Law Forgot”, above n 14, at 121. 
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maintenance).
59
  Welstead notes that the British Law Commission has 
provisionally recommended that an assumption of responsibility by the 
deceased should not be a threshold requirement, but should simply be one of the 
factors taken into account.
60
   
B Intestacy: Administration Act 1969 
Intestacy law determines who inherits property from the estate of a 
person who dies without a will.  Relationships are relevant for this purpose.  
Self-selection cannot work for this area of law because the deceased dies 
without making a decision about which of the deceased’s relationships are 
relevant for inheritance purposes.  It is important to provide for a clear and 
certain way of distributing a deceased’s estate upon intestacy. 
In New Zealand, intestacy law is set out in the Administration Act 1969.  
Spouses, civil union partners, de facto partners and children have statutory 
priority.
61
  Following these relationships, the Act sets out classes of relatives, 
starting with parents, then siblings, then grandparents, uncles and aunts.  In the 
penultimate instance, property will revert to the Crown.  Out of this, the Crown 
can provide for “dependants (whether kindred or not) of the intestate” and 
“other persons for whom the intestate might reasonably have been expected to 
make provision.”62 
This approach provides a certain and clear order of priority for intestate 
succession, which is important to limit the disputes that might arise upon 
intestacy.  However, the privileging of certain relationships over others is 
somewhat arbitrary.  While it is understandable that spouses, partners, and 
children are given statutory preference, it is less clear why certain relatives are 
given preference over others as well as non-relatives.  While this order of 
priority may reflect living arrangements in some families it may not reflect 
those in others.  Arguably, household members who were in a close relationship 
of emotional and financial dependence or interdependence with the deceased 
                                                
59 Ibid, at 121 – 123. 
60 Ibid, at 122.  See Law Commission Intestacy and Family Provision Claims on Death (CP 191, 
2009). 
61 Administration Act 1969, s 77. 
62 Ibid. 
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might take precedence over certain other family members, or would have if the 
deceased had made a will.  This would be particularly so where cohabitation has 
been lengthy and characterised by caring and intimacy.  This Act reflects a very 
traditional understanding of family and personal relationships, although 
recognition is more expansive than in the Family Protection Act 1955. 
Intestacy in the United Kingdom is governed by the Administration of 
Estates Act 1925.  In contrast, where there is no will and two siblings are 
cohabiting (or an adult child is cohabiting with a parent), a sibling or adult child 
can inherit from the deceased’s estate under intestacy rules, if the deceased had 
no spouse or civil partner (or child, in the case of a sibling).  The adult child will 
inherit in equal shares with any other sibling, but their claim is not subject to the 
priority of a non-cohabiting parent. 
In 2009, the British Law Commission considered whether non-conjugal 
relationships such as those between cohabiting siblings or an adult child and 
parent who are living together, should receive statutory priority.
63
  The 
Commission considered that the law already provided adequately for such 
relationships and that, unlike conjugal relationships, living arrangements were 
too diverse to formulate a standard rule. In response to this, Walstead observes 
that:64 
It is unfortunate that the Law Commission did not take the opportunity in its 
consideration of the current problems of intestate succession to look more 
closely at the similarity of the problems faced by consanguineal couples and 
cohabitants. 
C Bereavement and Sick Leave: Holidays Act 2003 
Bereavement leave requires that employers respect the need of 
employees to mourn the passing of someone with whom an employee had a 
close relationship.  The objective of this law is legitimate and relationships are 
clearly relevant to its operation.  There are some concerns with respect to the 
degree of self-selection of relationships allowed for the purposes of this law.  
Bereavement leave is a cost to employers and there is a need to ensure the 
                                                
63 Law Commission Intestacy and Family Provision Claims on Death (CP 191, 2009). 
64 Welstead “The Family the Law Forgot”, above n 14, at 121. 
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statutory regime is not open to abuse.  Legislation can provide some certainty 
that this will not be abused by requiring a close relationship between the 
bereaved and the deceased. 
The Current position in New Zealand is set out in s 69 of the Holidays 
Act 2003.  Any employee is entitled to take bereavement leave if they suffer 
bereavement.  This specifically includes the loss of a spouse or partner, parent, 
child, brother or sister, grandparent, grandchild or spouse’s (or partner’s) 
parent.65  However, bereavement also includes the death of any other person if 
the employer accepts that the employee has suffered bereavement as a result of 
the death.
66
  Examples of relevant factors to take into account are: the closeness 
of the association between the employee and the deceased person; whether the 
employee has to take significant responsibility for all or any of the arrangements 
for the ceremonies relating to the death; and any cultural responsibilities of the 
employee in relation to the death.67   
The New Zealand approach strikes a balance between providing some 
certainty by specifying key relationships as well as allowing sufficient 
flexibility for employees to obtain bereavement leave if someone they are close 
to dies.  However, s 70 provides that if the bereavement relates to one of the 
specified relationships, three days of leave will be permitted.  If not, only one 
day is permitted.  This distinction is arbitrary.  It is possible to envisage a 
situation where a relationship outside of those specified relationships causes an 
equally great bereavement.  The rationale for this distinction is likely to be to 
limit the financial liability of employers by specifying a range of relationships 
where a greater bereavement is considered likely to arise.  However, the 
prioritisation of certain family relationships may not align with how an 
individual views their own personal relationships. 
It could be suggested that this approach is inconsistent with the Human 
Rights Act 1993, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of family status, 
which includes relative.  Relative, as defined, includes a wider variety of 
                                                
65 Holidays Act 2003, s 69(2)(a). 
66 Ibid, s 69(2)(b). 
67 Ibid, s 69(3). 
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relationships than those specified in the Holidays Act.  It is questionable 
whether employees are likely to abuse such a policy.  First, there must be a 
death and second, the employer will be able to assess the impact of the 
bereavement on the employee.  As such, this is an instance where it would be 
appropriate to treat close non-conjugal relationships in the same manner as other 
family relationships.  Therefore, the law should allow for an equivalent period 
of bereavement leave for both the specified and non-specified relationships to 
which the Act applies. 
The Holidays Act 2003 also governs sick leave in New Zealand.68  Sick 
leave recognises the domestic responsibilities of employees and that employees 
perform informal care duties that benefit society.  The objective is to support 
employees to carry out these responsibilities.  Section 65 provides that an 
employee may take sick leave if they are sick or injured, if their spouse or 
partner is sick or injured, or if a person who depends on the employee for care is 
sick or injured.  With respect to the last category of relationship, the Holidays 
Act 1981 previously limited the recognition of dependents to the dependent 
children or dependent parents of a worker.   
The policy objective of this law is legitimate and relationships are 
relevant to the objective.  There is a need to limit the fiscal liability of 
employers so that employees only take sick leave where this is reasonable to 
care for another.  What a relationship of dependency entails is a matter of fact 
and degree and it is unclear if the employee must show that the sick person is 
dependent on them (as opposed to another person).  There may be other people 
that could assist the sick person, but, in the circumstances, the employee may be 
the only person able to provide necessary support at that particular time.  On 
balance this law may sufficiently address the needs of those in non-conjugal 
relationship, provided that dependency is reasonably assessed taking all the 
circumstances into account.   
                                                
68 Ibid, s 65. 
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D Joint Family Homes: Joint Family Homes Act 1964 
A “special type of joint ownership arises when a married couple settles 
the title to their home as a joint family home.”69  This Act provides a married 
couple with limited protection against claims in respect of their family home by 
unsecured creditors.  If one spouse owns the house, the Act also allows that 
spouse to gift a half share to the other without paying gift duty.  Section 2 of the 
Act provides that husband and wife “in relation to any settled property, means 
the husband and wife on whom the property is settled under this Act.”  As such, 
the Act does not apply to civil union partners or to de facto partners.   
In practice, the Act allows a spouse a protected sum of $103,000 from 
the proceeds of the sale of the home to satisfy the other spouse’s unsecured 
creditors (this protection does not apply against secured creditors).70  In fact, 
this may make the Act “less attractive than creating a family trust”, as a trust 
typically provides a greater level of protection against creditors.
71
  A transfer of 
property in similar circumstances can also be achieved under the Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976, and gift duty is also not payable on such a transfer. 
This Act raises questions with respect to whether it has a legitimate 
objective, whether relationships are relevant to the objective and whether people 
should be able to self-select which of their relationships matter (if relationships 
are relevant).  To begin with, in 2001, the Law Commission considered whether 
there was a continuing need for the Act and whether it should be extended to de 
facto and same-sex partners.
72
  In its discussion paper, the Law Commission 
acknowledged that the objective of the Act was to secure the marital home from 
being sold to satisfy debtors, in order to promote marriage at a time when de 
facto relationships were becoming more prevalent.
73
   
Originally, the benefits of the Act included an exemption from stamp 
duty, estate duty and gift duty.  However, stamp and estate duty have been 
abolished and it is likely that gift duty will also be abolished. (and can be 
                                                
69 Nicholas Drake, Janine Lay, Sally Varnham and Cordelia Thomas Conveyancing Law 
Handbook (3rd ed, CCH, Auckland, 2007) at 113. 
70 Ibid, 114. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Law Commission The Future of the Joint Family Homes Act (NZLC PP 44, 2001). 
73 Ibid, at 2. 
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avoided, in any event, through using the provisions of the Property 
(Relationships) Act 2001).  The Law Commission also indicated that 
registration under the Joint Homes Act means that, if one spouse dies, the other 
spouse does not have to go through the probate process as they would under the 
Property (Relationships) Act 200174, as their interest automatically converts to 
sole ownership under the Joint Homes Act. 
The Law Commission raised questions about the legitimacy of the 
objective of the Act, the relevance of relationships to the Act and the 
implications of confining its scope to spouses.  With respect to the latter, marital 
status is a prohibited ground of discrimination under the Human Rights Act 
1993.  The Commission considered that there was no clear policy rationale for 
not extending the Act to de facto partners and that the Act was discriminatory.75  
The Commission considered this a reason to repeal the Act.   
In the Commission’s final report released later that year, the 
Commission also considered that, even if the Act were extended to de facto 
partners, “its provisions would still discriminate against those who choose or are 
compelled by circumstances to live without partners.”76  It also considered any 
benefit under the Act that excluded sole owners discriminatory.  It 
recommended the repeal of the Act and suggested a new “blanket protection (up 
to the amount of the specified sum) of a bankrupt’s principal dwelling house.”77  
The Commission considered that this would allow for the protection of 
“necessary tools of trade” and “household furniture and effects”.  The 
Commission observed that in certain other jurisdictions, single persons were 
able to make such a claim (though their entitlements might be less than those of 
married persons or those living with family members). 
If the Law Commission’s reasoning is adopted, leaving aside the 
question of whether the objective of the law is legitimate, relationships are not 
relevant to achieving the objective of the Act.  While the Commission did not 
consider the extension of the Act to other family members, it did observe that 
                                                
74 Then the Matrimonial Property Act 1976. 
75 Ibid, at 16. 
76 Law Commission The Future of the Joint Family Homes Act (NZLC R 77, 2001), at 7. 
77 Ibid, at 8. 
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the provisions were not just discriminatory against other conjugal relationships, 
but also against people not in conjugal relationships. 
But is it possible that people in a non-conjugal relationship might wish 
to register their house under the Joint Homes Act?  It is not inconceivable that 
sisters in a relationship such as that between the Burden sisters might wish to do 
so.  Certainly, people in non-conjugal relationships sometimes have an equitable 
interest in property to which they do not have title.  In Riddles v Jones, an 
elderly mother purchased a house with her daughter, using the mother’s divorce 
settlement in part, although the daughter was the sole registered owner.78  The 
daughter agreed to provide a house for her mother for life but their relationship 
broke down and the daughter evicted her mother.  The court held that the 
mother had a beneficial interest in occupying the house during her lifetime.   
Similarly, in Morgan v Morgan, the High Court held that a deceased 
mother had an equitable interest in property held by a married couple (who were 
separated at the time of the case, the daughter being the executor of her 
mother’s estate), although this only amounted to a right to occupy the house for 
life, rather than a proprietary share.79  The High Court did not decide the case in 
the first instance, requiring further factual information.  However, it later ruled 
that:80  
I do not consider that the parties must be taken reasonably to have expected that 
Mrs Williams would share in the Kelburn property to the extent of retaining a 
beneficial interest in the property extending beyond the right to live in the flat 
during her life time. 
On balance, it is arguable that a wider range of family relationships or 
close personal relationships could benefit from protection under the Joint 
Family Homes Act, as people in non-conjugal relationships do share and buy 
property together.  As suggested by the Law Commission, however, the most 
appropriate response may be that personal relationships are irrelevant to the 
Joint Homes Act, and that protection against creditors should apply equally to 
all people whether they are in a relationship or not.   
                                                
78 Riddles v Jones (High Court, Nelson, CP 39/88, 20 June 1990). 
79 Morgan v Morgan HC Wellington CIV-2008-485-2494, 4 June 2009. 
80 Morgan v Morgan HC Wellington CIV-2008-485-2494, 13 October 2009 at [28]. 
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E Domestic Violence: Domestic Violence Act 1995 
As outlined in Chapter One, New Zealand recognises a range of close 
personal relationships for the purposes of a protection order under the Domestic 
Violence Act 1995.  However, the New Zealand approach previously 
distinguished between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships and in G v G, 
the Court refused to grant a non-molestation order (the equivalent of a 
protection order under the Domestic Protection Act 1982) to a mother against 
her son, because protection was limited to a “man and woman, living together in 
the same household”.81  The Court ruled that this was intended to refer to a 
spousal relationship, not a parental or sibling relationship. 
An application of the framework supports the approach taken by New 
Zealand.  Domestic Violence legislation is an example of an area of law where 
protection should depend on intimacy, not formal relationship status.  Some of 
the overseas reforms outlined in Chapter Four extended the protection of 
domestic violence laws that previously only recognised spouses.  However, in 
places like Vermont, protection was only extended to those who registered their 
relationship.  Welstead observes that couples are treated differently from other 
domestic relationships for the purposes of British domestic violence 
legislation.82  In particular, those who are not a couple have fewer of the civil 
remedies related to occupation of the family home under the Family Law Act 
1996.  However, Welstead notes that “there is an equal playing field” for orders 
known as non-molestation orders, to protect people from any physical or mental 
violence of a partner (be this a spouse or a non-conjugal partner).83 
In contrast to the British approach, s 52 of the Domestic Violence Act 
allows an occupation order to be sought by anyone in a domestic relationship 
provided that, at the time the order is made, either party to the proceedings owns 
or has a legal interest in the property.  As such, the protected person has a right 
to continue cohabitation regardless of whether they own or have an interest in 
the property or not.  This ensures that they are not penalised by reason of a 
protection order made against a person who owns the house they share.  
                                                
81 G v G HC Wellington M682/85, 2 November 1987. 
82 Mary Welstead “The Family the Law Forgot”, above n 14, at 119.   
83 Ibid, at 120. 
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F Pensions: New Zealand Superannuation and Retirement Income Act 
2001 
New Zealand Superannuation is a pension paid by the state to most New 
Zealand residents from age 65 in accordance with the New Zealand 
Superannuation and Retirement Income Act 2001.  Under s 80BD(4) of the 
Social Security Act 1964, a pension ends either upon death or four weeks after 
death if a spouse, partner or child survive the deceased.  Payment of a benefit to 
a surviving spouse, partner or child is known as a termination grant.  This four-
week period also applies to a veteran’s pension, a widow’s pension, the 
domestic purposes benefit, an invalid’s benefit, an independent youth benefit, an 
unemployment benefit, a sickness benefit, or a related emergency benefit.84  A 
termination benefit is not available if there is an entitlement to a survivor’s grant 
under the Accident Compensation Corporation Act 2001. 
The objective of this legislation is ostensibly to allow a surviving spouse 
or child a period of time to adjust to financial changes following the loss of 
income resulting from the death of the person receiving superannuation.  
Relationships are clearly relevant to this objective.  However, it could be argued 
that a termination payment is unfairly limited to spouses.  For example, an 
elderly person could also be affected by loss of income following the death of a 
close friend with whom they have been living for a long time.  In this respect, 
the Australian federal government amended Australia’s superannuation and tax 
laws in 2004 to recognise people in an “interdependency relationship” as 
dependants who can receive tax-free superannuation death benefits.85     
Under this approach, two people are in an interdependency relationship 
if they have a close personal relationship, reside together, one or each of them 
provides the other with financial support, and one or each of them provides the 
other with domestic support and personal care.  Two people are also in an 
interdependency relationship if they have a close personal relationship but are 
unable to satisfy the other elements of the definition because of a disability.  
                                                
84 Social Security Act 1964, s 80BD. 
85 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993, s 10(1) and 10A.  See also Superannuation 
Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994, 1.04AAAA for a breakdown of matters that can be 
taken into account. 
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There are two arguments, however, in favour of limiting the eligible 
pool of beneficiaries to spouses and children.  The first is that the fiscal 
implications of paying a termination benefit to all cohabitants could be 
significant and might result in welfare reductions in other areas.  If a distinction 
can generally be drawn between the degree to which people in conjugal and 
non-conjugal relationships share their lives, as suggested in Chapter Two, then 
this is a particular benefit that should be more closely linked to the sharing of 
lives than factors such as long-term cohabitation.  It might also be impractical to 
extend legal recognition on the basis of functional criteria, particularly given the 
relatively low value of the payment and the complexity involved in determining 
whether relationships fall within functional criteria. 
Second, many benefits targeted toward spouses and partners recognise 
that, in conjugal relationships where there are children, one partner may give up 
educational and employment opportunities to carry out caregiving duties.  For 
example, while the payment of a pension terminates after four weeks, it is 
possible for a woman whose spouse or partner died to receive a widow’s 
benefit.  This depends on whether she has dependent children, if she has had 
dependent children in the past, the age at which her spouse or partner died and 
how long they were married or in that relationship.  The right to a termination 
benefit could be seen as a counterpart to other obligations taken on by many, 
though not all, conjugal partners such as childbearing and childrearing.  As 
such, there is an argument that the termination benefit for a pension also reflects 
this approach and that its limitation to conjugal partners can be rationalised.  
G Fatal Accidents: Accident Compensation Act 2001 
Survivors’ grants recognise the loss suffered by people in relationships 
with an immediate victim.86  They serve a legitimate purpose and are intricately 
connected with relationships.  Section 69 of the Accident Compensation Act 
2001 allows funeral grants, survivors' grants and weekly compensation to be 
paid to the spouse or partner, or children and other dependants of a deceased 
claimant.  Other dependent means a person who, because of his or her physical 
or mental condition, was financially dependent on the deceased claimant, is 
                                                
86 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality, above n 2, at 37. 
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earning less than the minimum weekly earnings set by the Accident 
Compensation Corporation, is not the deceased’s spouse or partner and is not a 
child of the deceased aged under 18.87 
Again, it could be argued, as in the case of termination payments, that 
this approach is directly linked to the financial difficulties that may result where 
a deceased leaves behind a dependent child or a spouse who gave up 
employment and educational opportunities to care for children.  Of course, if 
this were so, it would be possible to link eligibility directly to these factors.  
However, it is not so linked, and spouses and partners do not need to meet any 
criteria to be eligible for compensation.  While it would not be appropriate for 
the state to pay a benefit to a range of people with whom the deceased was in a 
close relationship, the situation where an unmarried deceased is in a long-term 
non-conjugal relationship might be different.    
While the Act allows for the recognition of non-conjugal relationships, 
this is only on the basis that the surviving person was financially dependent on 
the deceased and unable to provide for him or herself (for example, due to 
mental illness).  A similar approach is taken under the Fatal Compensation Act 
1976 (UK), which only recognises marital relationships, civil partnerships and 
de facto relationships.  This clearly results in differential treatment between 
spouses and those in non-conjugal relationships.  The approach may differ in 
countries where the state does not pay survivor benefits as the right to sue for 
personal injury still exists.  In such cases, it might be possible for a person in a 
non-conjugal relationship to initiate proceedings, even though these might be 
unsuccessful. 
H Summing Up: The Significance of Fiscal Implications 
These are not the only legal areas in which it can be debated that a 
broader range of relationships should be recognised by the law.  Other areas 
such as tax and immigration are also important areas where the state provides 
benefits to people in conjugal relationships that other people in close non-
conjugal relationships cannot access.  It may be observed, however, that in areas 
                                                
87 Accident Compensation Corporation 2001, s 6. 
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where relationship recognition has fiscal implications for the state, the 
recognition of personal relationships tends to be limited to conjugal 
relationships, although non-conjugal relationships in which there is a high 
degree of dependency or caregiving may also, though not always, be 
recognised. 
However, in areas where relationship recognition has fiscal implications 
for third parties (such as employers or other family members), rather than the 
state, the law appears to more readily recognise a narrow range of non-conjugal 
relationships, though this is principally limited to close family relationships, 
rather than family-like relationships.   In contrast, in legal areas that do not have 
fiscal implications, the law increasingly recognises a wider range of 
relationships, though there is, by no means, consistency in the approach taken 
by different legislative provisions to identifying relevant relationships.  
Ultimately, this thesis recommends a more comprehensive and principled 
approach to the legal recognition and support of the full range of close personal 
relationships that may be experienced among adults. 
VI Conclusion 
This thesis suggests that the legal recognition of non-conjugal 
relationships in New Zealand could be improved.  The basic question that this 
thesis considered was whether the marriage model should be extended to 
include certain non-conjugal relationships in New Zealand, as it has been in 
countries such as Australia, Canada and the United States of America.  This 
thesis asks this question at a time where the distinction between conjugal and 
non-conjugal relationships has been destabilised, due to the de-emphasis of 
sexual intimacy as a criterion for recognising marriage-like relationships.     
Although there is little demographic information available about non-
conjugal relationships, it is clear that they can exhibit many of the features 
associated with conjugal relationships, as demonstrated by the high profile 
Burden sisters' case in the United Kingdom.  These include characteristics such 
as long-term cohabitation, caring, commitment and interdependency.  However, 
non-conjugal relationships typically exhibit these features to a lesser degree, 
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which means that they may have different needs and require different support 
from the state.   
Ultimately, this thesis does not recommend extending the marriage 
model to non-conjugal relationships in New Zealand, either by registration or 
ascription, for a number of reasons.  The primary concern is that the marriage 
model does not appear to respond adequately to the needs or living 
arrangements of people in non-conjugal relationships.  However, non-conjugal 
relationships in New Zealand can benefit from legal recognition in some cases.  
Aside from human rights considerations, the state has an interest in promoting 
these relationships due to their contribution to social cohesion and informal 
caregiving.  Yet there is no overarching framework to assist the state to 
determine which personal relationships are relevant to the law, and a haphazard 
approach has been taken to date.   
As such, this thesis recommends a new framework for recognising 
personal relationships that also allows for non-conjugal relationships in New 
Zealand to be supported and promoted by the law, where appropriate.  This 
framework was applied to a number of areas of New Zealand law in order to 
provide a basis for future debate.   
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